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© Alexander Tomov, Sofia, 1996
© David Mossop (English Translation), Sofia, 1996
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Sofia 1996
Dedicated to the memory of my dear mother, Radka Tomova,
whose dream was to be able to read this book.
Contents
Foreword 7
Section One The Crisis
Chapter One
The Birth Of The Global World And The Crisis Of Modernity
1. Integration And The Transition Of Civilisation 11
2. The Birth Of The Global World 20
3. The 20[th] Century - The Search Of A Model For The Global
World 24
4. The Common Crisis And The Collapse Of The Third Civilisation 28
Chapter Two
Collapse No.I: The Explosion in Eastern Europe
1. Decline And Death Throes 33
2. Reform And Illusions 39
3. Two Options And The "Mistake" Of Gorbachev 43
4. The Collapse Of Perestroika 46
5. The Explosion In Eastern Europe 51
6. Return To A Difficult Future 54
Chapter Three
Collapse No.II: Global Disorder
1. The Danger Of Chaos 56
2. Geopolitical Collapse 61
3. Economic Turbulence 63
4. The New Masters Of The World 65
5. The March Of The Poor 67
6. A Number Of Pessimistic Scenarios 71
Section Two The Fourth Civilisation
Chapter Four
Theory In The Time Of Crisis
1. Forewarning Of The End Of The Two Theoretical Concepts 74
2. A Return To The Roots Or The Main Thesis 82
3. Main Conclusions And A Message To Alvin Toffler 85
4. A Similar Message To S.Huntington 89
5. The Need For A New Theoretical Synthesis 92
Chapter Five
The Fourth Civilisation
1. Why A New Civilisation? 96
2. Some Thoughts On The Transitions Of Civilisations 99
3. The Distinguishing Features Of The Fourth Civilisation 103
4. Inevitability And When It Will Happen 106
Chapter Six
The Dimensions of a New Synthesis
1. Socialisation And The Deregulation Of Ownership 108
2. Post-Capitalism 116
3. Post-Communism 120
4. The Approach And The End Of The "Third World" 126
5. Balanced Development 129
Chapter Seven
Obstructions
1. The Defenders Of The Third Civilisation 134
2. The Great Threat - Media Imperialism 136
3. Post-Modern Nationalism 139
4. The Egoism Of Politicians 141
5. Militant Religions 143
6. A Cup Of Coffee In Apenzel 144
Section Three Alternatives To The Fourth Civilisation
Chapter Eight
The New Economic Order
1. The Economic Heart Of The Global World 146
2. New Growth And New Structures 150
3. Who Shall Dominate The World Economy? 154
4. Is There A Need For Global Economic Regulation? 159
5. Vivat Europa And The Death Of The Introverts 163
6. The Levelling Out Of Economies 166
Chapter Nine
The Culture Of The Fourth Civilisation
1. The Beatles, Michael Jackson And The Bulgarian Caval. 170
2. The Travelling Peoples 174
3. Man Without Ethnic Origin Or The Rebellion Of Ethnicity 179
4. Global Awareness 183
5. Multiculture And The Global Culture 186
Chapter Ten
The New Political Order
1. The Twilight Of The Superpowers 190
2. From Imperialism To Polycentralism 193
3, The Fate Of The Nation State 195
4. After The Crisis Of Political Identity 198
5. The Global Coordinators 200
CONCLUSION
THE NATIONS WHICH WILL SUCCEED 202
APPENDICES
Bibliography
INTRODUCTION
At the end of 1989 over a period of just a few months one of the two
world systems collapsed. Together with the two world wars this was clearly
the third turning point in the history of the twentieth century. For quite
some time now researchers and politicians in a number of countries have been
attempting to find an explanation for the collapse of the Eastern European
totalitarian regimes and the consequences for the world. Thousands of
publications and political statements have come to the concluded that
"capitalism swallowed up communism" and that "liberalism has conquered the
world". Fukoyama even went as far as to declare the end of history and the
establishment of a liberal world model. Others see it only as the end of the
Bolshevik experiment and the social engineering of a series of political
philosophers from Rousseau to Marx. After the victories of the former
communist parties in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria in parliamentary elections
in 1993 and 1994, liberal passions grew cold and talk of the new ascension
of left wing thought has appeared on the political agenda.
What really did happen after 1989? Where is the world heading? To the
left or to the right? Towards unified action or to division into new blocs?
Towards long-lasting peace or newrisks?
Almost everyone - theoreticians, researchers and politicians in both
the East and the West were caught unprepared by circumstances. The map of
Eastern Europe has changed tragically beyond all recognition. Dozens of
bloody conflicts have erupted. Europe is being thwarted at every moment in
its attempt to unite peacefully. The United States now without an enemy in
the world has felt an increasing need to change its global policies. Germany
and Japan have also increased their economic power and their political
confidence.
In short, the collapse of the Eastern European communist regimes has
profoundly affected the present and the future of all nations and has
changed the entire world, not just small elements of it. These profound
changes have touched contemporary human history in so far as they were a
consequence of inexorable global trends. For this reason we have to go back
in history to look for more general processes in order to reinterpret the
dynamics of modern life. It is time to look beyond than the ideological
euphoria of the changes caused and to attempt to define exactly what
happened and what we can expect in the future.
This is not my first book, but it is the first which I have written in
complete freedom, without censorship or self-censorship, without the
patronage and supervision of academic councils and "political friends". In
this book I have searched for the truth from the point of view not only of
the cultural environment which surrounds me but also of the world which
revealed itself to me in its inimitable diversity after 1989. The changes
which have taken place in Bulgaria can not be seen purely in terms of black
and white. We attempted hastily to overcome the absurdities and limitations
of our past and now, five years on we are still at the very beginning. The
task has proven much more difficult than anyone could have imagined. At the
same time much of the dignity which the Bulgarian people managed to preserve
until 1989 has been sadly lost.
Today in Bulgaria and the other countries of Eastern Europe not only is
the value system in a state of chaos but there is also chaos surrounding the
interpretations of what has happened and what must happen in the future.
Many people are disappointed by the changes and they have rejected by
looking back to the system of social guarantees, voting for the past. I can
not say that all the votes cast for the former Eastern European communist
parties are votes for the past, but most of them are. Hundreds of thousands
of people in Bulgaria, Poland and Hungary have said to themselves "Under the
former regime, I managed to build a house and bought a car (albeit poor
quality). Now, I haven't the slightest chance of doing so." The comparison
of the benefits to the majority of the population in the 1970's and 1980's
and those of the first five years of emergent democracy, does not favour
modern times. In terms of concrete facts and figures, this is indeed the
case. However, this is far from the truth if one looks at the situation in
the future and tomorrow in terms of the potential possibilities which
freedom offers.
I remember life in 1989 well, because up until then I had lived for 35
years in a totalitarian society. At first glance everything seemed all
right. There was full social security during childhood and guaranteed
education. Everyone had a job and a salary. The population was able to live
in a society without crime. However despite this, in that world called
socialism, we still asked ourselves many questions: Why do we produce less
and poorer quality goods than the West? Why are our shops empty more often
than not? Why are there chronic shortages of goods? Why do we have money and
nothing to buy for it? Why are we forbidden to do things which seemed so
natural?
I have often observed my daughters' parrots at home. Just as in a
totalitarian society, they have everything they could ask for: guaranteed
food, security and hygiene. They are "happy", because they have everything
which they could ever imagine. But they do not have freedom and for this
reason when they are let out of their cage they cannot fly. Without freedom
progress is impossible. In his cage, man cannot reveal his enormous creative
potential to take the best from the past generations and to give the best of
himself to the future. In the old totalitarian system we achieved much, but
we lost much more. Sooner or later that world had to change, not only
because it was suffering from crisis of its own identity but because the
world itself had changed...
My first encounter with politics was at the age of 11. I was on holiday
with my father in the Rila mountains. In a remote mountain lodge, 2000
metres above sea level, a portrait of Khrushchev was being taken down. They
were a few months late doing this and were obviously in a hurry to get rid
of it. I asked my father who that man was and why until yesterday his
portrait had hung proudly in that spot and today - it was gone. I later
learnt that he had been a "revisionist". For a long time this was how I
learnt all truths - ready-made and without any commentary. I was taught to
believe that I was living in a perfect society and, what was more important
was that any problems existing today would certainly be rectified for the
future. The formula, "any imperfections are due to the fact that we are as
yet in the first stages of communism" must be the most exquisite piece of
demagogy and propaganda which I have ever encountered. We believed in the
glorious future of communism, just like others believed in life after death.
We were unable to compare our daily lives with anyone and with anything
because we all watched the same television, listened to the same radio and
read the same newspapers in which the truth was written by other people.
In the 1960's and 1970's there were many people who did not believe and
who heretically opposed the aggression of the regime. However, the majority
of the population knew nothing of this. In Bulgaria there had been none of
the civil unrest of the Polish workers, the Hungarian uprising and the
Prague spring. It was only late in the 1970's that we began to realise that
perhaps things were not as they should be and it was possible to live in a
different way, that Eastern Europe was not the proponent of supreme human
progress. One reason for this was the opening up of Bulgaria to the Western
World, the appearance of new audio-visual media and the expansion of
scientific and technological exchanges. We were then able to see another
model and were able to make comparisons. Another reason was the admission by
the existing regime of the need to improve economic mechanisms and their
recognition of the importance of primary stimuli.
However, even then in the 1970's and 1980's, even during the years of
perestroika under Gorbachev, when the entire truth about Stalin became
public knowledge, our notions of the future were limited to the idea of
convergence. What happened in 1989 and especially what happened subsequently
was totally unexpected by everyone, both in the East and the West. I am not
afraid to admit this because I know very well that even the best political
scientists in the world and the academic centres specialising in Eastern
European studies had no idea of the impact and the diversity of the changes
which were taking place at the end of the 1980's. Even Gorbachev himself did
not expect it. The chain reactions of turbulent demonstrations which took
place in the whole of Eastern Europe after perestroika and the mass
dellusions that everythong would be just like Switzerland, as well as the
obvious geo-political changes - these are all factors which lead me to write
this book.
The basic question, which I have endeavoured to answer is this: What
did really happen at the end of the 1980's and why did the changes which
took place in Eastern Europe have global ramifications? Some of my
conclusions I date back to as early as 1982. In particular this is my view
of the relationship between communalisation (socialisation) and autonomy and
of the insubstantiality of statism at the end of the 20[th]
century. Other conclusions were formed in the late 1980's after
participating in a series of discussions at the congresses of the World
Federation for Future Studies which helped me to understand the situations
in other countries and to make comparisons with the situation in Eastern
Europe and other parts of the world. The third group of conclusions are
based on my own political experience as Deputy Prime Minister in the most
decisive period of reform processin Bulgaria and as a member of the
Bulgarian parliament from 1990-1994. My meetings with dozens of the world's
leading politicians during this period were of enormous influence in the
formation of the conclusions in this book. I cannot express adequate
gratitude to my colleagues from the World Organisation for Future Studies
and to my colleagues from the 21[st] Century Foundation in Sofia
- a young and promising group of people who helped me greatly with ideas and
critical commentary as well as the practical work in preparing the book for
publication.
At the risk of being paradoxical, there is little in this book which
relates directly to Bulgaria, despite the fact that my main motivation in
writing it were the problems facing my own country. While working on the
book I realised that it is impossible to understand what is going on in
Bulgaria if we do not make an attempt to understand what is happening in the
world, and what we want to do, to a great extent depends on global
processes. Today, no-one can develop in isolation. Such a future would be
absurd, if we do not want to go back into our cage. The entire world is
bound with common cords which no-one who want to move with progress can
ignore. For this reasonI have left my analysis of Bulgaria to a separate
book which will be published later.
The fourth civilisation is a book about the global transition which is
taking place in the world, its basis in history, the consequences of the
collapse of the regimes in Eastern Europe, the danger of global disorder and
chaos in which we are living today and the future and ways in which we might
overcome them There are three possible directions for the world to develop.
For the greatest part of the twentieth century the world has followed the
path of division on the basis of culture, religion and political blocs,
aggression and dramatic conflict. This was the world of the cold war, of
confrontations between socialism and capitalism. This was the path of social
Utopia, imaginary models and politicalf ormulae. The second path is the path
of liberal development, victorious capitalism and the vested interests of
the richest social strata. This is the path of domination of people by other
people, of countries over other countries and nations over nations. I would
call this path, the "path of the jungle", where the strong eat the weak.
What these two models of development have in common is that they both belong
to the past, they both complement each other and cannot exist without the
other.
There is a third path which will be discussed in this book. It is not
on the immediate horizon, it may be a difficult path, even Utopian. However,
it is, in my opinion, inevitable. My conviction is based on the fact that
the modern technological revolution is leading to the creation of a
different world civilisation. It could be said quite confidently that the
end of the twentieth century will mark the end of an era in the development
of civilisation. The twentieth century was an era of nation states,
aggression and conflict between nations for more living space. It was an era
in which the historically dominant countries imposed their cultures with
force. The apogee of this anti-humanitarian absurdity came in the form of
theories about the superiority of one race over another and of the need for
the "lower" races to be destroyed.
Today, this is all over, but we are far from a state of affairs where
there is no longer any danger from new aggression. Although we could in fact
be moving forwards a new, free civilisation there is still the possibility
that may just be reproducing recidivists for the next century. We are living
in a dangerous world, requiring absolute coordination, where there is no
clear order or established principles. The question is the choice which we
shall make. The aim of the "Fourth Civilisation" is to be part of the
discussion surrounding this choice.
We could possibly change the fate of world development in an improbable
way. For the first time since man has come into existence, we are able to
view our own existence not through the prism of individual tribes, classes
or nations, but from the point of view of global perspectives. This is a
unique chance, but it is also the responsibility of the era in which we
live.
Section one
The Crisis
Chapter One
THE BIRTH OF THE GLOBAL WORLD AND THE CRISIS OF MODERNITY
1. INTEGRATION AND THE TRANSITIONS OF CIVILISATION
During its centuries-old existence, mankind has passed through many
stages. The uncivilised period lasted more than 100,000 years. The civilised
period has lasted for between 5-7 thousand years. his is a period which has
seen the realisation of the essence of humankind and consists of three major
stages. They are three epochs which are synonyms for the progressof
humanity. Three civilisations with distinct levels of progress. At the end
of the 20[th] century we are living through the final days of the
Third civilisation.
F
rom the first appearance of human society to the present day there has
been a constant growth in the mutual dependence of people, nations, their
customs and culture. The first manifestations of the human race, of tribes
and inter-tribal links, the first city-states show that throughout history,
from epoch to epoch mankind has become more and more integrated and the
people of the earth have become more and more dependent on each other. I am
not in a position to argue with anthropologists about the exact date when
human life began and since there are so many different criteria relating to
the transition between animals, humanoids and Homo Sapiens I consider this
discussion to be of little benefit. Evidently during the palaeolithic period
(about 100,000 years ago) man established his domination over the over forms
of life and began methodically to conquer nature. At some time between 70
and 40 thousand years B.C. man began to tend animals, to create stone
cutting implements and to form social relations which were untypical of
other types of animals.
In the late palaeolithic period human populations began to resettle
from Africa through Asia to the northern parts of America. I am not
convinced, however, that civilisation began from only one root disseminated
by ambulant migrants or primitive forms of transport. I am more inclined to
believe that in the earliest societies the spreading of the seeds of
civilisation was of secondary significance to the growth of local
civilisations in various regions of the world.
The first manifestations of civilisation or limited social relations
are not only to be found in Egypt or in Greece, nor are they the fruit of
only one root. Between 3000-2000 B.C. not only did the cultures of Egypt and
Mesopotamia begin to develop but also the culture of ancient India. During
the same period the cultures of the nations of the Andes, South America were
also in their ascent. Ancient Greece with its highly developed
manufacturing, culture and philosophy also flourished at the same time as
India. These phenomena can only be explained with the overall changes in the
natural environment and very possibly with the increased radioactivity of
the sun. Such a conclusion is very significant since it shows that human
civilisation appeared in different parts of the world establishing pluralism
and diversity as a natural law. In other words, the human race developed
from different natural and cultural roots at the same time and is moving
towards integration without destroying its diversity.
There is something else which has lead to the constant expansion of
communities and for people to seek answers to the problems caused by
integration. This something is the connection between the processes of
domination of man over nature and the process of integration itself. With
the expansion and development of transport, culture, manufacturing and
trade, our forebears began to realise that the fate of mankind is
indivisible from the processes of its expansion and integration. Over the
centuries, mankind dominated more and more new territories, populated more
and more regions of the world and subsequently linked these expanded
territories into unified systems.
There is a certain logic in the development of human life from its
earliest manifestations to the present day - that progress is indivisible
from the increase in human communities, from the growth in the compactness
of populations and the mutual dependence of people. Every historical epoch
confirms this conclusion - from the first signs of early civilisation in
modern Africa and the development of tribal communities, to the appearance
of cooperative grain farming in Eastern Asia and the appearance of the first
developed dynasties in Egypt and the Near East and the expansion of art in
the ancient world. The development of human integration has passed through
many different forms: tribal/warrior alliances and slave owning states,
imperial states combining religions and cultures. The overall trend has been
constant, each subsequent form of human civilisation is either greater than
the previous or more integrated and dependent on the environment in which it
exists.
There are two phenomena which clearly show this process:
The first is the population of the world. From its first appearance to
the present day mankind has been growing constantly: about 6,000,000 in 8000
B.C.; about 255 million in 1 A.D.; 460 million in 1500; 1.6 billion in 1900;
2.0 billion in 1930; 3.0 billion in 1960; 4.0 billion in 1975; 5.0 billion
in 1987 and over 6 billion in 1994.[(]
The second important phenomenon is communications. With the appearance
of human civilisation sounds and gestures then language and fire were the
main forms of communication. As society developed man began to develop more
intensive forms of communication. All the activities of man are directly or
indirectly linked with the development of new communications - roads, sea
and airways, all manner of forms of transport, postal links, telephones and
telegraphs, computers and optical fibres, satellite television.
Communications (transport, information exchange and processing) are the most
accurate bench mark for the development and progress of civilisation. There
is an obvious logic involved in this. Over the centuries people have been
building bridges between each other and have been using them to exchange the
fruits of their labour and to influence the world in which they live.
I consider that from the outset I shall have to draw a very obvious and
necessary conclusion: the further human society progresses, the more compact
and integrated human society becomes and the more nations and individuals
become dependent on each other. This is an incontrovertible law which we can
do little to stop. It is also clear that this is an element of the overall
development of the Earth and an accompaniment to the entire history of the
human race and the overall development of our planet.
This, perhaps, gives rise to the question whether economic development
and the general development of human civilisation has definable limits or
whether there are limits to the growth in world population. Will human
progress lead to the disappearance of the primary differences between races
and nations? Will mutually dependent human existence lead to new phenomena?
Will states disappear to be replaced by international communities? These are
questions which will have to be answered.
I believe that notwithstanding the cyclical nature of its development,
the human race will irreversibly and logically move towards a mutually
dependent and integrated existence and from there to constant structural
reformation. The main reason for this is that human progress is becoming
more and more profoundly dependent on nature and the unity of nature is in
its turn influencing the unity of life on earth. The unity of nature has
become transformed into a unity of independent social communities. Producing
and consuming, harvesting the oceans, the seas and the care of the earth and
space, people are beginning to find themselves living in a more integrated
community and are becoming dependent on each other. Individual processes of
production lead to general pollution. The exploitation of natural resources
has caused overall changes to the environment. The development of
communications has created a common environment for the transfer of
information.
It can be stated with confidence that the process of overall world
integration is universal. It includes manufacturing, culture and religion
and the processes of human thought. This process is directly connected with
the universal philosophical problem of the integrity and dialectical nature
of nature. There is no doubt that by revealing its diversity nature is
becoming more unified. However, any claimsof its absolute unity are as
absurd as claims of its extreme fragmentation.
When historical processes are in their initial stages and civilisations
are still poorly developed, they tend to reflect closely the conditions and
the specific nature of the local natural conditions with their climatic,
geographical and other particular features. People are born different, live
different lives and believe in different gods. In Africa people are born
black, in Europe - white, in America "red" and in the East "yellow". Today
these differences for the most part are disappearing. Races, cultures,
religions and values systems are merging. This is not because nature is
being outdone, but that its localisation is being outlived.
The closer people become to nature the more their lives, consciousness
and behaviour become dependent on the common essence of nature. Individual
and specific elements disappear to become merged in the common elements of
life. In my opinion this is the meaning and the dialectic of progress. In
order to defeat the lions and the wolves, man had to unite and to join
forces and ways of thinking, to build on what he has so far achieved in
order to make further progress. In this way, year after year, century after
century man conquered increasing areas of nature, reached its profound
depths, exploited its common natural resources - the earth, the forests, the
air and the water. These resources have been exploited for the same reasons
- that in order to make greater use of nature, it is necessary to use the
combined efforts of individual human resources. The opposite is also true,
the more we use nature, the more we become dependent (or place other people
in a position of dependence) on it.
This is the link between integration and progress, between integration
and civilisation. The entire existence of the human race shows that
integration is a constant process. Moreover, civilisations as forms of
organised social life are an expression and product of integration. When we
speak of civilisations, it should be noted that they do not coincide with
the five social and economic formations defined by Karl Marx or with the
three technological waves of A.Toffler. Marx divided world development into
five large "social structures" according to the forms of ownership. This was
an undoubted intellectual contribution but an artificial and unilateral
approach. The exclusive use of the criteria "forms of ownership" (Marx) or
"technology" (Toffler) or the criteria of "spiritual development" (Toynbee)
is misleading. The specific nature of the civilisation approach is in its
complexity, in the indivisible connection between economics, culture and
politics. This approach cannot absolutise either technology or property or
any other sphere of human activity. This excludes the possible creation of
artificial formations and social constructions in the aims of "progress"
being isolated within only one part of human existence. Civilisations cannot
be seen merely as branches which reflect one side or another of human life
but as a common cultural process. They are distinct in terms of the way of
life of the ancient peoples who lived in that part of the world and secondly
in terms of the differences in the historical epochs in the development of
humanity. Further on I shall return to the second of these aspects of the
definition of civilisation. This shall release me from the strictures of the
formational approach and the ideologisation of history. Such a method can be
used to show the graduality of transitions and to explain the general and
individual elements in the development of different parts of the world. To
this end I shall define civilisation as: 1. the common and connected levels
of human development; 2. the character of this development during the
various epochs of human existence. Civilisations are not divided one from
another on the basis of revolutionary acts, a change of monarch or president
or armed conflicts. "Civilisation", according the great historian A.Toynbee,
"is movement rather than condition; sailing and not the
harbour."[2]. For this reason, I consider civilisation to be the
common essence of human development and its different forms are the stages
of its development.
How many civilisations are there at the moment? Is it, indeed, correct
to speak of a multitude of different civilisations?
Civilisation[3] and civilised behaviour are a synonyms for the
human essence, something which makes man different from the animal world and
the fundamental role of man as a transformer, harmoniser and creator of
nature. This role is fundamental to the essence of humanity and also a
measure of its development. Civilisation springs from more than one source -
in the ancient world there were about 26 initial
civilisations[4], or seen in another way, 26 sources of the same
civilisation. It is possible that there were direct links between them as
well as exchanges of cultural achievements and information. Even if this was
the case this was not the most typical feature of their development.
The ancient peoples developed in different ways since they were
reflections of their different natural environments. They formed the basis
for the appearance of a particular natural species and created the
preconditions for a unified civilisation while programming its diversity.
The more ancient the civilisation, the greater the differences between them.
Despite this, the way in which they appeared, their primitive economic
relations and their state and political structures speak of common elements.
This is why I use the term ancient civilisations or ancient
civilisation. The Egyptians, the Assyrians Shumerians, Greeks, Indians,
Chinese, Romans, American Indians etc. differ greatly in terms of their
daily life, culture, the colour of their skin but have much in common in
terms of the level of their development, their means of manufacturing and
their state-political structures. The zenith of the ancient civilisations
was attained no doubt by the ancient Greek city states and Rome. However,
India at the time of the Mura dynasty (322-80 BC) was also very advanced.
Together with the achievements of the ancient Chinese, Koreans, Mongolians,
Vietnamese and American Indians, they made up the culture of the first
civilisation of the first great epoch of human development.
To use Marxist criteria, the First civilisation can be divided into two
strata: primitive communities and slave owning. I am not convinced that this
is useful. First of all for reasons of the semi-human (uncivilised)
existence of the primitive community and secondly for reasons of the
non-social links within one "social" structure. The first civilisation was
replete with a diversity of forms of ownership, cultures and mechanisms of
government. These were its specific elements and what made it distinct from
subsequent civilisations. In Europe the first civilisation was primarily
slave owning, but this was not the case in Asia. Frequently, slave ownership
was accompanied by other forms of administrative and economic compulsion.
Europe during the first civilisation was mainly patriarchal, while ancient
China was until the second millennium B.C. matriarchal. Only the
civilisation approach can serve to explain these differences and at the same
time determine find the common elements in the lives of our forebears.
What the First Civilisation has in common and makes it distinct is the
undoubted dependence of the people on primitive production tools, the use of
force and the enslavement of some nations by others and the formation of
imperial state structures and the maintenance of permanent aggressive
armies. The peoples of the First Civilisation left us the first examples of
large-scale art which exist today amongsts the ruins of the Cheops pyramid
and Mayan towns, in ancient Chinese and ancient Indian architecture. These
decorations of human civilisation are at first glance different from one
another but they also have a lot in common. The materials, their dependence
on the gods and the supernatural, the philosophy of human life with
new-found self confidence can be seen everywhere and show once again the
common elements of the First civilisation.
The First Civilisation can be considered to have begun at some time
between 4500 - 3500 B.C. and to have come to an end during the
3[rd] century A.D. It would not be wise to place strict and
absolute dividing lines between the civilisations or the era of human
development since they tend gradually to merge one into another. Certain
peoples at certain times have tended to lag behind during the time of
transition but then somehow seem to manage to catch up. During the
5[th] or 6[th] century A.D. the Second Civilisation
began as a result of the structural, social and industrial changes taking
place first in Asia and then in Europe. The Second Civilisation is
frequently linked with the Middle Ages. If the First Civilisation lasted for
between 4000 or 5000 years the Second lasted only 1000 years from the
5[th] to the 14[th]/15[th] centuries. Each
subsequent civilisation as an era in the development of humanity is shorter
than the one which precedes it. This is a consequence of the accelerated
rate of progress arising from the accumulated material benefits of previous
generations. A very typical feature of the Second Civilisation was the
feudal nature of its manufacturing industries. However, as a defining
feature this is neither adequate nor sufficiently universal. Another key
feature of the Second Civilisation was the huge mass resettlement of peoples
and the inter-mingling of diverse cultures. During the First Civilisation
the processes of integration were manifested in terms of the concentration
of people and power in the city states and empires. These were destroyed by
the Second Civilisation which persued a process of integration of cultures
through the violent intermixing of ethnic groups, traditions and religions.
Between 400 and 900 A.D. new peoples begin to enter the annals of world
history. Integration at this time was a byword for aggression. At one and
the same time, as if on command, the Ostgoths and Westgoths, Huns and Avars,
Tartars and Mongols, Proto-Bulgarians and Slavs, Turks and Arabs began to
search for new lands and dominions. Although the intermingling of cultures
via war and aggression leading to the resettlement of peoples it was a
significant quality of the Second Civilisation, I cannot agree that the
Middle Ages were exclusively a period of destruction, plague and
Inquisition. It was also a time of the powerful integration of cultures and
production, new achievements in learning and art. There are many examples of
this, beginning, perhaps, with the magnificent architectural achievements of
the Byzantines, e.g. the wondrous cathedral of St.Sofia (532-537) in
Istanbul. Other examples can be taken from West European art, which has left
us magnificent works from its three most creative periods - pre-Roman, Roman
and Gothic: the court cathedral of Charlemagne in Aachen (795-805), the
castle of the Gailleurs on the River Seine (12[th] century) and
innumerable Gothic cathedrals, including Notre Dame in Paris built between
the 12[th] and 13[th] centuries. The Second
Civilisation created abundant cultural riches in the Near East and the
Middle East, North Africa and Mauritanian Spain, India, China and Japan.
The Second Civilisation was a time of the further rapprochement of the
nations which had been divided during the First Civilisation. In the
5[th] century, Samarkand was the heartland of a powerful culture
and a bridge between the Chinese, Turks and Arabs. The masterpieces of
Chinese culture and paper manufacturing technology reached Europe through
Iran, Byzantium and Arab dominions. If during the period of the First
Civilisation, the Romans, Macedonians and Indian copied technology, arms
manufacturing and methods of animal husbandry from each other, then in the
Second Civilisation a standard method of measuring time was established. An
important event took place in 807 when Charles the Great received a water
clock from the Harun al Rashid from Baghdad leading to the subsequent
arrival of Chinese and Arab clocks in Europe. People from all over the world
learnt to tell the time simultaneously. This lead to the further
standardisation of the criteria of life and history. During this period the
Chinese Empire further developed the achievements of the Greeks and the
Romans while the Arabs and the Europeans built on those of the Chinese and
the Japanese.
During the Second Civilisation forms of ownership and social relations
began to show greater universality. Feudalism began to establish itself over
the entire world in very specific forms, especially in China and Japan. To a
lesser extent, the Second Civilisation retained definite disparities in the
level of the development of its nations. A significant part of the world
continued to develop within the parameters of the First Civilisation and
even persisted to exist in pre-civilised forms for a number of centuries.
The Second Civilisation was a time of numerous conflicts and inevitable
crises for reasons of large-scale structural change - the destruction of the
traditional city-states and cultures of the First Civilisation and the
innumerable religious conflicts. This was also a time of large-scale state
and cultural development and the establishment of the pre-conditions for the
expansion of nations and nation-states. King Clovis (401-511) at the
beginning of the 6[th] century united the Franks, Justinian
(572-565) raised the level of state administration, taxation and the
application of law. Enormous progress was made in the fields of science,
medicine and mathematics in Baghdad, Cordoba and Cairo. In the Arab world,
Africa (Ethiopia and Ghana), Japan, China and America, great empires arose.
The new level of integration, typical of the Second Civilisation gradually
lead to the creation of national states. To be more precise these were not
single-nation states but the domination of a single nation or its symbols.
During the latter Middle Ages there was a gradual slowing down in the
processes of migration of nations and tribes which lead to the stabilisation
of populations and states. The intermingling of cultures typical of the
entire period of the Second Civilisation was gradually replaced by a period
of developing national cultures, national symbols and traditions and
struggles for the legacy of the cultural riches of the past. The formation
of national states and the gradual advent of the "modern age was the
beginning of the end of the Second Civilisation. It was no accident that the
Renaissance which was the symbol of this period of transition also
incorporated within itself a return to Greek and Roman art and the cult of
beauty and earthly passions. Civilisations follow the spiral of development
- each new civilisation destroys the previous while at the same time bearing
significant resemblances to it. The Third Civilisation can also be referred
to as a "Modern Age" - the age of nations states, factories and industrial
complexes. It began at sometime during the 13[th] and
14[th] centuries and will come to an end at sometime during the
20[th] century. The entire period of the Third Civilisation was a
period of the integration of manufacturing and spiritual life. In a similar
way to the First Civilisation, the forces of integration came mainly from
the most-developed states resulting from the accumulation of manufacturing
and cultural achievements, rather than as a result of the resettlement and
intermingling of nations at different stages of development as it was during
the Second Civilisation. The transport revolution which began in Europe was
of enormous significance during this period. An example of this were the
sailing ships with which Magellan circumnavigated the world and which took
Christopher Columbus to America and James Cook to Australia. The explorers
were followed by the conquerors hungry for plunder and easy riches.
Europeans and Arabs followed the Silk Road through Constantinople, Persia
and Tibet to China. The world was once more regaining its strength,
exploring the limits of the earth. European states begin to develop and
consolidate their power and expand their domination over the rest of the
world.
During the 16[th] and 17[th] centuries Europe,
the most powerful of world cultures, began to exert its power over the other
relatively less-developed nations. Over a period of three centuries as a
result of great geographical discoveries and their subsequent colonisation
European culture managed to exert its influence over half of the world. t is
far from the truth, however, that the only "heroic" discoverers were
Europeans, such as Columbus, Magellan, Vasco da Gama. By allowing ourselves
such a subjective attitude, we, Europeans often find ourselves guilty of
provincial ignorance. During the same historical period while the European
sailors, traders and soldiers were beginning to make their geographical
discoveries, a similar process was taking place in the East. Between 1405
and 1433, admiral Cheng Ho with hundreds of Chinese ships reached Zanzibar
and Ceylon. In the 15[th] century the population of China was
twice the size of that of Europe: 100-120 million in comparison with 50-55
million. Chinese civilisation was also comparable with European civilisation
in terms of its lustre, organisation and depth of philosophy. During this
period the great discoveries of Siberia and Africa were made. At the end of
the 15[th] century the conquest of America began. Arab caravans
reached the interior of Africa. Like the First Civilisation, the Third
Civilisation also arose from diverse and different roots. The difference is
that after the 15[th] century and in particular during the
18[th] and 19[th] centuries, the process of
integration had become universal in nature. Nations and cultures discovered
each other. The more developed began to impose their domination and culture
with violence. At the same time, a gradual process of mutual influence and
enrichment began to develop between the various cultures.
A typical feature of the Third Civilisation has been the significance
of the world integrity. Moreover, in ancient Greece, Theucidides, Aristotle
and Plato[5] searched for the common dimensions of life and
common rules for state administration amongst familiar nations. The Stoics
advocated the idea of moral and political unity of the human race. Some of
the thinkers of ancient Rome (Cicero and others) saw the world as a city
with the dimensions of the entire human race embracing all other nations and
cultures. The Renaissance enrichened this tradition. If the thinkers of the
First Civilisation were occupied mainly with the chronicles of warlords and
their victories, and the Second Civilisation with the defence of their
religious identity, the thinkers of the Third Civilisation undoubtedly
rediscovered man and his essence. Religion was of great importance to the
process of integration. K.Kautski referring to statistics states that in 98
A.D. there were 42 centres of population containing Christian communities,
by 180 this number had grown to 87 and by 352 - there were more than
500[6]. Ten centuries later the majority of the civilised world
was united by Christianity. Buddhism and Islam had a similar influence. Over
a period of about 1000 years, the major religions united the greater part of
humanity within large spiritual communities. The zenith of this process was
undoubtedly during the Third Civilisation. The unification of different
nations on the basis of value systems and spirituality was of was of great
historical significance. This lead to the building of bridges between the
different parts of the world at a time when manufacturing and commercial
links and communications were unsustainable.
By this time the majority of the great geographical discoveries had
been made. Transport and communications had made great progress and medieval
means of production had been succeeded by the first factories. Commerce was
no longer a haphazard accompaniment to life, but an indivisible part of
civilisation. Amsterdam had become a large scale cultural and commercial
centre. Venice and Genoa had become the major cities of the Mediterranean.
Peter the First and his followers had built Saint Petersburg and a number of
European cities had populations of more than 100,000 people. The First
Civilisation was a time of the great empires. The Second of the fall of
empire and unstable states and city states. The Third Civilisation was a
period a nation states. The gravitational centres of progress during the
First Civilisation were empires, during the Middle Ages city states and
during the Third - nation states. Nation states are one of the features of
the modern age distinguishing it from the Middle Ages and from what we can
now observe at the end of the 20[th] century. They did not
develop suddenly but as a consequence of a series of conflicts over many
centuries. Certain historians believe that this is one of the reasons for
the success of Europe, that it was these conflicts and the liberated spirit
of the Renaissance which guaranteed its domination. It is indeed possible.
In any event between the 15[th] and 17[th] centuries
France, Spain, England and Sweden and a little later Russia, began to
increase their power and might to guarantee their strategic advantage for a
number of centuries in the future.
According to P.Kennedy, between 1470 and 1650, the armies of the major
European powers expanded: Spain from 20,000 to 100,000; France from 40,000
to 100,00; England from 25,000 to 70,000 and Sweden from a couple of hundred
to 70,000[7]. These figures show not only the rise of the
economic power of the emergent major European powers, but also their desire
for the re-distribution of the newly discovered territories and the
domination of some states by others. The entire history of the period
between the 15[th] and the 18[th] centuries is a
history of war, battles for inheritance, colonies and riches. Armies and
Navies were expanded, military alliances were formed. As a result of wars,
trade and new conquests the whole world entered into a new phase of
integration. The Third Civilisation developed greater mass phenomenons in
all areas of life - transport, manufacturing, international trade and ideas,
the spiritual world and the world of ideas and religions. There is one other
important criterion which distinguishes the three civilisations - the forms
of production. The First was the age of agriculture and animal husbandry,
the Second saw the advent of manufacturing and crafts while the Third is the
age of industry and industrial giants. I accept A.Toffler's belief that
technological revolutions stimulated the progressionfrom onea ge into
another, but I do not believe that this is an exhaustive or adequate
criterion. There also another difference between us in terms of the
periodisation of history: A.Toffler divides history into two eras:
agricultural and industrial, while I have looked for the differences in a
wider and more civilisational spectrum. Technological changes are a
synthetic expression of the changes in forms of ownership. Typical features
of the three forms of civilisation were slave ownership, feudalism and
capitalism and it would be wrong to ignore them.
At the same time I believe that the transition between the various
civilisations was not abrupt and cannot be defined on the basis of one event
or another. New civilisations develop within a country and grow organically
as a number of trends. This usually takes place as a result of a change in
the instruments of labour and technology but at the same time as a result of
changes in social relations and means of government. This is the case with
the Third Civilisation and the period of its greatest prosperity during the
industrial revolution of the 19[th] century. Moreover, at the end
of the 19[th] century and especially during the 20[th]
century, there were a number of processes in world development which bore
innovations of the modern age and which were entirely different from the
first three civilisations. The most important characteristics of the Third
Civilisation - industry, nations, nation states began to change intensively.
In practice this meant the beginning of a process of the collapse of the
modern age and the Third Civilisation.
2. THE BIRTH OF THE GLOBAL WORLD
The industrial revolution in Europe at the beginning of the 19thcentury
brought with it a rapid process of economic and political
internationalisation. The borders of the nation states - the most
distinguishing feature of the Third Civilisation become too limiting for the
new manufacturing forces.
T
here is no doubt that the 19th century was a time of exceptional
technological revolution. In the 1850's and 1860's Great Britain, France,
Italy, Germany and Austria demonstrated significant increases in the growth
of their industrial output. The invention of the steam engine in 1769 by
James Watt and the locomotive by George Stephenson were of revolutionary
significance for world economic development and accelerated integration. At
the end of the 19th century the first experimental flights with an aeroplane
were carried out by Langley (1896). Enormous progress was made between 1885
and 1897 in the development of autmobile construction. In 1837 Morse
invented his communications code and in 1864 Edison improved methods of
electronic transmission. In 1876 Bell gave the world its first telephones.
The second half of the 19th century was a time of important discoveries
in the areas of transport and weapons systems. Revolutionary developments
were made in coal mining, mettalurgy and energy production resulting in the
increase of iron and steel production between 1890 and 1913: in the USA from
9.3 million tons to 31.8 million, in Germany from 4.1 to 17.6, in France
from 1.9 to 4.6 and in Russia from 0.95 to 4.6 million tons. Energy
consumption for the same period rose: in the USA from 147 million tons of
coal equivalent to 541 million tons, in Great Britain from 145 million tons
to 195 million, in Germany from 71 to 187 million tons, in Germany from 71
to 187 million tons, in France from 36 to 62.5 million tons and in Russia
from 10.9 to 54 million tons.[8] Energy and metal became the
major factors in the rapid development of railways and armies,
predetermining the development of entirely new branches of industry and
science.
A common feature of this process is that the industrial revolution of
the 19th century interlinked the interests of the developing nations in a
completely new manner. If until the 19th century, conflicts between nations
were of a purely localised nature and on mainly religious or territorial
grounds or for reasons of inheritance, after the developments of the
industrial revolution the main factors in the emergence of conflicts were
disputes for continental or world domination, cheap raw materials and
colonies.
These facts are perhaps sufficient to support the contention that the
Global World was born at the end of the 19th century. I interpret the term
"Global World" as meaning the level of development at which the majority of
countries and peoples become dependent on each other and, notwithstanding
their own national governments, form a common essence. If this is the case,
then the end of the 19th century was just the beginning of world
globalisation within the framework of the nation states of the Third
Civilisation. During the same period the world began an intensive period of
establishing common economic (export of capital), technological (transport,
communications, science) and cultural links. At some time towards the end of
the 19th century the great world powers were already unable to resolve their
own conlicts in isolation. Conflicts could no longer be limited to their own
borders but to the economic and political divisions already existing in the
world. A new world trend began to emerge, that of imperialism.
The trend towards imperialism was the first manifestation of the
globalisation of the world, a qualitative new level of world integration. I
consider imperialism to be a result of the intermingling of two intersecting
phenomena: the strong feelings of nationalism which existed everywhere at
the end of the 19th century and the objective trend towards integration as a
result of the export of capital and aspirations towards the economic
division of the world. In the 19th century, globalisation existed only as a
direct initiative of the nation state. However, during the second half of
the 19th century economic development began to transcend national borders in
the form of ambitions and aspirations towards national dominance. Such
belligerent nationalism within the conditions of internationalisation gave
rise to what J.Hobson, R.Hilferging and V.Lenin defined as
imperialism.[9]
Looking at the way in which humanity greeted the advent of the
twentieth century, one is suprised by their equanimity of spirit. Upon a
cursory examination of the major newspapers of France, Germany and Bulgaria
published on the 1st of January 1900, I observe a remarkable similarity.
Almost everywhere countries greeted the new century with fervent and
malcontent nationalism. The new century was seen as a century during which
individual states would satisfy their ambitions for new territory and
conquer and punish their opponents. The dominant atmosphere was of
nationalism and imperial aspirations and against this background, the
emergence of socialist ideas. National borders had become too limiting for
the expansion of industry. The Germans and the Bulgarians wanted to unite to
castigate their neighbours. The British rejoiced in their colonial dominions
and dreamed of an even greater Britain. The French reminded the Germans that
they would not stand for any more humiliation like that suffered in 1870.
Not one of the European nations or the USA are an exception. They were all
overcome by some level of imperialist amnbition. This was like a contagious
disease brought on by a need for raw materials and control over the railways
and the sea routes but it also penetrated political, journalistic and social
thought.
During this period, Fichte developed his idea of the exclusive role of
the Prussian state in the progress of humanity. Fichte was the greatest
proponent of the way in which nationalism and the need for
internationalisation becomes transformed into imperialism. But France was no
different. During the decades after the destruction of the French army in
1870, French nationalism reached unseen heights. Charles Morras defined
nationalism as the absolute criterion for every political action. In general
at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th European
nationalism flourished. In the USA at the end of the 19th century, economic
and demographic growth, albeit slower than in Europe also gave rise to a
similar explosion of self-confidence and aspirations for a new role for
America in the world. The idea of an international society, a common feature
of American political thought during this period, was also frequently
proclaimed as a right to domination and even war.
It could also be said that at the beginning of the 20th century
humanity was obsessed by the political paradigm typical of all world
empires: nationalism combined with imperial ambitions. In other words,
internationalisation and globalisation stem from the ambitions of isolated
nationalism and nation states. This was also reflected in the structure of
manufacturing, politics and life in general. Over a thirty-year period,
between 1880 and 1910 the standing armies of the world powers increased
significantly. The Russian army increased from 791,000 to 1,285,000 persons.
The French army increased from 543,000 to 769,000. The Germany army
increased from 426,000 to 694,000 and the British army from 246,000 to
531,000. The army of the Austro-Hungarian empire increased from 246,000 to
425,000. The Japanese army increased from 71,000 to 271,000 and the army of
the United States grew from 34,000 to 127,000[10]. Stockpiles of
weapons and huge amounts of human resources were ammassed in the event of
war, which was soon to break out.
The First World War was the first manifestation of an integrated world,
the first major demonstration of world globalisation. It was proof of the
growing interdependence of countries which did not allow them, apart from
rare exceptions, to stay out of the conflict. Practically the entire world
was sucked into the conflicts of the First World War. From this moment on
the world began to manifest itself as a mutually dependent system developing
within a common cycle. I consider this argument to be of particular
significance and I would like to develop it further.
The First World War linked the majority of the countries within a
common conflict but also formed the beginning of a common economic cycle in
the development of the industrial nations. What other explanation can be
given for the fact that in the 1920's all the major powers witnessed, to a
greater or lesser extent, advances in industrial progress? Taking 1913 as a
basis (100%) the indices of industrial output growth between 1921 and 1928
were as follows: in the USA from 98 to 154.5%; Germany - from 74.7% to
118.3; Great Britain from 55.1 to 95.1%; France - from 61.4 to 134.4; Japan
from 167 - 300%; Italy from 98.4 to 175.2 and the Soviet Union from 23.3 to
143.5[11]. All the developed nations, as though bound by some
common umbilical cord, suffered economic collapse at the beginning of the
1930's. Only those nations such as the USSR who had isolated themselves from
the world economy escaped the crisis. In 1937 Germany succumbed. This common
feature of world economic development also manifested itself after the
Second World War in countries with an open market economy.
Despite certain divergence in terms of the stages of development, it is
clear that after the 1920's the most industrialised nations of the world
began to develop in a more mutually dependent manner. Today at the end of
the century, this mutual dependence has attained unseen levels as expressed
in the indices of the world stock exchanges and in the unconditional mutual
interdependence of exchange rates. During the period between the two world
wars a new global essence began to develop entirely independently of
national governments. This began with the increasing in the level of mutual
interdependence between countries and gradually gained strength from the
growth in new technology, commerce and finance, transport and
communications, culture and science and armaments etc.
Nevertheless, the 20th century witnessed only the birth of the global
world. The global revolution still only exists as a possibility. It will
take many decades to achieve the gradual and problematic development of
global structures within the model of the individual nation states.
Globalisation is a level of international integration at which
interdependence between nations and cultures exists at a planetary level.
Such mutual interdependence is not a matter for one or two or a group of
nations but between each individual state and the world as a whole, between
individual regions of the world, between all nations and cultures
simultaneously.
If upon the emergence of human civilisation, the processes of
integration affected only a number of individual tribes and was localised
and during the Middle Ages it took on regional proportions, then since the
beginning of the 20th century, it has existed within the framework of
mankind as a whole. All countries and peoples are involved in a common
system which is governed in a particular way and on the basis of certain
principles. This system arose spontaneously, via struggles for domination,
wars and violence. One should take into account the difficulties people
encounter in attempting to overcome the boundaries of their own environment,
religion and nation. At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the
20th century people were little occupied by thoughts of the world as a whole
or the priorities of universal human interests. Of course, there were a
number of writers and businessmen, Henry Ford was a prime example, who were
exceptions to this rule. However, this was not the case for the large mass
of the active inhabitants of our planet, politicians and the influential
owners of large amounts of wealth.
The culture of the Third Civilisation is above all a culture of
national thought and behaviour and the 20th century will remain entirely
within its dominion notwithstanding the accelerated processes of world
integration. Its militant nationalism and militiary blocs created the first
models of the global world based on violence and conflicts and on the
familiar struggle for national domination which existed in previous
civilisations.
3. THE SEARCH FOR A MODEL FOR THE GLOBAL WORLD
The first model of the global world was the colonial system. It was a
product of the combination of 19th century nationalism and the acceleration
of globalisation. In the middle of the 20thcentury and as a consequence of
the two world wars this modelcollapsed to give way to a two-bloc political
and economic model.
T
he first model of the global world was colonialism. During the second
half of the 19th century the larger nation states, motivated by desires for
empire began gradually to conquer andto divide the world. Geo-politically
the world became integrated through the colonial system for the first time
into a single unity. By achieving pre-eminence in the seas and oceans and
possessing the largest fleet in the world, Great Britain after 1815 turned
its attention to the rapid conquest of territories from Africa to India and
Hong Kong. Over a period of between 50 and 70 years the British managed to
create the greatest colonial empire in the world. From 1815-1865, a further
100,000 square miles was added to the territory of the British Empire.
During this period France was the only other country to attempt to
compete with Great Britain. It was later to be followed by Germany, Belgium,
Italy, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, the USA, Russia and Japan. Starting from
the basis of the nation state and moving towards globalisation, the great
powers of the time began a process of the domination and re-division of the
entire world into a unified world system linked through imperial centres.
As can be seen from table 1, during the last quarter of the 19th
century, the largest colonial powers expanded their territories by almost
200 million head of population and 2.32 million square kilometres of
territory. Between 1900 and the beginning of the First World War this rate
decreased as a result of the satiation of the "colonial market"
Table 1
Size and population of the colonies
(1875-1914)
State
1875
1900
1914
sq.km.
pop.
sq.km.
pop.
sq.km.
pop.
Great Britain
France
Holland
Belgium
Germany
USA
22.5
1.0
2.0
2.3
-
1.5
250
6
25
15
-
[*]
32.7
11.0
2.0
2.3
2.6
1.9
370
50
38
15
12
9
32.7
11.0
2.0
2.4
2.9
1.0
350
54
45
12
13
10
All the most prestigious, accessible and wealthy colonies have been
conquered by the beginning of the twentieth century, resulting in the
establishment of the first model of the emergent global world - the colonial
world.
The colonial system itself gave rise to the second momentous event in
the globalisation of the world. Hardly had the system become firmly
established when it began to give rise to a series of almost irresolvable
world conflicts: the irreconcilable struggle for the re-division of the
world and the First World War in which millions lost their lives. The
resulting radicalisation of public opinion in Russia, Germany and to a large
extent in other parts of the world stimulated the growth in anti-imperialist
attitudes and provided an opportunity for the growth of the radical ideas of
socialist revolution.
These events in themselves gave rise to the second model of the
emergent global world - the model of the two systems which began with the
October revolution in 1917 and continued until 1989-91. Almost the entire
period of the twentieth century passed within conditions of the two opposing
systems and the existence of the bi-polar global model. During this period
the existence of the two systems was explained basically as the opposition
of two ideologies, the ideologies of the rich and the poor, socialism and
capitalism. This was also the view of Marxism-Leninism. After the collapse
of the Eastern European political regimes the existence of the communist
world was presented as an historical mistake, as the consequence of the
profound delusions of huge masses of people and the tyranny of dictatorship
etc.. This was of the view put forward by Z.Bzezinski[12], but I
find these ideas be simplistic and far too easy. In actual fact the
processes were much more complex and contradictory.
During the period of its mutually dependent development, the world
began to subordinate itself to a greater extent to the principle of
equilibrium, a principle which is based on the laws of nature. The lack of
social equilibrium leads sooner or later to serious conflicts and delayed
development. In the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th within the
process of accelerating industrialisation and rising imperialism two global
imbalances formed: the first - between the rich metropolitan countries and
the second - between the rich, ruling classes of the imperialist bourgeoisie
and the enormous masses of the poor proletariate. These large imbalances
were particularly developed in the poorer countries and the countries who
found themselves on the losing side in the First World War. In general
terms, in the 19th century and the first 50-60 years of the twentieth
century, class differences became much more marked and the ensuing class
struggle was a direct consequence.
It was these class conflicts and international disproportions which
gave rise to the radical revolutions in Russia, Germany and Hungary and a
series of other countries between 1917 and 1923. This also goes some way to
explaining the development of dominant political doctrines such as in the
USSR, Italy, Germany and a number of other countries. To take the example of
the USSR, the guiding aim of the Soviet economy in the 1920's and in
particular the 1930's was to overcome its backwardness and to undertake a
programme of rapid, accelerated industrialisation and to create a stable
armaments industry. Its initial ambition to achieve a balance with the rest
of the capitalist world and subsequently to overtake it was the dominant
strategy of Stalin in the 1930's and 1940's. This economic policy, while
defensible, can in no way justify the violence and historical absurdity of
totalitarianism. I am merely attempting to explain its roots. All my
academic research and my direct observations of the Soviet totalitarian
system show that millions of people were aware of the violence of the system
but that they accepted it as something inevitable, as a lesser evil than
poverty and misery. The illusions and the crimes perpetrated during the
regimes of Stalin, Hitler and Mao and the other violent regimes of the 20th
century are indisputable. These crimes were stimulated by the vicissitudes
of history, by the ambition to create an alternative model of social
progress. Are Robespierre or Danton or the British colonisers, or the
Russian conquerors of Central Asia any less culpable?
The deeply rooted reasons for these crimes need to be explained before
they can be resolved. There is no doubt that at the root of Stalin's
violence initially against the rural population and subsequently against the
whole of Soviet society after 1929 lay his ambition to achieve rapid
industrialisation. The strategy of rapid industrialisation and anti-colonial
conflicts in a number of less-developed countries should be viewed as a
reaction against emergent global imbalances. That which was considered by
many to be the struggle of the repressed nations for the freedom of the
proletariate was actually a struggle against economic backwardness, against
imperialism and the monopolies of most developed nations and the struggle
for national supremacy. In the 20th century, the poorer nations had no other
option to defend themselves against colonialism other than to concentrate
their force and might through powerful state structures. Slogans such as the
"welfare of the proletariate", "care for people" were always associated with
the power of the state. Poverty always generates Utopias. Communism was one
of them.
During the first half of the twentieth century the world had continued
to develop on the basis of liberal market doctrines and it persisted in
being a world of rich and poor peoples, metropolises and colonies and
profound class differences. When markets are free but imbalanced, the strong
easily swallow up the weak. Such imbalanced historical development allows
those countries with more rapid development to become dominant. Sooner or
later this was bound to lead to social revolutions. This, I feel, is the
explanation for the division of the world into two opposing blocs as an
alternative to the existing colonial model. After the two world wars and the
economic crisis of 1929-33, the liberal idea underwent a crisis and opened
the way for the radicalisation of the world and its division.
By 1925, two countries had yielded to "state socialism" - the USSR and
Mongolia - with a total population of over 150 million. 25 years later this
political system had spread into more than 20 countries and accounted for
more than half the population of the world. After the victory over Germany
in 1945 the power and the authority of the USSR grew immensely. Under the
auspices of its power the national patriotic forces of a number of countries
threw off the colonial domination of Britain, France, Belgium, Portugal,
Holland and other countries. At the beginning of the 1960's, with certain
exceptions the colonial model ceased to exist and was replaced by the
two-polar model. At the end of the 1950's the two world systems embraced
populations of about 1-1.5 billion people and possessed military parity.
Without achieving full economic parity or high levels of productivity, the
USSR managed to undermine the monopoly of the USA in strategic military
areas. Two basic centres of power became established in the world - Moscow
and Washington accompanied by other satellites with varying degrees of
power.
Since the Second World War the world has witnessed a number of local
conflicts. There have been armed struggles in the Near East, North and
Equatorial Africa, Indo-China, India and Pakistan, Chile, Bolivia, Cuba and
tens of other regions and countries. All these countries were directly or
indirectly linked with the two superpowers and their opposition. On the
other hand the achievement of nuclear parity between the USSR and the USA in
the 1950's brought an end to the trend towards
ultra-imperialism[13] and the possibility of the world becoming
subordinated to a single world power centre. Beneath the nuclear umbrellas
of the two super powers and carefully balanced between them, the countries
of Western Europe, Japan and a number of other Asian and Latin American
countries achieved great success.
I believe the achievement of nuclear parity to be a phenomenon with key
significance for world development. Napoleon with his ambitions for an
empire from "Paris to India" , Hitler with his "World Order" and Stalin with
his aspirations for the "victory of world communism" all longed for a
unified world empire. This was also the view of a number of other
politicians and thinkers who seeing a trend towards world integration and
the expansion of manufacturing came to the conclusion that a future world
would be a world of monopolistic unity, a unified manufactory for workers
and peasants (Lenin), ultra-imperialism (Kautski), permanent revolution
(Trotski) and so on. To this extent the bi-polar model is a higher level of
development than the model of colonial empires. On the other hand, the
bi-polar model is only a stage in the formation of the global world and the
actual peak of the crisis of the Third Civilisation. I defend the thesis
that the two bloc system has to be seen as a transitional stage from the
point of view of the development of the global world and the transition
between the Third and the Fourth Civilisation.
Until the end of the 19th century, researchers analysed world changes
through the prism of national thinking and the nation state. After 1917 and
especially after the Second World War, the main object of research was the
two world systems - socialism (communism) and capitalism, their competition
and the struggle for domination. This was a reflection of the realities in a
world which had overpowered the minds of billions of people. Henceforth,
however, any analysis of the structural changes within the world cannot be
based on the confrontational bi-polar model. Only the global, civilisation
approach is capable of providing the correct response to questions and to
reveal the common and, consequently, the local trends of human development.
4. THE COMMON CRISIS AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD CIVILISATION
The 1970's saw the Suez crisis, the increase in the price of oil
(1973-5) and the end of the Brent Woods system[14]. Everyone
began to speak of the crisis of world capitalism. At the end of the 1980's
everyone began to speak of the crisis of world communism. In actual fact,
the entire world had been overcome by a profound crisis.
T
he ideologues and politicians of the two superpowers always maintained
that the system of their opponents was in crisis. In the communist countries
students attended lectures about the "common crisis of capitalism" while in
the West Kremlinologists talked of the "crisis of world communism". In
1960-2 Nikita Krushchev frequently was heard to say that the "collapse of
the colonial system is an historical victory over imperialism". In 1989-90
the victory of world capitalims over communism was declared. Was this really
the case? I have come to a different conclusion. I believe that the problem
cannot be reduced merely to the collapse of one system and the victory of
another. In actual fact during the second half of the twentieth century, it
was not only the communist system which was in a state of crisis but the
whole of the two bloc political system in the world, the entire structure of
the Third Civilisation. Industrial technologies, nation states and their
alliances, the culture of violence against the individual and nature
suffered serious repercussions.
What was the world like before the 1980's? There were two giant groups
of nations within which 99% of the weapons of mass destruction and 80% of
manufacturing industry were concentrated. Each group was closely connected
with military, political and economic alliances (NATO and the EU, the Warsaw
Pact and COMECON) with common military and economic infrastructures, with
joint institutions and education of personnel. All other countries and
peoples were dependent in some way or another on these groups. It is no
accident that hundreds of local conflicts during this period were waged with
the weapons of one or other of the military blocs and regarded as the
continuation of their undeclared war. On the other hand, the two bloc system
existed in the conditions of continuing integration and the growing
dependence of countries on each other. This was the main reason for the
general trends of world development to enter into contradiction with its
existing structures. The extent of these contradictions was so great that
there are justifiable grounds to speak of the common crisis of the two bloc
system and, in broader terms, the crisis of the entire modern age.
The first cause which lead to this crisis was the character and
structure of world economic growth.
After the Second World War, the global economic product of the Earth
increased four-fold. The total manufactured output of the period between
1950 and 1990 is equal to the growth of production from the beginning of
civilisation to the present day. There had never been such a turbulent
period in the development of the manufacturing powers of humankind.
Humankind had never witnessed such a period of dynamic processes reliant on
mutual cooperation, discoveries, the multiplication of discoveries and their
by-products. The other side of the coin was that such economic growth gave
rise to enormous deformations. The competition between the two super powers
and their allies assisted in the acceleration of progress but also lead to
previously unknown levels of unbalanced growth. In the 1980's the average
national product per head of population in the industrialised countries was
more than 11,000 dollars. In the majority of African countries this figure
was between 250-300 dollars.
While in the most developed countries of the world post-war development
had lead to an enormous abundance of goods and the domination of
consumerism, in the Third World more than 1.9 billion people were suffering
from malnutrition and disease. The level of consumerism in the developed
industrial countries rose to a level 40 to 100 times greater than in the
developing countries. This process of world development gave rise to the
most unexpected paradoxes. The money spent by today by the French on pet
food would be sufficient to feed the starving children of Ethiopia and
Somalia.
The iniquities in world development have increased during the last
couple of decades. Under colonialism, capital was re-directed towards the
poorer countries. After the war, however, it began to move in the opposite
direction. Large investments began to be made in the USA, Western Europe and
Japan. In the 1980's alone, direct investments in the developing countries
fell by about one hundred percent - from 25 billion USD in 1982 to 13
billion in 1987. As a result of this the poorer nations began to rely on
large amounts of credit in order to be able to feed their people, resulting
in the crippling debt burden which exists today. At present the countries of
Latin America owe international creditor banks and a number of governments
more than 400 billion dollars. Over 100 billion are owed by the Eastern
European countries. These statistics are proof not only of enormous
deformations but of the profound crisis which is affecting the foundations
of the world financial system. While the processes of international
integration do not permit the development of a monocentric world, the seven
richest nations of the world and the 300-400 wealthiest banks control the
lives of the majority of humanity via debt management.
On the other hand, the disproportionate economic development resulting
from the mad rush to purchase armaments and conflicts led to the economic
overloading of the two superpowers. As a direct result of the exisiting
two-bloc geo-political structure the USA managed (or some say was obliged)
to amass huge internal debts of more than 4 trillion dollars. In the 1970's
and 1980's the debts of the USSR increase enormously and delayed the rates
of its development.
A second characteristic problem of the two-bloc model of develoment was
the increase in environmental problems. For the entire period of post-war
development, as a result of uncontrolled industrialisation and the blind
faith in political and ideological ambitions the world lost practically one
fifth of its cultivable land, one fifth of its tropical forests and tens of
thousands of species of animal and plant life. During this same period the
level of carbon-monoxide in the atmosphere increased more than ten-fold. The
level of ozone in the stratoshpere has diminished and humanity is faced with
the threat of global warming. Talk is now of a global ecological tragedy.
Even today despite the growth in ecological awareness and "green" movements,
the world environmental crisis is seen as something of secondary
significance as something less important than the struggle for economic
growth, military strategic stability or national domination. Global warming
as a result of the industrial boom has already had serious, possibly
catastrophic, consequences. The reduction of irrigated agricultural land,
the increase in the levels of the oceans, the dessication of entire regions
which produce the majority of the world's grain - these are just a small
part of the possible consequences.
Despite the potential serious consequences for the world the leaders of
the two systems did not want, nor were they able to take any decisive
measures to allocate more funds for the conservation of the environment and
to reduce military expenditure or to pass common legislation to guarantee
the priorities of human needs.
The third and no less important cause of the crisis of the two-bloc
system was the fact that in the 1950's mankind surpassed all logical
extremes of military growth. The cold war and the opposition of the two
world systems lead the two super powers into a ceaseless race for
domination. This contest reached such a level that in the mid 1980's the
USSR and the USA possessed enough nuclear and strategic warheads to destroy
life on earth several times over. The eight most economically powerful
nations on the earth - the USA, USSR, China, the UK, France, West Germany,
Italy and Japan continually and deliberately increased their military
budgets during the entire post-war period.
In 1984, world arms export reached record levels of 75 billion dollars,
several times greater than the amount of money necessary to buy food and
medicines for the hungry and sick in the world and for investment in the
poorer countries. As a result of the opposition of the two blocs in the
1980's between 13 and 15 million people were employed in the arms industry.
In 1987, the global military budget of the world was more than 1 trillion US
dollars. This extreme overarmament lead to the overall deformation of entire
world development and distorted the structure of industrial production. It
caused enourmous deficits in the budgets of the industrialised nations and
created serious pre-conditions for the future of world finance. No less
important was the fact that as a result of the constant increase in arms
production and nuclear weapons in particular, the level of nuclear security
fell to very low levels. The danger of a nuclear Third World War loomed
greater than ever. At the end of the 1980's the two super powers - the USSR
and the USA had over 12 thousand units of nuclear arms - which from the view
point of common humanity was beyond the realms of common sense.
Thus, the deformation of economic development, the world environmental
crisis, the wealth of the North and the poverty and disease of the South,
the demographic booms, overarming - all these factors are the clear symptoms
of a profound crisis. It is true that all these critical phenomena have been
frequently discussed before and that some of the problems which I have
mentioned here have been the subjects of international summit meetings and
research groups but it is also true that they have been looking for
explanations to these phenomena in the wrong places.
In my opinion the most profound reason for the crises in the
environment, manufacturing and population growth can be found in the growing
inadequacy of the entire two-bloc structure of the world. On the one hand,
during this period, following the logic of confrontation and the struggle
for domination, the two super powers, their allies and all the remaining
smaller countries established structures oriented towards the development of
the economic and military power of the bloc to which they belonged. On the
other hand, the inter-bloc and inter-state power-struggle created a
manufacturing capacity which lead to the internationalisation of the world
and caused world problems which until then had been unknown.
The contradiction is manifest. Institutions, politics, propaganda, the
training of personnel, the links between manufacture and defence were
directly dependent on the profound ideologisation of thinking, while the
globalisation of humanity lead to the destruction of the confrontational
structures of the two blocs. In the 1970's and 1980's the bi-polar world
could no longer cope with global and world trends. This contradiction still
exists today notwithstanding the collapse of the two world systems. The
reason was the impossibility of bringing a sudden halt to the inertia of the
past based in the instutitions, upbringing, education and thinking of
people.
There is no doubt that in the West, and in particular in the East,
humanity has taken too long to come to terms with these problems. Moreover,
subsequent generations will bear the consequences and will discover new
disasters particularly in the environment and as a result of the abnormal
military competition between the two world systems. A number of academics
and politicians issued warnings in the middle of the century. The
scientists' rebellion against atomic weapons in the 1950's, the courage of
Sakharov in the USSR, and the actions of Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russel
and Jacques Cousteau are just a few examples. However, the conditions of
political opposition continue to exert an enormous power of inertia. This
inertia comes from the cultures of the existing civilisation, the
nationalism of the modern age and the world conflicts of the 20th century.
One of the main reasons for the acceleration in the crisis of the
two-bloc system and the collapse of the iron curtain was the growth in world
communications. In simple terms, the growth of radio, television, computers
and satellite dishes destroyed the iron curtain, pierced the armour of the
tanks and lead to the formation of a common culture of integration. The
revolution in communications which began at the beginning of the 1960's
brought about incredible political and spiritual changes throughout the
entire world. The Beatles and the Rolling Stones became a world phenomenon
not only as a result of their musical talent but also due to the new methods
of information transfer. In 1971 I went abroad for the first time, to the
German Democratic Republic. I asked my hosts why all the television ariels
faced west and he answered "It makes the German people feel united."
Television had begun to erode the Berlin wall even then.
After the 1960's and the 1970's people felt a new wave of integration
and discovered their common humanity. This was, however, in sharp
contradiction to the collapse of the world and the structures of the
political regimes. The new generations began to grow up in an atmosphere
which was no longer dominated by the dogma of ideology but by music and
spirituality and the thirst for contact with progressive cultural images.
Clearly this was in contradiction with the two-bloc division of the world
and the division between capitalism and socialism.
On the other hand, computers, communications and new world media began
to exert a direct influence on the human conscience and to create the
beginnings of a new previously unknown global culture. Together with the
globalisation of commerce and financial markets, this raised questions about
the basic structures of the third civilisation - nations and nation states.
There is no doubt that their borders had begun to change giving rise to the
problem of the formation of another world structure and of another political
and economic order.
In the 1960's when the cold war emerged from the ice age and the
peoples from the two sides began to get know each other, the first barriers
in their consciousness came down. In the Eastern bloc, intellectual
movements and calls for more freedom caught the leaders quite unawares. In
Czechoslovakia the Prague Spring blossomed, Hungary began a process of brave
economic reforms and in Poland the workers began to fight for their rights.
This period produced the indefatiguable spirits of Vladimir Visotskiy in
Russia, the "Shturtsi" in Bulgaria and Ceslav Niemen in Poland.
Many people in the West also realised that military, political and
cultural confrontation was of little benefit. In the 1960's and 1970's in
the USA and in particular in Western Europe movements for peace and
understanding gained momentum. The demonstrations against the war in
Vietnam, the youth movements in 1968, the hippy peace movements and a number
of other phenomena were manifestations not only of the political status quo
but also of a new emergent culture. The bearers of the new spirituality in
the West in the 1960's were born not so much in the academic environments of
Eaton and Harvard but in the fields of Woodstock and amongst the millions of
fans of John Lennon, Mick Jagger and Ian Gillan.
At the beginning of the 1960's the president of the USA, John F.Kennedy
was the first American statesman to evaluate the Eastern European nations
not merely as the incorporation of evil but recognised that they had
attained certain social achievements from which much could be learned. Of
particular significance was his attempt to build intellectual bridges with
the East and to break the ice of the cold war. Without accepting the
violence of the totalitarian regimes, many intellectuals in the West began
to perceive more clearly not only the mistakes and errors but also the
successes of the Eastern European countries and to propose the application
of certain of the benefits of state socialism, particularly in the social
field.
Year after year the means of global integration - transport, commerce,
radio and television lead to to growth in international contact and slowly
lead to the blurring of the iron curtain between East and West. With the
appearance of the computer and satellite television in daily life and with
the intensity of world radio television and cultural exchange the barriers
between the two systems became more illusory. New means of communication
made the policies of isolation, concealment of truth and global division
absurd. The monopoly of information collapsed as a direct result of the
revolution in communications which in turn lead to the undermining of the
two-polar model.
Despite everything which I have mentioned until now, is it still not
overstated to speak of the collapse of the Third Civilisation? Am I not
attempting to impose original thought in an aggressive way onto the
evolution of human development? I am conviced that this is not so. My
arguments for speaking of a general change in civilisation will be developed
in the subsequent chapters. They involve technological and geo-political
structures, ownership and the transition from traditional capitalist and
socialist societies and the blurring of the concept of the nation state.
Everything which symbolised and represented the modern age - industrial
technology, nation states, capitalism and socialism and the bi-polar world -
has undergone change. As a result of the explosion of world communications
the process of cultural globalisation has begun to accelerate and what
emerged has taken on new sharper features. This trend has gradually created
more and more adherents of a new world and a new civilisation. Sooner rather
than later the two-bloc system of world civilisation was going to collapse.
The question was "when?" and "in what way?"
Chapter two
COLLAPSE I: THE EXPLOSION IN EASTERN EUROPE
1. DECAY AND DEATH
Between 1960 and 1990 a noticeable gap began to open up betweenthe
socialist
countries of Eastern Europe and the industrialisedcountries of Western
Europe.
At the beginning of the 1980's there was a growing danger that this gap
was going
to become insurmountable...
A
lthough the two-bloc structure of the world was entering a period of
common crisis its disintegration began not in the West but in the East. The
changes in Eastern Europe were revolutionary" while in the West they were
seen as "evolutionary". Why?
In my opinion the reasons for this can be seen in the greater
inadequacies of the Eastern European totalitarian regimes to adapt to the
new trends in world development and to adapt themselves to the new
technological and economic conditions which appeared in the 1970's and
1980's. The Eastern European totalitarian bloc was the weakest link in the
world of the Third Civilisation.
As early as the 1950's the Americans, the Japanese and the Western
Europeans had begun to look for completely new approaches to the way in
which their lives were structured. On the one hand, under pressure from the
new external and internal realities which had to be taken into account and
on the other hand as a result of competition with the Soviet Union and other
countries of the Eastern Bloc, the most developed industrial nations began
to improve their systems. Today the economies of the USA, Japan and France
have little in common with what they were in the 1920's and 1930's.
By preserving free initiative, the industrialised Western countries
managed to overcome the danger of monopolism within their economies and
extreme social stratification. In this way they did not allow the
predictions of Lenin that "imperialism cannot be reformed and will
disintegrate under the blows from its own contradictions"[15] to
come true. In fact the opposite was true, after the Great Depression of 1929
and during the post-war period the largest Western European states and the
USA undertook a series of measures aimed at overcoming the danger of further
monopolisation and achieving greater social equality and harmony. Economic
and political power were balanced through moderate state regulation,
anti-monopoly legislation and the stimulation of medium and small-scale
business.
The most significant changes undertaken in the USA and Western Europe
were in the structure of ownership. After the passing Legislation allowing
the transferring of share ownership to employees in 1974 in the USA hundreds
of thousands of employees began to acquire stock in the companies in which
they worked. Similar trends can be seen in Great Britain, Germany, France
and a number of other Wester European countries. They also undertook
programmes to stimulate the development of small and medium business.
Millions of small companies sprang up in the areas of services, tourism,
trade, electrical goods and a number of other branches of the economy. By
some accounts these small enterprises account for up to half the working
population of Western European countries.
At the same time the large family properties in Western Europe and the
USA have lost the position of monopoly and importance which they had at the
beginning of the century. Today neither Rothschild, nor Dupont, neither
Morgan nor Rockerfeller can exert direct influence on questions of national
importance as they could have done a hundred years ago. This has allowed
Western European societies to halt their deterioration and to stop the
growth of class contradictions and gradually to wipe out the gap between the
different social groups. Thirty years after the end of the Second World War
the nature of employed labour had changed beyond recognition and the
proletariate described by Marx dissolved within a entirely new social and
technological environment. If now at the end of the 20th century one is to
visit the factories of, for example, Zussler near Zurich or American
Standard New York, one will see a completely new type of work force with
different interests and a different mentality and, more importantly, a
workforce which is integrated within the decision making processes. These
are no longer the same workers which lead Karl Marx to write "Capital" and
who gave rise to mass political and trade union protests at the beginning of
the 20th century.
In the post-war period and particularly in the 1970's and 1980's a
process of change in the nature of property ownership began which continues
to the present. This in its turn has had direct ramifications upon the
nature of power. This revolution has allowed the USA, Japan and another
twenty or so countries to adapt much more quickly and effectively to the
needs of the modern scientific and technological revolution and to become
global leaders.
At the same time the development of the USSR and Eastern Europe has
been halted as a result of the totalitarian nature of their regimes. It is
true that when it was formed in 1922, the Soviet Union inherited a poorly
developed industrial base and a poorly educated population but it is also
true that the totalitarian regime established by Stalin at the end of the
1920's had destructive and devastating consequences upon all areas of life.
Tens of million of people lost their lives as a result of violence and
repression - this was as a dramatic feature of the Stalinist regime as the
complete repression of free creativity and private initiative.
Centralisation in the decision making process could only provide temporary
benefits in military and defence issues but in all other cases it halted
intellectual, technical and economic development. From the very outset
Stalinism contained within itself the thesis of forced, coercive growth. The
initial results did not hide the truth that, given time, coercive
development was to become transformed into stagnation and regression. The
destruction of private enterprise, the total and coercive collectivisation
of agriculture in December 1922, the substitution of market forces with
party and subjective criteria and the repression of the intelligentsia could
not do anything but leave a profound scar and cause serious consequences for
human development.
During the period between 1950 and 1960 total nationalisation could
still be explained using complex and serious internal reasons, the general
radicalisation of European regimes (especially in the 1930's) and the
necessity to achieve military parity. However, during subsequent decades the
totalitarian regimes became totally bankrupt. Many people in Eastern Europe
still believe that the collapse in the Eastern European systems was due to
the mistakes made by Mikhail Gorbachev and his programmes of "perestroika".
I, personally, believe that the historical role of Gorbachev was a direct
result of the overall negative trends in the development of Eastern Europe
and the universal economic and political crisis which had gripped this part
of the world.
This crisis above all manifested itself in terms of the dramatic
technological backwardness which began to become apparent as early as the
late 1960's and became most marked during the 1980's. Eastern Europe began
to lag behind in electronics, bio-technology, communications, environmental
facilities and many other fields. Because all these technological fields are
so closely linked Eastern Europe began to fall behind in every other
possible field from the production of nails to complex aviation technology.
The technological advantages of the West affected daily life, the workplace
and management. The rate at which the East began to fall behind in the
1980's was so dramatic that certain experts began to speak of a possible
"global technological gorge" opening up between the East and the West, or in
other words a "self-perpetuating backwardness".
With the appearance of micro-electronics, new communications and space
technology, the Soviet military, who had up until now played a key role in
the political life of the totalitarian state, began to realise more and more
clearly that their economic backwardness would sooner or later affect their
military and strategic position. This was also understood by those
politicians with greater awareness unencumbered by political dogma. Although
the USSR had achieved nuclear parity and, in certain areas, superiority,
with the USA, its backwardness in the field of micro-electronics and
communications at the beginning of the 1980's began to change this trend.
The enormous amounts of money expended on military causes undermined the
Soviet economy and doomed it to universal inefficiency.
In a comparison of figures, it can be seen that while in 1960 the GNP
of the USSR was only about $5000 USD less than in the USA, in 1980 this
difference had reached $10,000 and in 1990 - $20,000. In 1960 the
manufacturing output of the USSR was $1000 per head of population more than
in Japan. Only 20 years later Japan was producing goods to the value of
$11,864 per head of population in comparison with $6,863 in the USSR. At the
beginning of the 1990's the gap had widened to $30,000.[16]
A similar process was taking place in comparable smaller European
countries. The German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland
and Bulgaria were experiencing growing difficulties reflected in the drastic
increases in their external debt in the 1980's. Without the need for further
statistics, I believe, that the most obvious example was the difference
between the type of automobiles produced in East and West Germany. Whether
we compare Wartburgs with Mercedes or Trabants with Volkswagens it is quite
clear that we are dealing with two distinct generations of manufacturing
cultures. My example is based on motor vehicles since they reflect the
general level of industry as a whole: metallurgy, chemical production, heavy
machinery construction, electronics, textiles and so on.. While industry in
Western Europe was already using a new generation of production technology,
Eastern Europe was still dominated by a generation of production machinery
which was physically and morally at least twenty five years out of date.
The majority of Eastern Europeans lived in the conditions of
information deprivation. They were fed propaganda of constant progress and
achievement, the collapse of world capitalism and the greater and greater
victories of world socialism. In actual fact the reality was exactly the
opposite. Of course, many progressive leaders in Eastern Europe during this
period were aware of the problems but none of them were able to release
themselves from the common bonds of Eastern European imperialism. This was
made clear by the fate of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the Prague
Spring of 1968, as well as the unrest amongst the Polish workers and the
timid attempts at reform made in Bulgaria in 1986[17]. It was
quite clear that changes could only take place in the context of global
reforms affecting the USSR as well.
The negative consequences of technological backwardness were
exacerbated by the changes in the world economic situation in the mid
1980's. The collapse in the prices of oil and a number of other raw
materials lead to a sharp decline in the ability of the USSR and its allies
to function efficiently and to improve the standards of living of its
peoples. In the 1980's the member countries of COMECON experienced their
greatest difficulties in foreign trade and were obliged to increase their
external debts. From the mid 1980's the Soviet Union and its allies lost
their most important comparative economic advantages and were obliged to
cover their current account deficits with large external loans which even
then came to more than 100 billion dollars.
The nature of the technological changes of the 1970's and 1980's also
raised doubts about economic centralisation. In the 1930's and after the
Second World War technological innovation relied heavily on the centralised
accumulation and management of funds. Energy production, nuclear technology
and chemical production, large irrigation projects, heavy industry and arms
production were very strong arguments in favour of the need for centralised
planning and the active participation of the state in the economy.
On the other hand the technological wave of the 1970's pre-supposed the
decentralisation of the decision making process. The production of software
and personal computer applications, the appearance of tens of thousands of
different types of services and the progress in bio-technology stimulated
and continue to stimulate individual creativity. This was in contradiction
to the very essence of the Soviet type of system.
Consequently the backwardness of Eastern Europe in the 1970's and
1980's was not only a consequence of political and economic conjuncture but
had a long-term and objective character. It was connected with the inherent
backwardness not only of individual areas of manufacturing but of the
primary governmental and economic structures. As a result of the influence
of new technologies on the life of societies, the crisis soon spread to the
personal lives of the individual Eastern Europeans. In the 1970's and 1980's
personal consumption per head of population in Eastern Europe began
progressively to fall behind the average consumption figures for Western
Europe, the USA and Japan.
According to UN statistics for 1960, for every 1000 West Germans there
were 78 motor vehicles in comparison with 20 in Czechoslovakia and 17 in the
German Democratic Republic. In 1985 this figure had risen to 400 in West
Germany in comparison to 180 in East Germany and 163 in Czechoslovakia. In
1960 in the USSR there were 1.6 telephones per hundred people and in Japan -
5.8. In 1984 this figure was 9.8 for the USSR and 53.5 in
Japan[18].
In the late 1960's the economic backwardness of the USSR and its allies
began to spread to non-manufacturing environments. In 1960 infant mortality
per 1000 newly born infants was 26 in the USA, 31 in Japan and 35 in the
USSR. In 1985 this figure had changed to 10.4 per thousand in the USA, 5.7
in Japan and 25.1 in the USSR. Similar comparisons can be made in the area
of science, education, culture and cultural life in general. It would, of
course, be naive and imprudent to ignore the successes which the USSR and
its allies achieved in the area of space research, physics, chemistry and
molecular biology and in certain other areas of technology. These were,
however, rather oases within the overall system rather than its essential
features. They did not change the overall picture of backwardness or its
deepening character.
Clearly, against a background of increasing internationalisation and
more and more intensive exchange of information, the backwardness of Eastern
Europe began to become transformed into a universal moral and political
crisis. In the context of the boom of world communications, radio and
television, satellite communications and information transfer, the truth
could not be hidden for long. The attempts of the USSR and the other Eastern
European countries to propagate lies reached absurd extents to prove that
they were at the head of technological and economic progress. For more and
more people in Eastern Europe it was becoming clear that the backwardness of
their countries in manufacturing and consumerism was a direct result of the
vices of the system itself.
It should be noted, on the other hand, that right up until their demise
the Eastern European regimes retained certain benefits such as full
employment, a low crime rate, universal social guarantees and a number of
other features. The price of these benefits from the 1960's onwards,
however, had begun to manifest itself in the form of empty shops, the lack
of basic products, the low standard of living and the lack of personal
freedom etc.. Given such a situation, it was more and more difficult to
speak of the successes of the Soviet style system against the background not
only of a worsening economic situation but also of the moral and political
climate. The Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, the uprisings and protests of
the Polish workers, the reforms in Hungary, the dissident movement in the
USSR, the mass movement in favour of emigration to the West was a
manifestation of the growing level of dissatisfaction or unhappiness with
the existing system.
In the 1970's the USA and its Western allies managed to impose a new
leading ideology: the issue of human rights and the rights and freedoms of
all citizens of the world. A number of "capitalist" countries such as
Sweden, Austria and others guaranteed more social benefits, including
pensions, unemployment benefit for young persons etc.. In general, in the
USA, Japan, Western Europe and a number of other smaller countries with a
market economy, life become more attractive and more in tune with the
growing diversity and increase in human needs. In contrast with this in
Eastern Europe and the USSR, there was a sharp increase in crime,
drunkenness, apathy and scepticism.
This lead to major geo-political consequences. After the collapse of
the colonial model, the Soviet Union, despite its concentrated efforts, was
unable to impose its system on the newly liberated countries. The majority
of them adopted systems and models closer to those of Western countries.
Attempts at "socialist revolutions" in Algeria, Egypt, Syria, Ghana,
Somalia, Ethiopia and a number of other countries did not produce the
expected results. Poverty remained a problem. The promise of a rapid leap
into the "paradise of socialism" also remained an illusion.
While the USA and Western Europe and later Japan were keen on expanding
their influence in the world via investments, cultural influence and
education, the Soviet Union in order to expand its geo-political influences
concentrated on the support of "revolutionary" regimes, expending colossal
amountsof state money in the process. They maintained the point of view that
in states with poor economies progress could only be achieved via
nationalisation and centralised planning. Life, however, shows that this is
not the case.
The upshot was that in the 1970's and in particular in the 1980's the
Eastern European regimes were in the grips of a universal structural,
economic, political and spiritual crisis, both internally and externally.
Geo-politically this crisis was expressed in terms of the widening gap
between the role of the USSR as a world super power and its real economic
abilities. During the entire post-war period the military expenditure of the
USSR exceeded all permissible economic levels. Military budgets undermined
national development and seriously threatened the future of the system. On
the other hand, despite the economic crisis and evident technological
backwardness the Eastern European governments continued their policies of
universal social guarantees of employment and wages which in the 1980's in
particular lead to chronic increases in foreign debt. Consumption was
greater than production. Financial commitments to the military, price
subsidies and excessive state investments lead to the creation of enormous
budget deficits.
Essentially the system was consuming itself from within. While Western
countries were reforming and adapting to global technological problems, the
crisis in Eastern Europe was worsening. It was becoming more clear that
without radical reforms, backwardness would lead to death.
2. REFORMS AND ILLUSIONS
Attempts by the Eastern European totalitarian regimes to reformwithout
damage
to the foundations of their systems were illusory. These were merely
attempts to prolong the life of a civilisation on the wane.
T
he collapse of the Third civilisation, or if you prefer, its
"reconstruction" could have been an evolutionary process as it was in the
West, through economic reforms and the political evolution of the
totalitarian states. Since the creation of Soviet Russia in 1917 and most
notably during the last decades of its existence numerous attempts at reform
had been made. These reforms merit a general examination and can be divided
into five periods within the history of the Soviet model system.
The first of these was the period between 1917-1929 which I like to
refer to as a time of consolidation and the search for a model of
development. Notwithstanding the civil war and widespread violence the
possibility of returning to some form of democracy still remained. A certain
amount of private property, paricularly in agriculture, had been preserved.
The NEP programme (New Economic Policy) introduced by Lenin in 1921 provided
the opportunity for the use of foreign capital and private initiative.
The second stage of "pure socialism" began at the end of the 1930's
with the destruction of the remains of the NEP and a total assault on
economic, political and cultural life. The coercive formation of the
collective farms, the creation of an enormous army of labour camp slaves,
forced economic growth based on administrative and political methods and the
extermination of millions of political opponents - these were the
foundations of the Soviet Stalinist regime. During this period the Soviet
system developed as a monolithic hierarchical organisation in which the
violence of the party elite and its subordinated security organisations
dominated. From 1930 to 1953 every manifestation of private initiative and
free thought was punished with prison or death.[19]
The third period in the development of the Soviet system began with the
death of Stalin in 1953 and the "thaw" of Nikita Khrushchev. Although to
some extent contradictory, the policies implemented by Khrushchev during
this period were to leave a lasting mark on the further development of the
world. For the first time the truth about Stalin's crimes was revealed and
both Stalin himself and his system lost their authority as the proponents of
social justice and world progress.
The fourth period began in 1964 and ended at the beginning of the
1980's. It was justly named by Mikhail Gorbachev as the period of "zastoi"
(stagnation). During these years Leonid Brezhnev brought a halt to the
"thaw" begun by Khrushchev and began his attempt to immortalise the
totalitarian system through a series of internal and external cosmetic
changes. It was during this period that the USSR and its allies began to
fall behind their Western opponents in the areas of technology and
economics.
The fifth and final stage was the period of "perestroika" introduced by
Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-1991) which was eventually to lead to the collapse
of the Eastern European regimes and the USSR itself.
My reason for this periodisation is that from the beginning to the end
of the Soviet system there were two contradictory political trends: one of
which saw totalitarianism as the essence of the utopian communist dream and
a second which aspired to more flexible, economic and political models.
The second trend appeared directly after the February revolution of
1917 in the ideas of local self-government by workers, the implementation of
the NEP by Lenin in 1921 and 1927, the "thaw" of Khrushchev and finally in
the policy of "perestroika" of Mikhail Gorbachov. The essence of this second
trend was the combination of party and political centralism with relatively
greater freedom for the private sector (especially in trade and agriculture)
and in the area of art and culture. Its origin can be seen in the traditions
of European socialism and social democracy.
In the 1920's the proponents of a more flexible and dynamic political
line - N.Bukharin, G.Zinoviev, S.Kamenev, A.Rikov and others lost their
battle for power, allowing the party bureaucracy to dominate all structures
of society. This was the decisive moment for the development of the essence
of the Soviet model. The victory of Stalinism transformed the USSR - and a
number of other countries after the Second World War - into bureaucratic
command societies.
During the period between 1954-1956 when N.Khrushchev was fiercely
critical of the Stalinist era, he found himself in conflict with the
Stalinist system in all sectors of life. As a child of the very same system,
Khrushchev was condemning not the system but the style and leadership
methods employed by Stalin and the cult of personality. He proposed a
reevaluation of the system and mechanisms of its leadership. Khrushchev's
illusion was that by changing the leadership and functioning of the system
he would make it more effective and resolve its major problems.
During the Brezhnev period (1964-1982) a considerable number of
"improvements" were made to the leadership. The attempts made to revive the
economy by giving greater freedom to industry and a timid embracement of the
private sector clashed with the dominant principles of the totalitarian
system. There was talk of de-centralisation, collective initiative and new
economic mechanisms. However, not a word was said about the party monopoly
on power and finances, banks and the market. It would, however, have been
impossible to have freedom or private initiative without major changes to
the banking system, price liberalisation, reform to the system of investment
banking and the removal of large funds from the hands of the party and state
elite. It was quite absurd to make changes to the structures of property and
administration without changes to the principles of political power or
without profound changes to the legislative system and the guarantee of
constitutional rights and freedoms of its citizens.
History frequently provides us with examples of the combination of
heroism and illusion. Frequently the intellect of leaders and the grandeur
of their objectives have been let down by the naivety of the way in which
they attempted to achieva them. Such was the case with Stalin's opponents in
the 1920's and 30's and the policies of Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950's.
Zinoviev, Kamenev, Rikov and Bukharin paid for their naivety with their
lives since they were up against not only Stalin's will and cruelty but also
the interests and power of the party-state apparatus. Khrushchev also paid
for his own naivety and was removed from power in October 1964. For the ten
years he was in office, Khrushchev wavered between the desire to put an end
to the Stalinist repressions and the preservation of the system. The same
man who was bold enough to reveal the crimes of Stalin to the whole world
allowed cruel acts of repression against Soviet art and culture. The same
man who had the fortitude to remove the body of Stalin from the mausoleum in
Moscow became a proponent of the super-Utopian idea of the "rapid leap" into
the "paradise of communism".
The enormous belief that good could be imposed from above and that the
system could be revitalised by "the enthusiasm" and privileges of the
nomenclature, were naive. Khrushchev was no less a believer in the system of
state socialism. By throwing Stalin and Beria onto the scrapheap of history,
he deprived the Soviet people of their Divine leader and was obliged to
offer them a new Utopia - the rapid advent of communism, industrial
dominance over the USA and a high standard of living for the people of the
USSR etc.. After Krushchev's removal from power it became more difficult to
delude the people with promises of new Utopias and illusions. The myth of
the infallible leader in Stalin had been shattered. Khrushchev's programme
for entering the era of perfect communism by 1980 had failed. The next
utopia in line was Brezhnev's off-the-peg theory of a developed socialist
society.
Despite all this the logical question arises of why despite its general
instability the Soviet totalitarian system survived for such a long time -
74 years? I believe that there are a number of reasons for this.
The Soviet totalitarian model arose during a period of general crisis
and the large scale transformation of world capitalism, during a period of
globalisation and a search for various models of existence in a new
inter-dependent world. The 20th century was a time of cataclysm, change and
transition and of two world and hundreds of local wars in which more than
150 million people lost their lives. Despite its Utopian nature, the Soviet
system was a model for potential progress which emphasised absolute social
protection, guaranteed the interests of workers andpeasants and total
nationalisation as a condition for concentrating resources and directing
them towards new construction. The belief that universal social guarantees
were the basis for progress provided temporary historical justification for
the centralised type of society.
The continuing existence of the Soviet totalitarian system can be
explained with the desire and the ambitions of many nations rapidly to
overcome poverty and to avoid their possible colonisation by the larger
colonial metropolises. For many countries during the 1950's and the 1960's
the Soviet Union was a guarantee of protection against colonisation by other
countries, despite the fact that "fraternity" with the USSR meant another
type of dependence.
Was it not the case, however, that the crisis of liberalism and the
return to the ideas of nationalisation was also taking place in other parts
of the world? Practically everywhere in the world before and after the First
World War and especially at the end of the 1920's societes were undergoing
radical changes and centralisation. The victory of Hitler in Germany,
Mussolini in Italy, the Left in France and Spain was proof of this. The
crisis of world capitalism brought about by colonialism, monopolisation, the
First World War and the economic crisis of 1929-33 was sufficient motivation
and justification for the actions of Stalin as "necessary policies" in the
context of forthcoming world conflict. For millions of people the Soviet
Union was not so much a country of violent political aggression in which
millions of innocent people lost their lives but rather the power which
defeated Hitler, saved humanity from the death camps of fascism and gave a
chance to many peoples to live their lives in freedom and independence.
In 1932 in the introduction to his criticism of socialism, Ludwig von
Mizes wrote, "In Europe to the East of the Rhine there are very few
non-Marxists and even in Western Europe and the United States his (Marx)
supporters are greater in number than his opponents"[20]. If
today at the end of the 20th century, socialism is perceived as "something
bad in the past", for over half a century - from the 1920's to the 1970's it
was seen as the hope for the majority of mankind.
This is due to the not insignificant achievements of socialism in the
areas of industrialisation, science and technology, culture and art and,
most significantly, the social guarantees of labour, wages, a place to live
and so on. To disregard or to conceal these achievements would be imprudent,
and, indeed, impossible from an historical point of view. Each historical
period notwithstanding the nature of political power leaves behind it
something positive, guaranteeing the furtherance of human life. The
successes of the USSR in industrialisation, transforming it from a country
surviving on the remnants of a system of feudal agriculture into a world
super-power, guaranteed wages, work and income for the vast masses of its
population were for many people sufficient grounds for maintaining the
system.
I, therefore, do not consider the model of state socialism to be the
ravings of a group of mad politicians. Its appearance, existence and
dissemination over the whole world from the second half of the 19th century
to the end of the 20th was a consequence of huge world transformations and
reactions against the imperialist colonial world with its injustices and
wars. Despite its illusions and errors it was a conscious attempt to offer
protection to the interests of the oppressed and division and class
struggles to be replaced with unification and social unity.
I realise how difficult it is only a few years after the collapse of
the totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe for these words to be uttered.
However, we should not be too hasty in our evaluation of history from the
point of view of a specific political moment in time. The continued
existence of the Soviet type of system and the popularity of the communist
idea during the greater part of the 20th century was a consequence of the
objective and global processes of transition of the modern world. It was a
part of the processes of world integration, but also a part of the crisis of
the Third Civilisation. The same factors which provided the opportunities to
state socialism also dug its grave. Continuing global integration could no
longer tolerate isolationism. Social guarantees led to the demotivation of
labour. The growth in personal and group self-confidence were limited by the
lack of basic human rights. The reason for the collapse of this system was
its tendency to consume more than it produced and to maintain "balance" via
the methodical use of aggression upon the personal freedoms of its citizens.
The very idea of achieving universal justice and material plenty via
coercion and "forced awareness" were Utopian and inhumane.
The contradictions arose from the economic essence of the system, from
the type of ownership, and not from the style and methods of leadership, as
Khrushchev considered. Khrushchev did not attempt to change the system
which, in its turn, killed him politically. His illusions were inherited
from Bukharin and in the end the system was doomed to failure. However, that
which was planted by Khrushchev, the desire for change, eventually gave
fruit. On the one hand because the reformers within the Soviet party and
state leadership were able to learn from its lessons and on the other since
they were all aware that partial and cosmetic changes would not lead to
success.
Twenty years and four months had passed since Khrushchev was removed
from office when on the 11th of March 1985 Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev was
elected to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union.
3. THE TWO OPTIONS AND THE MISTAKE OF GORBACHEV
Gorbachev had two options - to change the system either by liberalising
the economy
or by changing the political system. The first option would have
guaranteed stability
and a gradual transition, the second - conflict and chaos. In any event
neither he nor his successors had a plan for global action.
A
t the beginning of 1985 the majority of the Soviet population was ready
for change. It was tired of the drawn-out death throes of the Brezhnev
leadership, filled with hope when Yuri Andropov came to power, crushed by
his death soon after that and his replacement with the aging Brezhnevite
Konstantin Chernenko. Soviet society and in particular the intelligentsia
during this period were tired of the endless speeches and demagogy, of the
discrepancies between words and reality, of the empty shelves and the
universal lack of everything which the ordinary member of the public might
require. Mikhail Gorbachev found not only fertile ground for change but he
indeed became the natural mouthpiece for the expression of all the ambitions
and hopes of the majority of Soviet society.
During his first year of office Gorbachev made significant changes to
the politburo, the government, the leadership of the armed forces and
foreign ministry. It was during this period that Edward Shevernadze came to
the fore in the Soviet leadership as foreign minister and member of the
politburo. A.Yakovlev became the leader of the propaganda section of the
Central Committee of the CPSU. Boris Yeltsin became the leader of the Moscow
party committee of the CPSU. In practice these were the three political
figures who most radically and faithfully supported the political and
economic reforms.
In 1985 Gorbachev opened up the way for improvements in Soviet and
American relations in the areas of arms control policy and the radical
reduction in first-strike nuclear weapons. The summit meeting held between
Gorbachev and the American president Ronald Reagan in November 1985 in
Geneva was the beginning of a turn-around in world nuclear arms policy. In
1986 Gorbachev accelerated personnel changes in the leadership of the
communist party and the Soviet state as well as in the mass media and local
party apparatus.
I believe that these first two years were decisive for Gorbachev's
choice of strategy. Undoubtedly, the change which he began were on a much
larger scale than those of Khrushchev and affected all areas of life.
Despite this in 1985 and 1986 Gorbachev continued to pursue the idea of
revitalising the system in the aims of "more socialism". In June 1986 in
Habarovsk he formulated the essence of "perestroika" and the need for its
advancement. During this period the people of the USSR were allowed much
greater spiritual freedom and learnt many truths about their history and the
outrages of Stalinism.
Now, looking back on the documents and facts of this period, it can be
seen that Gorbachev did not have a plan for global action. He had not
imagined that perestroika would cause such global transformations. The
General Secretary of the CPSU was motivated by the idea of strengthening
Soviet society and socialism, rather than overthrowing the culture and
system of a waning civilisation. This "provinciality" in his attitude to a
global power, such as the USSR was, is quite evident in his thousands of
speeches and articles of the time, however, it is also proof of the lack of
the global responsibility necessary for the leader of one of the two super
powers.[21]
Gorbachev had two options. The first of these was to give priority to
economic reforms (similar to Hungary and China) with simultaneous guarantees
of centralised power followed by the gradual implementation of political
reforms. The second option was to introduce political reforms followed by
economic reforms. If he had opted for the first option he would have had
further opportunities for global influence, but he did not and plunged the
USSR into a network of internal conflicts.
From the speeches made by Gorbachev between 1985 and 1986 it can be
seen that he did not underestimate economic reform and wanted to find a way
of implementing reform both in the economy and in politics. It is, however,
clear that Gorbachev and his allies were thinking on their feet and that
they did not have a clear action plan suitable for universal, global change.
The political campaigns began to take a hold but economic reforms tended to
falter in their tracks. The simultaneous implementation of economic and
political reforms in actual fact gave weight to the latter. As Gorbachev
announced the policy of Glasnost and began to reveal the truth about the
past, he put the authority of the party apparatus under threat and accepted
the enormous challenge of political reforms and the divisive inner-party
conflicts. The beginning of "perestroika" through the policy of "glasnost"
in essence meant the priority of political reform over economic reform. This
fact was of decisive significance for the fate of the USSR and Eastern
Europe and the whole world. If Gorbachev had delayed political reform and
had placed the accent on the economy, this would not have lead so rapidly to
the chaotic collapse of the Eastern European systems and the USSR. Such a
transition would not have lead to the explosion of nationalism and dozens of
local wars and conflicts. The Eastern European nations would not have become
a burden for the developed Western European nations and there would not have
been the need for billions of dollars in financial aid.
Gorbachev's choice was not the result of a deliberately thought-out
plan but rather the result of circumstances. However, having opted for a
model of change, sooner rather than later local conflicts and the collapse
of Eastern European structures were inevitable. Of the reasons for such a
denouement, one is of particular significance. The integrated nature of the
totalitarian system was totally reliant on the centralised nature of power.
In contrast to market economies where people are linked by an enormous
number of horizontal connections independent of the central power, in a
totalitarian economy social integration is maintained via central state
institutions. This applies not only to economic entities but also to ethnic
groups and the structures of information exchange and culture.
Rapid reforms to the system of political authority without economic
foundations within a totalitarian society by definition pose a risk of the
entire system collapsing in chaos. Imagine factories which are accustomed to
receiving materials allocated to them by the central planning institutions.
The destruction of this institution or change within the political or
administrative system allows the factories to sell to whom they want and to
ignore whom they want. The result of this is that at one fell swoop
thousands and millions of economic bonds are severed and the chaos becomes
unimaginable.
This was also the case in the area of international relations. Under
totalitarianism many national groups were able to co-exist peacefully within
the order imposed from above and any conflicts between them were
cosmetically concealed. However, these peoples peoples lacked sufficient
horizontal economic and cultural bonds as for example is the case with the
various nationalities inhabiting Switzerland. After the collapse of the
central power, nations which had until the previous day been good neighbours
began to divide up territories, power, money and in many cases opened up the
way for armed conflict with tanks and weapons.
Whether Gorbachev understood the scale of the emerging crisis is a
question of some doubt. What is clear, however, is that during this period
economic reforms made no progress, whereas political reforms began to give
rise to greater and greater conflicts. In January 1987, a little more than a
month after the release of Sakharov from internal exile, Mikhail Gorbachev
laid before the Central Committee of the CPSU a series of measures aimed at
political reform. These included secret ballots with multiple candidates and
the election of non-communists to senior state posts, participation of
employees in the election of directors at their place of work, the reduction
of state ownership in favour of cooperative ownership and so on. This was
not only a direct and decisive blow to the party apparatus and its vested
interests, but also to the power structure itself. After this plenum
feelings of opposition to perestroika began to make themselves felt. The
indignation of the party apparatus was total and reactions became more and
more overt. However, the inertia of change was too great to be stopped. In
1987 a process of political rehabilitation of intellectuals repressed by
Stalin began and the first timid steps were being made towards the opening
of private cooperative shops.
In the same year, which I consider the zenith of the perestroika, a
number of serious problems began to manifest themselves. Most significant of
these was the fact that "perestroika" had given practically no positive
economic results and had not alleviated the problems faced by ordinary
people. The successes which were being achieved in the medium range arms
negotiations were having less and less influence on the public opinion.
People were more concerned with the lack of goods in the shops. In October
1987 the first nationalist conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaidjan flared
up. This was the beginning of the general crisis in national relations
within the USSR. At the same time a number of diverse, but well organised,
opposition groups began to appear within the Soviet leadership. On the one
hand, both within the Central Committee of the CPSU and outside it the
opposition to Gorbachev's reforms was becoming more vocal and aimed at the
preservation of the status quo of single party power and the totalitarian
system. On the other hand, in October 1987, Boris Yeltsin made official
accusations against Gorbachev and Ligachev, marking the beginning of a
political movement aimed at more radical and liberal reforms.
From this moment on Gorbachev was obliged to strike a balance between
these two groups which limited his flexibility and making his action seems
more contradictory. The General Secretary was neither able to turn back,
which would have marked the end of his career and perestroika, nor was he
free enough to make sufficient intensive progress. Gorbachev had already
surpassed Khrushchev but was not safe from the same fate.
In November 1988, Estonia declared its independence and the right of
the Supreme Council of Estonia to veto laws passed by the Soviet parliament.
Mass independence movements began in Lithuania and Latvia. The ethnic
tension between Armenia and Azerbaidjan continued. In this situation, on the
7th of December 1988, Gorbachev announced to the UN that the Soviet army
would be reduced by half a million and the pull-out of Soviet troops from
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany began. The Soviet leader called for
a new world order. This was his biggest tactical mistake. He realised his
global responsibility too late. When Gorbachev finally understood his
decisive significance in international reform and in general, as well as the
fate of perestroika,he had already lost his power.
4. THE COLLAPSE OF PERESTROIKA
The collapse of perestroika in 1991 had been foreseen as early as the
end of 1988.
With the conflicts which ensued, it will be evaluated by modern
historians as a process filled with contradictions. On the other hand, it
opened the floodgates to new opportunities for progress and history in the
long-term will appreciate as the catalyst for the advent
of the new civilisation.
I
shall take a more detailed look at the changes which took place in
Eastern Europe not only because since I lived through them personally but
because I am convinced of the fact that the events of 1986--1991 will affect
our fate for many years to come. 1989 and 1990 were years of the gradual
"fiasco" of perestroika as a line of evolutionary change within the
totalitarian system. Its collapse took several forms. Firstly -- the
complete failure of economic reforms and, consequently, the reduced support
for perestroika on the part of the Soviet people. Secondly -- allowing the
local inter-ethnic conflicts to get out of hand and the consequent explosion
of ethnic self-confidence and demands. Thirdly -- the collapse of the
Eastern European political and military alliances and the severance of ties
between the Eastern European nations and Moscow.
As early as the beginning of January 1989 the majority of Soviet
republics began to pass a series of new laws establishing their own
languages as the official language of the republic. In March of the same
year in the first free elections for the Congress of the People's Deputies
the nationalist movements in the Baltic Republics won the absolute majority.
In May, Lithuania and Estonia and in July Latvia, in spite of Moscow's
displeasure, passed a law, declaring their independence. The question arose
of the fate of the USSR, its integrity and unity and the future of the
central leadership. This was, indeed, Gorbachev's most serious ordeal and
the precursor of the final collapse of perestroika. The opposition of the
neo-communists within the Soviet leadership was a powerful force in favour
of preserving the unity of the Soviet Union and hard-line policies.
The potential collapse of the Soviet Union was unacceptable for the
Moscow elite, mainly for ideological reasons. It is not to be underestimated
that for 70 years millions of people in the former USSR were absolutely
convinced of the need for its existence and of the idea and meaning of the
Soviet system. No less important is the fact that the collapse of the USSR
was de facto to signify the demise of all the higher leadership posts. In
1990 and 1991 such a possibility instilled feelings of insecurity in the
Soviet elite. Tens of thousands of senior civil servants, amongst them
leading figures in the Moscow government, were threatened with losing their
jobs.
There is another side to the question which has to be considered. The
majority of the world political elite considered the potential collapse of
the USSR as a complex and possibly dangerous issue. From my direct personal
conversations with senior politicians in the USA, France, Germany and
Austria and other countries and from indirect political analyses, I have the
impression that in 1990 and 1991 only the minority of them were in favour of
a collapse of the USSR. The world was concerned about the appearance of new
nuclear powers such as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan and the potential of
large-scale military conflict with the possible use of nuclear arms. The
insecurity of this super power was a matter of concern for all. This
insecurity could also be felt in Moscow. It coincided with increased
criticism of the economic and social policies of the CPSU. The leaders of
the other Eastern European states, members of the Warsaw Pact, were amongst
those who were becoming vocal in their criticism.
The most significant factor which was to sound the death knell for
perestroika was the explosion of ethnic and nationalist tension within the
USSR itself. IN January 1990, thousands of Azeris protested near to the
Soviet border with Iran. A few days later the Lithuanian communist party
ratified Lithuania's independence. On the 11th of January, Armenia exercised
its right to veto Soviet legislation, following the example of the Baltic
states. The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaidjan over Nagorni Karabakh
continues to escalate. Protests and tension began to make themselves felt in
Moldova and Tadzhikistan. These were clearly not individual phenomena but
symptoms of the general collapse of the USSR.
On the 7th of February 1990, the Central Committee of the CPSU accepted
in essence the idea of a multi-party political system as the basis for the
creation of democratic socialism. In February and March during the local
government elections the established nomenclature lost many senior positions
in favour of independent and largely unknown new leaders. A little later,
V.Landsbergis was elected as the first non-communist president of a Soviet
republic. From this moment on the process of collapse began to accelerate.
Gorbachev had clearly begun to lose control of events. After 1989 the rate
of change was no longer being dictated by Gorbachev or his entourage. On the
other hand it must be appreciated that Gorbachev did not give in to the
temptations or the suggestions to halt the reform process with the help of
the army.[22]
By the middle of 1990 it was already evident that the three Baltic
republics would achieve full independence. The next great challenge came
from Kiev where the Ukraine, on the 16th February, also declared its
independence. In August another group of Soviet republics declared their
independence. Gorbachev was left the with the only alternative of proposing
a new union of independent republics. His suggestion to reorganise his
cabinet to include the leaders of all 15 republics showed that even as late
as November 1990 the central Soviet leadership was unaware of the real pace
of the reform processes and their real scale and power. In December
Kirgizia, the last remaining 15th republic declared its independence.
During the period (November--December 1990) the opposition against
Gorbachev had begun to increase and he was forced to make compromises. In
December 1990 he was forced to dismiss some of his most loyal allies and
supporters of the reform process. On the 2nd of December the Minister of the
Interior was replaced by Boris Pugo and on the 26th of December Gorbachev
put forward Genadiy Yanaev for the post of Vice-President of the Union. I do
not believe that it would be a contravention of political ethics I if were
to share my personal impressions from the meeting I had with Genadiy Yanaev
the day after he was elected to the post of the Vice-President of the USSR.
From my conversation with him it soon became clear that the election of
Yanaev was a return of those forces which desired the stabilisation of the
situation, the preservation of the USSR, more hard-line politics and a
desire to use the position of Gorbachev to achieve these aims.
In the same month, December 1990, the head of the KGB, V.Kriuchkov
began to become more vocal and to increase the authority of his position by
officially proclaiming the time-worn slogans of the danger posed by the CIA
and that the KGB was prepared to fight against any anti-communist forces. On
the other hand, one must not forget the exceptional foresight and shrewdness
of the foreign minister of the time, Edward Shevardnadze, who warned of the
imminent possibility of dictatorship. During the entire period of 1991
Gorbachev was forced to manoeuvre between these influences, hoping to
preserve the Soviet Union and to continue his line of paced reform within
the ideology of perestroika, albeit in an new form.
When I look back and analyse the events of those days, I find it
impossible not to believe that the conflict which took place at the end of
1990 was impossible for two major factors: on the one hand, the increased
rate of the disintegration of the Soviet state via the development of
democratic and completely independent movements in all the former Soviet
republics while on the other -- the threats to the interests of the ruling
elite and the increased activity of the majority of the Soviet leadership
aimed at the preservation of the status quo.
And so we arrive at the attempted coup of the 19th of August 1991. One
question begs to be answered: Did Gorbachev and other proponents of
perestroika know of the imminent coup and its scale? I do not believe so, at
least in terms of specifics. They could not have failed to have seen the
storm on the horizon or have felt the potential danger, but nothing more. On
the 16th of August A.Yakovliev warned that a coup was being prepared in
Russia, but this was more of a political conclusion than information based
on specific facts. A month later, on the 15[th] of September I
had a long conversation in Moscow with Yakovliev and Shevernadze. My
profound conviction from these talks is that they had both had a foreboding
of the events but had not believed that it could take place so quickly. I
feel that Gorbachev was of the same opinion. They had not believed for
example that the minister of defence, D. Yazov, could be involved in such a
plot. They had not believed that the entire council of ministers of the USSR
would be so willing to reject the new Treaty of Union to replace to the USSR
with a Confederation of Independent States. Of course, there were many
inexplicable occurrences during the course of the attempted coup, but that
is the way of politics. Large-scale change is often connected with many
inexplicable events when the momentary psychological or physical conditions
of an individual or group of individuals can be of decisive significance for
events.
The intention of the leaders of the coup was to carry replace Gorbachev
quietly, or at least to put him out of the way in reserve. Yanaev,
Kriuchkov, Pavlov[23] and others had evidently been in favour of
the maximum flexibility in the change of power with the eventual gradual
restoration of the Soviet regime. Gorbachev had to be convinced to withdraw
for reasons of illness or nervous exhaustion or to come into line with the
leaders of the coup and to "cure" himself of his illusions. There were clear
analogies with the coup of August 1991 and the removal of Khrushchev from
power in October 1964 -- a statement regarding the illness of the leader,
putting the troops on alert along with a declaration that they would not be
used as an elementary attempted to pacify the people and international
society.
There were, however, enormous differences between 1991 and 1964.
Underestimating these differences was one of the biggest mistakes the
leaders of the coup made. In August 1991 the Russian nation and in
particular the Russian intelligentsia were of a completely different state
of mind. Their thirst for and their experiences of freedom were stronger
than any more primitive feelings for preserving the status quo.
Notwithstanding economic difficulties, masses of the Soviet people had
experienced the taste of free life. Although perestroika in terms of
strategy and tactics was already bankrupt, it had lead to profound changes
in the way of thinking of wide ranging social groups. The 19th of August was
the litmus test which in reality showed what had been achieved by Gorbachev.
Perestroika had not only unleashed the will of the people but had also given
it the self-confidence not to heed what was said to them "from above".
Shortly after the attempted coup the rock group, "The Scorpions"
released their hit "The Winds of Change", dedicated to those who had
thwarted the coup. Indeed, this wind came from the heart of the reformed
Soviet society, from the new spirit cultivated by perestroika.
On the day after the coup, on the 20th of August, several hundred
thousand demonstrators protested against it in St.Petersburg, thousands
surrounded the White House. Huge demonstrations were organised in the larger
towns of Russia. Major sections of the Russian army refused to carry out the
orders of leaders of the coup or take any decisive actions. On the evening
of the 20th of August it was already becoming apparent that the
self-proclaimed "Committee of salvation" had lost control over the
situation. At that moment the leaders of the coup had two choices: either to
declare a bloody civil war with no predictable outcome or to sound the
retreat.
In the final outcome, the coup was thwarted by the decisive actions of
Boris Yeltsin and his supporters, but also by the millions of ordinary
Russian people who were unwilling to make compromises with their
consciences, the generals and officers whose thoughts and deeds were not
limited by party interests and remained loyal to their exalted mission. I
will never forget my telephone conversation at that time with Edward
Shevernadze. At the time of the conversation the outcome of the conflict was
far from clear. Despite this I felt in him not only his decisiveness to
engage in the struggle, but also a clear feeling of responsibility to avoid
the unthinkable -- to avoid a civil war or a large-scale thermo-nuclear war.
I feel tempted to write that not only in the USSR but in other countries as
well the driving forces of change were the standard bearers of the emergent
new civilisation. Many of them, perhaps still unconsciously, other, thinking
with the criteria of world progress, and yet others since they had just had
enough of thinking the way other people wanted them to think.
The 19th of August 1991 was the real date of the end of perestroika and
the start of new beginnings in the process of economic and political reforms
in the USSR. The collapse of the coup meant, in practice, the collapse of
the major forces which were holding up the reform process. It meant
something else as well: together with the ban on the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union and the dismissal of the Council of Ministers, the arrest of
the conspirators the main it resulted in the removal of the main
institutions of power which until that moment had held the USSR together.
Making the most of this moment, in the days following the failed coup, the
former Soviet republics confirmed their announcements of independence. The
new union treaty of which the leaders of the coup had been so frightened and
which would have saved the Union was forgotten. The new directly elected
president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, began a series of direct contacts with
the leaders of the former Soviet republics and with only a few months
withdrew the prerogatives of the centralised Soviet ministries. This in
reality meant the collapse of the USSR and the passing of its basic rights
and obligations into the domain of the Russian republic.
After coming to terms with the huge public support for the actions of
Boris Yeltsin, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned in 1991.[24] This was
the end of a significant period in the history of the nations of the former
USSR. As paradoxical as it may seem, this period also marked the beginning
of a new era in the development of the world. The collapse of one of the two
superpowers meant in practice the collapse of the bi-polar world and
together with this the structures which were typical of the Third
Civilisation.
5. THE EXPLOSION IN EASTERN EUROPE
The radical changes within Eastern Europe during the period between
1989 and 1990 were the first part of the universal political restructuring
of the world order.
These changes began as a huge emotional outpouring soon to be followed
by enormous problems and disappointments.
A
number of experts on the subject believe that the changes in the
Eastern Europe were the result of understandings reached by Gorbachev and
Reagan at their numerous meetings, in particular in Malta. My personal
opinion is that these processes could not have come about as the result of
any agreement. The changes were a result of the growth in self-confidence of
the Eastern European peoples as a consequence of perestroika, of the
confidence in the influence of the democratic movements and the feeling that
Gorbachev and his entourage were losing control over power.
The extent of the influence of the reforms which took place in the USSR
after 1985 on the countries in Eastern Europe was enormous. In Bulgaria, for
example, whose language is very close to Russian, the most popular
newspapers between 1986 and 1989 were not Bulgarian but Soviet. The spirit
of perestroika, the revelations of truths about the past, the constant
reminders that the Utopias of the totalitarian regimes were bankrupt lead to
enormous changes in people's attitudes and prepared the way for the
beginning of the explosion. Despite differences in scale and methods, all
the "socialist" countries of Eastern Europe began to give birth to new civil
movements and the growth in free expression and the desire for profound
reforms.
On the 6th of March 1989 the speaker of the Soviet foreign ministry,
Gerasimov, announced that the future of every Eastern European country lay
in its own hands. In this way he officially dismissed the Brezhnev doctrine
which guaranteed the control of Moscow over all its Eastern European
satellites. There is no doubt that Gorbachev had given prior notice of this
announcement to his Western partners. From this moment on, events unfolded
at an unbelievable pace.
In May 1989 the Hungarian government dominated by reformist communists
opened its border with Austria and allowed thousands of citizens from the
former German Democratic Republic to travel to West Germany. A little later
the Polish trade union "Solidarity" achieved a decisive victory in the
elections to the Senate and part of the lower chamber of the Polish Sejm.
Moscow accepted these events calmly, thus proving that it had indeed
accepted a new policy towards Eastern Europe. On the 7th of July at a summit
meeting of the Warsaw pact countries in Bucharest, Gorbachev declared that
all the members of the pact were at liberty to chose their own paths.
What was the objective of the Soviet leadership in relation to its
former allies?
Analysing the experience of Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and a
number of other Eastern European countries of this period, I believe that
between the spring and summer of 1989 Gorbachev had begun to apply a policy
based on two main theses: first of all -- the rejection of the "Brezhnev
doctrine" on the limitation of sovereignty and allowing greater freedom to
the governments of the relevant countries; secondly -- the replacement of
the old leaderships with new, more pragmatic leaders and the preservation of
the Soviet zone of influence on the basis on new alliances and treaties.
This, however, involved the same theoretical and practical problem as in the
Soviet Union. On the one hand, Gorbachev wanted to give greater freedom and
to support the reform processes within the Eastern European communist
parties. On the other hand, he could or would not comprehend the scale of
the explosion, the fuse of which he had lighted himself. The reform
processes resembled an uncorked bottle of champagne rather than a
well-thought out scheme. After liberation of their spirits, the people would
no longer accept leaders imposed upon them from above and pouring out onto
the streets and squares they demonstrated new power and self-confidence.
After the summit meeting in Bucharest in July 1989 events unfolded like
a chain reaction. On the 7th of October Gorbachev directly influenced the
beginning of reforms in the DDR and on the 18th of October Erik Honneker was
replaced by Egon Krenz. A few days later the Berlin wall came down. On the
10th of November the Bulgarian communist leader, Todor Zhivkov, was replaced
by Petar Mladenov, who was favoured by the Soviet leadership. At the end of
November and the beginning of December after mass unrest in Prague, a new
government was formed consisting mainly of non-communists and on the 29th of
December Vaclav Havel became the first non-communist president from more
that 40 years. During the last few days of December the Rumanian dictator
and his wife were killed after a military coup and a hastily improvised
trial.
From the point of view of the history of the Eastern European nations
these changes had enormous significance. They followed the logic of the
analogous changes which were taking place within the USSR, but rapidly
overtook them in terms of their speed and depth. Apart from the universal
elements of the crisis within the USSR there were the additional factors of
the struggle and aspirations of the smaller Eastern European nations for
complete sovereignty and independence. This also helps to explain the more
radical nature of the changes which took place within them.
From a global point of view the explosion in Eastern Europe was the
first phase of the larger geo-political changes and the creation of a new
world order. The changes in Moscow, Berlin, Sofia, Prague, Budapest and
Bucharest, together with the collapse of the USSR can be determined as the
beginning of the collapse of the Third Civilisation. The military and
political alliances of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON were rendered pointless.
The political map of Europe had changed beyond recognition.
The democratic changes in Eastern Europe could have taken place in a
different way but they could not have been avoided. The changes were a
consequence of the crisis of the totalitarian regimes, their inability to
adapt to the large technological and political changes in the world and the
requirements of the new age. The administrative coercion of the one-party
system and the repression of private economic initiative were shown to be
historical mistakes.
Only history will decide what would have been best for the world --
either the "Chinese" model of reform by placing priority on economic reform,
or the "velvet revolutions" which in reality took place. I have to say
personally, that not only in Bulgaria but in most of the other Eastern
European countries very few people believed in the rapid demise of the USSR
before 1989. No-one could believe that a super power such as the USSR could
allow itself to reject its global privileges or that the leader of such a
super power would voluntarily "concede" his "conquests" without wanting
anything in return.
And now, looking back to the facts of 5--6 years ago, I can see for
myself yet again, that the changes in Eastern Europe were not thought out
beforehand, not were they carried out effectively from a regional or global
point of view. The West was carried away with the "ideological" ecstasy that
communism was on its way out. In the Eastern European countries themselves
the nature of the changes was motivated mainly by internal conflicts and
clashes. In some Eastern European countries restorationalists got the upper
hand, with aspirations to restore to themselves the pre-war rights they had
lost. Radical change from strong state regulation to radical liberalism had
its destructive consequences. It was clear that in this way the Eastern
European countries would undergo a long period of instability and a slow
adaptation to the European Community.
From a positive point of view, the most important consequences of the
changes in Eastern Europe were the destruction of internal obstructions to
world integration and the creation of the new structures of the global
world. At the same time the discovery of new virgin territory for world
globalisation was far from promising world harmony. Realisation was soon to
come in the West that the belief in the final victory of world capitalism
was wrong. In the East internal conflicts continued. New solutions had to be
found while the common crisis persisted...
6. RETURN TO A DIFFICULT FUTURE
Was the return to power of the former Eastern European socialist
parties a logical
stage in development? There is a common reason for this. It was a
confirmation
of the thesis that the political process is not a series of
happenstances but is rather
governed by a definite logical process.
A
fter the series of mainly "gentle" revolutions in Eastern Europe in
1989 and 1990 and the changes which took place later in the USSR, the period
between 1993 and 1995 was marked by a series of elections in which the
former communist parties (or their political successors) were returned to
power. In Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Slovakia the former
communists won categorical victories at the polls. In December this was
repeated in Russia by the communist party lead by G.Zuganov. In Rumania and
Yugoslavia the former communists never actually left power. This gave rise
to the question which is not uppermost in the minds of modern thinkers and
politicians: was this return to power of the ex-communist parties a logical
stage in development?
I have to admit that during the five or six years of the reform process
many of these parties did undergo profound changes. They accepted the values
of democracy and pluralism and changed their platforms. In contrast to the
newly-formed parties of anti-communists, democrats and liberals they had
well organised party structures and people faithful to them in all sectors
of economic power. Some of these parties together with the structures of the
former state security organisations had been preparing themselves for
pluralism and opposition politics as early as the period of perestroika.
Economic domination, the creation of their own "loyal" dissident and
political circles, the infiltration of trusted members into the newly-formed
anti-communist parties - all this was undoubtedly well planned and had a
strong influence on the political situation.
The most important reason for the return of the ex-communist parties to
power, in my opinion, can be found in the nature of the totalitarian system
and the logical stages in its change. What I referred to earlier as the
"mistake" of Gorbachev was also decisive here. The new democratic, radical
and liberal forces came to the forefront riding high on the wave of
political reform. E.Gaidar and A.Chubais in Russia, L.Balzerovic in Polish
and Y.Antal in Hungary all became symbols of the reform. All the reformers,
however, were faced with the same problem - while political changes could be
carried out radically and quickly, economic reform required time, trained
specialists and techniques specifically designed for the transition from
extreme centralism to a market economy. The "phased" discrepancies between
economic and political changes caused economic difficulties, serious
political clashes and crime.
The explosion of emotions and anti-communism of the autumn of 1989 and
during the period between 1990-1991 succeeded in alienating the former
administrative and economic elite from the new democrats. Their more or less
forced removal from ministries and state factories provided them with
significant opportunities in the private sector where they acted in close
cooperation with tens of thousands of well-trained experts from the former
state security organisations. The only way for the new democratic forces to
control the economic forces was to get them on their side, as happened in
the Czech republic. Elsewhere where pragmatism was replaced with virulent
anti-communism, the new political forces were unable to control the economic
sector sufficiently to carry out large-scale reforms. The economic forces,
banks, factories and the private sector, in general remained in the hands of
people trained by the former totalitarian regime.
The second important reason was the disappointment of the population.
One group of the population had benefitted from a series of social
privileges and guarantees under the totalitarian regime. By supporting the
reforms between 1989 and 1990 many of these people expected a rapid solution
to the problems which they were experiencing and not the chaos, crime and
fall in living standards and production which in reality ensued.
Unfortunately, as a result of the delays in economic reform during the
period of perestroika and the clashes with the harsh reality of the open
world economy these hopes remain unfulfilled. Bulgaria did not become a
Balkan Switzerland, as some of its leaders promised, nor did Rumania become
France. Quite the contrary, the populations of the Eastern European
countries had to come to terms with the unwelcome news that they produced
little, consumed much more and had to reverse this ratio by 180 percent.
For these reasons in 1992 almost all the Eastern European countries
experienced a profound change in social attitudes. The political elite who
had been in power from 1989-1990 were forced to realise in terror that their
sleepless nights, the titanic struggle and reforms were now considered by
many as mistaken. Of course, it should be added that many of the new
democrats did in fact make many mistakes. In the long run the radical nature
of the economic reforms in the period between 1989 and 1990 and the delay in
implementing economic reforms led to the political equilibrium being upset.
Sooner or later it had to be restored. A significant percentage of the
population in Eastern Europe had become impoverished and disappointed. They
preferred to vote for the former communist parties seeing in them hope for
the restoration of the social benefits which they had lost.
However, can the reformed communists live up to these expectations? The
answer is a conditional "no", or a partial "no". The condition is that they
undertake a flexible policy of reform aimed at the widest possible social
strata of society. Due to the legislative changes which have been
undertaken, any return to the past is unlikely, although to a certain extent
still possible, mainly in Russia. There still remains the difficult path of
peaceful reforms needed to achieve successful economic policies. For this
reason the return of the ex-communist parties is a return to a difficult
future. It will not halt the global processes of integration, nor will it
delay the processes of moving towards new, civilising social relations.
After the battle of Waterloo at the beginning of the 19th century, the
processes of restoration in France looked inexorable and many believed in
it. However, it was to be seen that once the seeds of revolutionary ideas
had been sown, it was to be very difficult to destroy them, the freedoms
that had been won could not be taken away. Such is the case with the return
of the ex-communist parties to power. They will either have to adapt to the
new civilising realities or they will thrown onto the scrapheap of history.
For the ex-communist parties of Hungary and Poland this will be easier,
their ideological reformation began a long time before they came back to
power. For the Bulgarian Socialist Party or the Party of Social Democracy in
Rumania this will be more difficult.
Whatever the outcome, the reflected processes of global transition in
Eastern Europe will not be smooth. As a reaction to the errors and the
collapse of perestroika politics went too far to the right and then turned
sharply to the left. The realities of life will put the former socialist
parties to the test. Some of them will rise to the challenge and some will
fall victim to the contradiction of their own ideological contradictions,
while still others will collapse under the pressure of vested interests.
Whether the New Civilisation will accept them is a matter that the future
will show us.
Chapter Three
COLLAPSE II: GLOBAL DISORDER
1. THE DANGER OF CHAOS
Ever change of epoch takes place in the context of conflict and
disorder.
The crisis in the East is just the first phase of the changes in the
present global political order. The second phase will take place in the West
and Far East...
T
he universal processes of globalisation and the collapse of the Eastern
European regimes have given rise to a whole series of unfamiliar phenomena.
Humanity has entered a new phase of development marked by the huge and
growing level of mutual interdependence between people, nations and
cultures. The global order based on the principles of bi-polarism of two
super powers and which had dominated since the Second World War has been
destroyed. To a large extent the way in which the Eastern European regimes
collapsed lead to this state of chaos firstly in their own countries and
later in international economic and political relations. I define chaos as a
universal crisis of the spiritual and value systems, the rejection of
certain standards of global intercourse and the instability of others, as a
period of relative disorder leading to change in the world order.
The first phase of this chaos began in 1989--1900 with the collapse of
the Eastern European regimes and the economic and military organisations in
this part of the world. The dissolution of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact in
the space of a few months led to chaos in economic relations within Eastern
Europe. The mutual export of goods between the former members of these
organisations fell sharply. Almost all the countries in the region lost
their markets and the stability of their industrial structures was all but
destroyed. Later this was followed by the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Soviet
Union and Czechoslovakia. A number of ethnic conflicts flared up, some of
which developed into full-scale wars. For the three years between 1990--1993
the region was in absolute chaos.
I believe that this first stage will be followed by a second, very
important stage of changes. This second stage, which has already begun is
affecting the larger Western powers and their mutual relations, with new
roles and positions being assumed by the Asian states and the acceptance of
new principles in international economic and cultural relations and with
formation of new institutions for the regulations of global processes etc..
Some of them will want to preserve the status quo and their position of
dominance, while others will want to prove old theories. However, there is
only one truth: the post-war global order has lost a number of its main
foundations. Humanity has entered a transitionary period from the bi-polar
model to a new, unfamiliar global structure. The universal crisis of the
post-war political model had caused and continues to cause the general
collapse of contacts and relations wwhich will be of great significance for
further development.
There are two interrelated factors which are of influence on the
processes which are taking place: globalisation as a fundamental and
continuous phenomenon and the crisis in Eastern Europe which was provoked by
globalisation and which at the same time has accelerated its pace. The
problem, however, is that no-one, or almost no-one was prepared for what
happened - neither the collapse of the iron curtain, nor the consequences of
the new drive towards globalisation and its side effects.
I want to speak of the dangers posed by chaos and general disorder
mainly because after the collapse of the Eastern European regimes not one of
the factors which caused the universal crisis of contemporary civilisation
has dissappeared entirely.The deformations of economic growth remain and
global ecological problems have yet to be solved. After the renewal of
nuclear tests, albeit tactical, by France in September 1995 no-one any
longer believes that disarmament is irreversible.
In the context of the bi-polar model the world was governed by two
super powers and a group of nations dependent on them. Today the level of
direct government has sharply declined. After the collapse of the USSR a
number of new pretenders to world leadership have appeared and before our
very eyes the roles and relations of former allies have changed radically.
Politics is no longer two-dimensional but an equation with hundreds of
unknowns. A clear example of the ontradictions between the great powers can
be seen in the war in the former Yugoslavia. The vested interests of certain
states, in assisting various leaders and arming different armies demonstrate
that the old political tradition, the tradition of the bi-polar world has
long since passed away.
Or let us take Europe. The unification of the two Germanies did not
only impose a series of new responsibilities on West Germany but has created
complex problems for pan-European processes. Germany transferred part of the
burden of unification on to its European partners via the mechanisms of
international financial relations. The integration of the two German states
has changed the structure of Europe and the relations of the states within
it. The granting ofassociate membership status to the Eastern European
countries within the structures of the EU seemed in 1989-1991 a relatively
easy task but was soon delayed almost indefinitely. This was to a certain
extent because of the unwillingness of Russia to allow itself to be
encircled by a new "iron" or other type of curtain. The place and role of
Russia itself in the global community are still unclear.
In the global aspect the collapse of the Eastern European regimes has
had even greater consequences. The collapse of the Soviet Union and its
economic potential to all intents and purposes removed one of the two main
super powers from the geo-political map. Only the USA remains. A number of
years have passed and there are already voices which proclaim that the super
powers are no longer necessary. France has offered to extend its nuclear
umbrella over Germany. Germany and Japan have demonstrated their desires to
become permanent members of the Security Council.Russia has officially
requested membership of the group of the most developed nations.
The collapse of the Eastern European economic and political structures
has opened up a hole in world economic relations with consequences for the
world economic order. A not insignificant number of investments have flowed
into Eastern Europe. West Germany's great commitments to its new Eastern
provinces have resulted in a deterioration in the condition of the European
exchange rate system. Without the burdens of such problems, Japan and a
number of other countries in the Far East have continued to develop their
potential and to exert more and more influence on the world economic
processes. China has demonstrated high levels of growth and a flourishing
economy. The changes in South Africa and the forthcoming transition in Hong
Kong have encouraged high levels of investment and movement of funds.
In 1992 and 1993 while delivering lectures in Switzerland and the USA I
emphasised on several occasions that geo-political turbulence will affect
the world financial systems. Even today few people really believe in this
although the facts are there for all to see. In the winter and spring of
1995 the American dollar began to tumble against the Japanese yen. The world
financial markets became very worried and the most prominent financial
experts explained it away with the American budget deficit, the crisis of
the Mexican peso or ambitions to increase American export. What really
happened demonstrates the reduced abilities of governments and central banks
to exercise effective control over international economic relations. Certain
"invisible" private forces are already in control of the world economy and
are rarely affected by governmental influence.
Moreover, the first symptoms of uncotrollability appeared directly
after the collapse of the Brenton Woods system at the beginning of the
1970's when in March 1973 Richard Nixon allowed the dollar to float. For
almost a quarter of a century the dollar has been trying to find its levels
via floating exchange rates and now we are on the eve of a new governmental
vacuum. The reason for this is the constant increase in the role of the
private banks and unidentified financial funds in global economics, the
growth in the role of centrifugal effects in the world financial systems. In
the spring of 1995 the director of the International Monetary Fund,
M.Cammedessu, declared that in the near future and with its present
structures the IMF would not be able to continue to fulfil its functions.
"We are living in a dangerous world" were the words of Cammedessu. His
trepidations were emphasised by the constant growth in unregulated funds of
money as well as by the growing mountain of state and private debts etc..
Neither the present international financial system nor the entire world
economic and political order will be able to prevent any possible crises.
The chaos has affected the spiritual relations, thinking and value
systems of people. The world communist movement underwent a catastrophe with
negative repercussion for a number of other socialist and social democratic
movements. On the other hand, the unpreparedness of the West to act quickly
and the clear inadequacy of liberal doctrines to stop the crisis showed that
they are unable to offer a miracle treatment. Many politicians in attempts
to avoid divergence between reality and ideas have stated that it is no
longer political programmes or ideologies which are important but pragmatic
action. As in other similar historical transitional periods a large number
of people are confused and prefer to take refuge in local pragmatism and
finding solutions only to current problems. The lack of a common view about
how one should approach the new situation has opened the door to
nationalism, ethnic ambitions and xenophobia. A significant number of world
politicians have been compelled to turn their attention to current problem
solving and to ignore global and regional problems. It is becoming more and
more evident that there is a need for a global analysis on what is taking
place, its consequences and a search for a solution to the chaos which is
ensuing. Today there is no doctrine or common theory about the future of the
world, or how to solve our common problems: the global economic order, the
environment, poverty, religious tolerance, stabilisation of growth etc..
This is one of the reasons why nationalism often comes to the fore in the
search for solutions to global problems.
The attitudes of the younger generations is a very important indication
of the spiritual crisis. I often speak to my colleagues who are lecturers in
various institutions of higher education in the industrialised countries of
the world. In the less developed countries the situation is less clear. The
young people in these countries want to achieve the material prosperity of
the richest nations which is in itself strong motivation. In the USA, Japan,
France, Great Britain, Canada and Germany, however, for quite a long time
now, students and young people have no overall idea about their future. The
ambition of achieving a certain level of material prosperity, a large bank
account, one's own business, to travel abroad and so on, are largely
manifestations of tradition rather than anything else.
But what does this mean? Healthy interests and the stability of the
system? Or, rather, a spiritual crisis in a vacuum expressed by the new
generations in the most developed countries drowning in luxury and spiritual
consumerism.
World history has witnessed other periods of chaos and disorder of
global structures: some longer some shorter. The problem is that the changes
which are taking place today are not as the result of wars in which the
victor imposes his will with force. The globalisation of the world has led
to a universal crisis of the current world order. This is a crisis of the
entire world system, of national and regional thinking and consequently
everything else which typifies the Third Civilisation. Within global
relations there is a new spiritual, economic and political vacuum. If these
vacuums are not filled with adequate changes to world structures, there may
be indescribable consequences. Why has there been such an explosion of
religious sects in recent years? Why has terrorism become a global problem
and is more and more uncompromising and violent in its forms? Why are people
becoming more alienated from politics? Why has fundamentalism spread into
new territories? Why has international crime grown so much?
The reason is that the current world order is not adequate to respond
to the new realities. NATO and the USA alone are not capable of resolving
world conflicts. This may even lead to a reaction from Russia or China and
new divisions within the world. The UN does not have the strength to stop
conflicts. It is becoming apparent that many elements of the current world
system are outdated and its major mechanisms have to be changed and
repaired.
The manifold lack of clarity in international political and economic
relations are an expression of an inadequately low level of agreement
between countries and the expectation that everything will resolve itself.
The disorder is on such a large scale that it requires common action on the
basis of universally accepted principles. Of course, the world today is much
more integrated. This should not be seen so much as an advantage but as a
condition for overcoming the chaos more rapidly and for allowing integration
to develop. This will also require some form of world coordination, of
mutually acceptable decisions and the growth in the role of organisations
such as the UN. It would, however, be imprudent to suppose that the problems
with which we are faced will be resolved quickly and conclusively. This will
require a relatively longer period. The new world order will develop
gradually, based on mutually agreeable action .This conclusion is based on
the fact that the real world powers are still acting from their position as
nation states and their national responsibilities and will only change the
international rules of the game within that context. This is logical but it
also carries a risk. Given a variety of events and varying conditions any
one country with a more dominant global role by changing its internal order
runs the risk of causing a universal cataclysm.
Globalisation and its progeny - the global world, will lead to a crisis
not only of traditional international relations but also of the political
systems of national societies. The interests of more and more people stretch
beyond the bounds of a single state and depend less and less on the
decisions of a single government. Everywhere in the developed world there is
a decline in trust for traditional political systems and a need for new
decisions. Thus:
1. The lack of a mechanism for reliable international, economic and
political regulations;
2. The contradiction between the unlimited global power of world
corporations and the limited power of governmental decisions;
3. The reactions of 2.5-3 billion poor people in the unification of
humanity into a single mutually dependent whole;
4. The danger of new nationalism and the restoration the division of
the world into blocs;
5. The possibility of the bi-polar model being exchanged for a
mono-centric world structure and the domination of one or a group of rich
states;
6. The destruction of small cultures and the dilution of national
traditions and values;
7. The limitation of the private life of the individual and his
transformation into a "manipulated animal" by the new media;
8. The crisis of traditional political systems;
9. Terrorism and international crime;
All this factors are expressions of the disorder and danger of chaos -
an expression of the crisis of the borders between the two epochs.
2. GEOPOLITICAL COLLAPSE
One of the most important consequences of the collapse of the Eastern
European
totalitarian regimes was the change in geo-political structures. The
bi-polar
world seems to have collapsed irreversibly.
T
he "modern" age which has occupied the last five centuries in the
development of humanity has been a time of the creation and consolidation of
nation states, of the formation of alliances and opposing political blocs.
After the collapse of the Berlin wall a series of global processes began
which were to lead to gradual but irreversible changes in the world
political order. Directly after the fall of the"totalitarian regimes in
Eastern Europe the majority of political commentators and researchers
considered that the problem would be limited to the collapse of the USSR and
a number of smaller Eastern European states and thereafter their inclusion
in the structures of the developed nations of NATO and the EU. Such
one-sided views continue to predominate today, despite the fact that most
people are aware of their inadequacies. The problem is that after the
explosion in Eastern Europe a slow but unstoppable process of universal
geopolitical change began. I refer to this process as "geo-political
collapse", since it affected the political structures typical of the entire
twentieth century and in a broader context, the entire Third Civilisation.
What is clear is that the map of Europe is being reshaped. However, let
us look at the rest of the world. Despite the strong influence of Russia in
Central Asia there is a growing conflict of interests between a number of
Islamic states and China. The unification of Germany has changed the
proportionality of power in central Europe. There is no need for detailed
forecasts in this area although there are certain clear trends emerging
which seem to herald the end of the old world order.
The first wave of the geo-political collapse clearly took place in
Eastern Europe and most significantly in the USSR. The second will be
connected with the increase in the political importance of Europe (above all
Germany) and Japan. he role of the USA, the only remaining super power, will
be to provide a balance with all the consequences which that entails. The
third wave will be a consequence of the increase in the economic and the
political importance of a number of smaller countries in South Eastern
Europe, Asia and Latin America.
At the beginning of the 1990's we were witnesses not only to the
collapse of the Eastern European political structures but also to the
potential of profound changes within the West. There is no doubt that the
borders of the European community will move towards the East and that the
role of Germany in this process will be extremely significant.
The consolidation of the European Union and the creation of a single
European currency which appears to have strong political
support[25] presuppose a number of changes in trans-Atlantic
cooperation. I do not believe that trans-Atlantic ties will weaken but I do
believe that the creation of a common European currency will bring about
many changes in their nature, scale and direction.
It is true that a large number of lesser developed states still do not
have the self-confidence and strength to undertake independent activities.
Even if this were to happen, such ideas would develop in isolation rather
than as a part of a logical process. For the moment the countries outside
the Group of 25 are strongly dependent on the most developed nations.
Amongst them, however, there are a number of nations with growing ambitions
for more economic and political influence. Which will be stronger?
Integration or an eruption of ambitions and the struggle for new influence?
The question is whether the struggle for free economic and political
relations will begin in Asia, Africa or Latin America? Will this not be
stronger than the processes of global integration?
In any event one thing is clear - the old world order created between
the 18th and 19th centuries by a group of advanced European states and the
two super powers which emerged in the 20th century is now a thing of the
past. The old geo-political world is collapsing before our eyes and not only
as a consequence of the collapse of the USSR. In the autumn of 1995 the
voters in Quebec very nearly voted for secession from Canada which could
have lead to the real collapse of the Canadian state. Almost daily,
politicians and civil servants in the European capital of Brussels reiterate
the view that the USA should no longer play the role of a super power. In
Paris the views are even more categorical. The state of chaos is due to the
fact that the world is undergoing transition. There are many processes and
situations within this transition as well as many unpredictable deviations.
3. ECONOMIC TURBULENCE
Colossal disproportions have accumulated within the financial systems
of the world. Until now they have not lead to any great crises because of
the regulatory role played by the world political order. However, after its
total collapse are we not bound to feel the cold embrace of instability and
chaos?
O
n the 1st of September 1995 the world news agencies reported an
emerging financial crisis in the most prosperous of post-war economies -
Japan. Thousands of investors withdrew their deposits from the Kisu Credit
Union in Osaka and the Hiogo bank in Kobe which were then closed to all
kinds of banking operations. Their clients wanted to withdraw over 3 billion
US dollars or almost 1/4 of the total deposits of the union. The
bankruptcies of a number of Japanese credit unions and the unprecedented
problems they caused for a number of large banks cast huge doubts about the
stability of the banking system in Japan. The reason for such shocks is the
huge amount of debt accumulated in the 1980's when stock exchange prices
were very high and suddenly fell as a result of the global recession.
The problem, however, is more complex. More and more people are
becoming aware of the fact that the debts accumulated by governments and
individual financial structures will not be repaid. The enormous debt of the
American government and the increased indebtedness of other developed
countries pose a question about the efficacy of the world financial system.
It is true that in contrast to the Great Depression of the 1939, the banks
and national governments now have much greater reserves and experience in
avoiding financial crises. However, it is also true that such colossal debts
are possible in the conditions of guaranteed political economic regulation
and a clear and stable political order. The trust in the major currencies is
based not only on their real condition but on their established monopoly of
the world markets.
It is not difficult to comprehend that if the geo-political
restructuring does take place then political and military factors will lose
their influence and the problem with debt will prove catastrophic. There is
a direct link between the changes in world political structures and
stability of the existing financial systems. Neither of them are adequate
for the conditions of the epoch which we are now entering.
Of course, the world economy will continue for a certain length of time
to develop positively. The reasons for this are the newly opened markets of
Eastern Europe, Russia and South East Asia in particular. Countries which
had until now been culturally and politically isolated are now attractive to
foreign investors. Care will have to be taken that this growth does not give
rise to further "economic turbulence". For reasons of cheap labour in the
East many manufacturers in Western Europe and America are turning towards
Asia. In 1995 this caused much unrest amongst the German trade unions and
was one of the main factors for concern voiced at the congress of German
Social Democrats in Manheim in autumn of the same year.
There is no doubt that with the democratic development of China and the
smaller dragons within South Eastern Asia and with the opening of the
Eastern European and Russian markets world economic structures will undergo
significant changes. I am almost convinced that many governmental and
private structures will not be able to resist the temptation and will answer
the primitive instincts of competition and profit. This will have two
consequences with serious repercussions in the near future. The first is
that the world economic structures which have existed up to now will have to
undergo significant changes. Secondly, there will be an increased danger of
uncontrollable economic shocks.
Jacques Atalie in his marvellous book "The Millennium" recalls that the
Dutch cities which contributed so much to modern civilisation in the 15th
and 16th centuries declined because of the temptation to spend more than
they earned and to accumulate more debts than they could bear. Is this not,
however, the illness of all modern governments, from the USA to Europe,
Russia and Japan and the horrific debt problems of Brasil, Argentina and
Mexico? Is this not a warning of the potential collapse of the entire
financial system or at least of its entire lack of correspondence to modern
day needs?
Of course, these debts and the mountains of bad debts are not
distributed evenly between all states. The USA and France face huge
problems, Germany and Japan much less and least of all, and practically
non-existent - such countries as China, Indonesia and Southern Korea whose
economies are at the beginning of an undoubted period of ascendency. This
divergence in the positions of countries and nations in the context of
global economic transformations will alter their place and their role in the
world economy. The whole of the 21st century will be a time of economic
levelling if, of course, the world turns its back on the old order and
successfully enters the new civilisation. This process of levelling-out will
at the same time be in conflict with cultural and industrial traditions,
differences in social welfare, macro-economic criteria and standards etc..
The fundamental elements of the plan put forward by the French Prime
Minister, Alain Jupe, in the autumn of 1995 were targetted at France joining
the European Monetary Union and reaching a position level with the other
European states. We can all remember the huge reaction and the large-scale
protests in responce to the threat of losing social benefits and privileges.
Such shocks will be caused with every integration and this is one of the
most fundamental elements of global economic reform. Large scale structural
reforms will take place with the implementation of the common European
currency. The difficulties related to the integration into the EU of Eastern
European countries will be even more difficult. The integration of Russia
will be slow and painful and even more so in the case of the poorly
developed Asian and African states.
However, there is no reasonable alternative. The processes of
integration will continue to developed and will lead eventually to a
large-scale global renewal. For this reason, in my opinion, the change in
the economic roles of the various countries and nations, the globalisation
of financial and commodities markets, the opening of millions of niche
markets in Eastern Europe and Asia, the inadequacy of the world financial
system, the mountain of debts and the re-solution of economic imbalance must
be considered as the collapse of the old and the beginning of the new
economic order. It has taken many nations five hundred years to establish
their national economies. Today they are becoming integrated and this in its
wake will bring about the enormous integration of labour, knowledge and
abilities.
4. THE NEW MASTERS OF THE WORLD
The globalisation of the world has lead to the appearance of new groups
of leaders whose influence and power is many times greater than that of the
majority of politicians. They are not always well-known but they control a
huge portion of the world economy and finances, the global media and
communications and their power is not subject to any serious regulation.
E
very day billions of television viewers watch the leading world news
stories. Almost every day somewhere in the world there are elections or
other important political events. The politicians are presented or present
themselves as the most important decision makers. This was the case in the
20th century. With the demise of many monarchies politicians have become the
heroes and the undisputed leaders of the world. Is this still really the
case today?
Yes, but only superficially. Since with the consolidation of the global
world, the opening-up of societies and the embracing of the international
market there are new territories for world domination. Someone had to come
in to take control of international, economic, cultural and media business.
Someone who would not be limited by national boundaries and who had to have
enough money. These were the global businessmen.
At the beginning of the century, the trans-national businessmen were
mainly colonisers. Today they are legally in control of 80% of world trade,
about the same amount of technology and about 1/3 of world manufacturing.
The number and the influence of the transnational corporations is constantly
on the increase. Their leaders account for the major part of the new
economic elite of the world whose power is now unequalled. Who can predict
in what part of the world it is most profitable to manufacture a certain
type of item? Who can invest enormous sums into science and technology in
the aims of breaking into a market? Who can transfer billions of dollars
from one end of the world to the other in a matter of hours? Only they can -
the newly emerging leaders of the modern world.
Almost no-one stands above the international business leaders. They
control international technological and information exchange. They own the
majority of the satellites used for relaying television programmes. They
also own the global information and television networks. What is more
important, the leaders of the trans-national corporations are constantly
expanding their power. Now they want free, open markets, the removal of all
state limitations and the implementation of neo-liberal policies. On the
other hand the world economic leaders want more dialogue with each other.
How can they devide their spheres of influence? Where will they direct their
investment resources? Where and what markets and what to aim for? The common
objective uniting these new leaders is the removal of all state barriers to
their eventual domination of the world. If they persist at their present
rate to expand the international and industrial corporations within 20-30
years they will have succeeded in dominating practically the entire area of
international trade, and they will have achieved a monopoly of world
communications and distribution of technology.
Ted Turner and CNN, Rupert Murdoch and his media empire and even the
smaller press magnates such as M.Ringer in Switzerland today have much
greater influence over people than the presidents of the majority of
countries in the world. While in the context of individual national states
it is possible to speak of anti-monopoly legislation, in international
business "everything is permitted". If things continue to develop as they
have been doing up to now, within 15-20 years we will be faced with
extremely complex problems.
The media are little concerned with the new leaders of the world. Only
a handful of the great financial players find their way into the television
studios: owners of banks and financial companies who control the movements
of tens or hundreds of billions of dollars. Quietly but unerringly they are
creating a power, more powerful than any government and which creates its
own rules of its own game. The leaders of the world financial capital can
influence exchange rates and pour in funds from all corners of the earth.
Very often they are so influential in world economics that they can compel
national governments, including the great powers, to play along with them
and take the relevant decisions.
This is so incongruous! These new integrational economic structures
appear completely to lack any form of political regulation or at the best
have only some sort of political facade. This is one of the reasons why
global relations have been so undeviatingly infiltrated by the mafia with
enormous sums of money from drugs, prostitution, currency speculation and so
on. This is also why the citizens of the world are becoming more and more
dependent on the transnational economic elite, rather than the politicians
they have elected.
If rules are not brought into this international game, if the world
does not establish institutions for their regulation and control, if
policies towards the poorly developed nations are not changed, then very
soon the world financial elite will begin to rule world development alone.
This is the greatest contradiction used by the hidden leaders - while
economic and cultural life is becoming more and more internationalised and
globalised, governments are remaining nationally limited. People see them as
weak and helpless in the face of events. I am far from the thought that the
leaders of the world corporations are bad people or that they ought to be
proclaimed enemies and proponents of imperialism. The world cannot develop
without them but if things remain as they are, the positive role of the
transnational companies as the driving force in the world might be
undermined.
When I speak of chaos and disorder and the unsatisfactory regulation of
the world, I mean categorically the inadequacy of the international economic
infrastructure and the lack of of sufficient international political and
legal regulatory bodies. Such a situation hides many dangers for humanity:
unregulated financial operations, unregulated monopolisation, international
mafia, the danger of periodical crises. What is more important: the greater
the share of transnational companies in world production the more countries
will open up to one another, the longer there is an absence of global rules
to the game, the greater will be the danger of an increase in serious
crises.
5 THE MARCH OF THE POOR
During the blazing summer of the 1985 in Hungary, a tanker lorry was
stopped on a motorway. The tanker was filled with the corpses of Asians
travelling secretly to Western Europe. They had died of suffocation and heat
exhaustion in their flight from poverty to salvation. Every year millions of
citizens from the poorly developed countries set their sights on the rich
countries of the West, using all possible legal and illegal means. Their
march continues...
T
he politicians and their supporters in the most developed nations of
the world can recline in complete, blissful peace. They have complete
information on the condition of the poor, but they have neither experienced
their problems, not demonstrate any particular desire to help them. It is
difficult, very difficult, when you live in Zurich, Cannes, Barcelona or
Salzburg to believe that at the moment when you are giving a piece of meat
to your dog, somewhere in the world tens of thousands of children are
suffering from hunger and illnesses connected with hunger.
One of my friends, a member of the French parliament, told me recently,
"There has always been inequality between nations and humanity is used to
it." I do not agree. Despite the eternal inequalities between the developed
and underdeveloped, during the past 20 or 30 years something has taken place
which has radically changed and will continually the position of the
under-developed nations.
Thanks to world media and, in particular, to television for the first
time they have become aware of how really poor they are. 20 or 30 or even 50
years ago the citizens of India, Bangladesh, Congo or Ruanda were really
unaware of the huge difference in the living standards between their
countries and the most developed nations of the world. If they did know,
this was not common knowledge. The situation was more or less similar in
Eastern Europe and Russia where poverty and the reaction of the poor led to
the acceptance of social utopias and their elevation into official state
religions.
Globalisation brings peoples closer but also gives rise to new concerns
about inequalities. Via the medium of television and other means of
communication, people around the whole world have become aware of the
enormous differences in ways of life and the enormous injustices existing in
the world. This is a new phenomenon and if it persist then it will give rise
to a wave of reactions from the poorer nations. New means of communications
unite us, make us look at the world as a global village, but this openness
runs the risk of creating new conflicts arising from imbalance.
The largest and most compact populations of poor people (according to
the criteria of the UN on poverty) exist in Southern Asia - about 550
million people. 130-140 million poor people live in Eastern Asia and no
fewer than 220-230 million in the Middle East and North Africa. About 260
million live in sub-Saharan Africa and about 100 million in Latin America.
In addition, there are about 200 million poor people in the industrialised
countries.
The gap between the rich and the poor is dismaying. The twenty richest
nations in the world produce a GNP per head of population of between 16,600
(Australia) and 33,500 (Switzerland) USD. The twenty poorest nations,
according to the same criteria, vary between 72 USD (Mozambique) and 261
(Ruanda)[26]. This enormous difference cannot be resolved using
conventional methods.
Nevertheless, if we are to take the market and international
corporation as the only means of salvation, this would mean that the
technological, financial and social gap between the poor and the rich
countries would become even wider. This has been seen in the last 30-40
years. Even now the gap between the poor and the rich countries and people
is self-perpetuating. This is one of the most convincing signs of the crisis
of modern world structures.
Humanity undoubtedly is to blame for such a state in Mozambique,
Tanzania, Bangladesh, Laos, Vietnam, Ethiopia and other less developed
countries. They were all until recently former colonies of the most
developed nations and many of their priceless historical and cultural
artifacts can be seen in museums and private collections in Paris, London,
New York and Geneva. They have all experienced bitter armed struggles and
periods of instability. Measures taken by the UN and other world
organisations to assist the poor have been mainly cosmetic. If these trends
persist and if liberal market illusions are not substituted with something
else, then the hidden dangers may become apparent for all to see. In the
most general terms I refer to this danger as the march of the poor.
One of the most significant manifestations of this condition is the
migration of the poor to the larger towns. Tens of millions of people in
Asia, Africa and South America have left their places of birth to migrate to
the cities, transforming what until were recently small towns into
megapolises consisting of shanty towns and primitive suburbs with
multi-million populations. Despite the efforts of the national governments
this process continues. It has transformed Mexico city, Rio de Janeiro,
Calcutta, Bombay and tens of other cities into places with an enormous,
unmanageable poor population. The poor come to the large cities in search of
food, work and a chance for their children. Perhaps, the most important
reason for this is the desire to reap the benefits of the familiar values of
civilisation. The images on the television screen and mass advertising
campaigns are the most powerful of all magnets, compelling the poor to flee
from their traditional way of life. In all corners of the world where
poverty is a typical phenomenon, this process is continuing. This is
particularly the case in those places where there is no private land
ownership or where land ownership does not bring satisfaction of sufficient
economic results.
The second logical consequence of the march of the poor is emigration
to the most developed countries of the world. In recent decades the 25 most
developed nations have been the object of mass immigration for foreigners.
They enter their "Eldorado" with the help of relatives, false documents,
locked in goods containers and lorries. The liberal dream of the open
society will result in the increase of the flow of the poor looking for work
and peace of mind in the rich countries. In this way the liberalism of
openness will backfire.
Given the present world economic order the richest countries will have
to create stronger barriers to emigration and to build new Iron, Stone and
Wooden curtains between their countries and the rest of the world. I do not
want to be a prophet of doom but such divisions would drag humanity into a
dangerous dimension for human development. Forecasts show that the situation
in the European community will become particulary complex. At the moment in
Germany there are about 4.4 million immigrants, in France - 2.4, in Great
Britain - 1.2 and in Holland about 0.6. In the EU in total there are over 10
million immigrants. According to some calculations if the flow of immigrants
is not limited within the next 5-7 years this number could double. This
march of the poor could have explosive consequences in the developed
countries and at the same time result in a "brain drain" from the poorer,
limiting their chances of improving the standard of living. There is also
the danger of the rich western countries reacting by closing their borders
and isolating themselves. According to the agreement reached in Schengen
which limited the possibilities of many nations to travel within Western
Europe there has been a stream of reactions and disappointment which is
difficult to describe. Many Eastern Europeans are convinced that they have
been deceived by the West and that the Berlin Wall has been reconstructed by
western politicians. The pressure for free access to the rich West will
continue and no administrative barriers appear to be able to stop it.
When speaking of the march of the poor, I also have in mind their
growing tendency towards self-protection and resistance. I am quite sure
that if they do not receive the opportunity to make changes the poor of the
world will unite in search of a new universal ideology. The same reasons
which led to the October revolution in Russia and transformed communism into
the greatest utopia of the 20th century might also create new or re-create
old social views.
Poverty has always given birth and will continue to give birth to
utopian views and dreams of a rapid leap into wealth. The great leap
promised by Mao Tse Tung, the promises made by Khrushchev about the
communist paradise and even Hitler's Third Reich were part of the illusory
belief in the supernatural force of power, human will and violence. The 20th
century was a time of competing utopias. In the new era it will be much more
difficult to achieve similar unity simply because of the influence of the
mass media and economic dependence. However, these means of indirect control
might themselves be powerless. It is unlikely that the poor will look back
to communism. It is more likely that they will look for salvation in
nationalism and in particular in religious fundamentalism and new
totalitarian doctrines. The great danger for the world in the post-cold-war
period may come from the combination of economic problems and the struggle
for cultural survival. If the present world economic order is preserved, in
the next 10-15 years we shall undergo a series of strong economic and social
shocks which will come from the poorer regions. They may take the form of
local wars, the political influence of fundamentalist unions, protest
movements of immigrants in the industrial countries etc.. The other side of
the coin is a possible xenophobic reaction.
Xenophobia in the richest nations and fundamentalism in the poorer are
the two extremes, two major products of the emerging crisis. They are the
catalysts for other conflicts between cultures and religions and between the
ethnic groups in search of a unifying force. Many researchers believe
xenophobia a transitional stage. I, however, believe that it will
periodically re-occur in direct connection with the level of cultural
conflicts within the open world.
Those who are aware of their poverty will aspire to overcome their
problems and to identify their own fate with common ideas, common religions
or new idols and leaders. Today the situation is still transitional. The
poor are desperate rather than unified in a common awareness, but this will
change. The reaction of the poor contributed to the success of the Islamic
fundamentalists in Algeria, the high level of support for the fundamentalist
party in Turkey at the local elections in 1994 and the parliamentary
elections in 1996 and to the consolidation of the regime of the Ayatollahs
in Iran. The march of the poor is a fact and a product simultaneously of
globalisation and the world order which is still inadequate to meet its
demands.
If we accept liberal ideas as sufficient in modern times, this will
lead to a new division of the world, to the appearance of new leaders as
well as Utopias offering protection to the poor of the world. The way in
which we can avoid such a potential outcome lies in world integration, in
the establishment of a new world political and economic order and an
entirely new kind of global society. This is the task which faces us, which
faces the new generation of politicians above all in the industrialised
countries.
Such a task cannot be resolved at summit meetings, like the one in
Copenhagen in March 1995. It is not general discussion or promises of new
charity but profound structural reforms in the world economy which will help
to resolve the problems. This includes specific programmes for the
stimulation of investments in the least developed nations, an increase in
the role of the UN and the restructuring of the activities of the IMF and
the World Bank etc..
Fundamentalism and terrorism, the danger of reestablishing opposition
between political blocs, the appearance of new utopias are all dangers which
express the crisis of the transition to a new world. No-one will be spared:
not the Europeans bathed in the luxury of social welfare, nor the dynamic
USA, nor the over-ambitious Japanese. Realisation of poverty is one of the
most important phenomena which the opening of the world and new
communications has caused. It may lead to more and more violent reactions,
alienation and a hatred for the rich countries and their elites. Did anyone
believe that we would become witness to such senseless acts of terrorism as
the bomb attack in Oklahama city or the Tokyo Metro in 1995. The bomb
attacks in Paris and Lyons carried out by unknown extremists caused grave
concern throughout Europe. These will hardly be the last. This is how it was
in past civilisations when different cultures and different levels of wealth
clashed. The other possibility is a rapid and coordinated change in the
world economic order. The most developed nations and their governments will
have to make a choice between global concern and responsibility or growing
instability for all.
6. A NUMBER OF PESSIMISTIC SCENARIOS
Periods of transition in human development resemble a tunnel with a
number of exits. You can take the most direct route to thelight or enter a
side tunnel with a dead-end and fluster around in the dark, turn around and
return to where you started from.
T
his book is not meant to be either optimistic or pessimistic. It does
not make categorical forecasts but outlines the possibilities. For the world
in which we are living, this approach is particularly important. Our world
is in a state of transition between two epochs and is instable.The question
is which direction will modern humanity take? Summing up the conclusions to
this chapter, I believe that the dangers which I have mentioned can be
grouped into three pessimistic scenarios.
I refer to the first of them as the scenario of "long-term
indeterminacy", or perhaps the scenario of "continuing chaos". This would be
an extended 20 or 30 year period (perhaps even longer) of geo-political
instability and attempts to expand the positions of the great political
powers. France and Germany would want to establish for themselves a leading
role in Europe, independent of the USA and Russia. The Euro-Atlantic
partnership, the keystone of world politics in the last 50 years might be
threatened. Russia, threatened with the possibilities of becoming isolated
as a result of the expansion of NATO might look to the East to form
alliances. Very soon China might begin to have global ambitions and Japan
will turn its economic power into political ambitions. Given this scenario
the transitional companies will be compelled to play a greater "national
patriotic" role rather than the role of a globalising force.
Perhaps, you do not believe that this is possible. Take a look at
Bosnia, crippled children, dead and wounded civilians and raped women. Why
did the USA support the Muslims, Germany the Croats and Russia the Serbs?
Why at the end of the 20th century can we not put a stop to a senseless
letting of blood. Was it differences between three ethnic groups in this
long-suffering country which lead to the differences between the great
powers or was it the other way around?
There will be a constant series of conflicts on the periphery of the
entire post-Soviet system, in the border regions between Islam and
Christianity and in the regions of great poverty. Let us hope that they will
not be as bloody. The greatest danger in this scenario is the wave of
national, regional, cultural and religious egoism which it contains. The
"period of long-term indeterminacy" will not end before the advent of the
21st century.
This period might also be called a time of "chaotic policentralism".
Where there will not be a single super power. There will be no clear
international political or financial order. We will be witness to a slow,
contradictory and conflicting accumulation of aspirations, roles and egoisms
and of the grudging recognition of the rights of others. In the 1970's and
1980's a number of American politicians declared almost half of the planet a
zone of vital American interests. Today this is being done by a number of
Russian, Greek, Turkish, French and even Japanese politicians. The problem
is that in the majority of cases these zones coincide or overlap. The
Balkans is a typical example of an area which Europeans, Americans and
Russians consider an important region for their interests.
Chaotic policentralism is a state in which there are many centres of
power, but the poles of power change as a result of conflict. This disorder
existed at the beginning of the Second Civilisation albeit in different
historical conditions. Unfortunately, global thinking is at such a low level
that the danger of conflict cannot be avoided. This scenario will be
dominated by local conflicts. International crime will flourish and there
will be an increase in the wealth of a small group of international rulers.
My second pessimistic scenario could be called "Back to the bi-polar
world". In actual fact we are still partially in it. Psychologically a large
number of politicians, senior figures in the armies and security forces,
retired officers and a number of others still live in the bi-polar world.
Older people whose whole lives have been connected with the struggle against
the class enemy (communism or American imperialism) dream of a return to the
period of strong-arm politics. There are those in the East who consider
Gorbachev a traitor or an agent of the CIA and dream of the restoration of
the Warsaw Pact and the super power status of Russia. In the West there are
others who advocate the idea of a single world super power in the USA and
the transformation of NATO into a dominant world military force and the
casting out of Russia and China into the back-yard of international
relations.
It would be very easy for these people and their ideas to become
dominant in world politics: for example, the conflict in Bosnia and the
bombing of Serbian targets in September 1995; or the results of the
parliamentary elections in Russia in the same year and the presidential
elections in 1996. Despite perestroika and other great changes and despite
changes of attitude towards Russia, the trust which exists between
politicians in the East and West is still extremely fragile.
It is quite possible that the "bi-polar" model of the world could be
restored as a consequence of the conflicts for the fate of Eastern Europe.
On the one hand, Russia wants to preserve its influence in this region, not
to be isolated from Europe and to have guarantees for its future. On the
other hand, in the West there is an increase in the influence of those who
desire the expansion of NATO to the borders of Russia. The Eastern European
countries themselves, with the only possible exception of the socialist
government in Bulgaria, want to enter NATO and to guarantee its security and
existence within Europe. In this event, every incautious step, each hasty
move without considering the global consequences could turn the clock back
centuries and extend the life of the Third Civilisation artificially.
It is a complete illusion to consider Russia a weak country, engrossed
in its own problems. An influential American state department official told
me in 1994 that "now Russia is weak, this is best time to teach it where it
belongs". I replied that such an idea was imprudent and belonged to the
vocabulary of cold-war talk. Russia possesses a huge military might and huge
resources. And such a suggestion would be sufficient for confrontation to
reassert itself. Whether it is caused by nationalist forces within Russia or
naive politicians in Western Europe, isolation of Russia, in my opinion,
does not have any long-term prospects and hides great dangers.
The question of "whither Eastern Europe?": whether it should enter the
structures of NATO or not, hides a potential danger for the restoration of
the bi-polar world. However, this will not resolve the matter of the
proportionality of world forces. I believe that if Russia is alienated from
the European processes and in particular from mainstream world politics, it
will seek its revenge in Eastern Europe, the Balkans in particular, and in
Asia. The new Eastern bloc may include Russia, its former Asian republics
and China which very soon will be in a position to increase its world
political role.
The fact that a new bi-polar world will be based on a new combination
of states will not alter its inadequacies. Such a scenario would only slow
down the processes of world integration, exacerbate the universal crisis of
the Third Civilisation and cause unhappiness for hundreds of millions of
people. It would also result in a new spiral of armaments, new ecological
dramas and new even greater poverty for Africans and Asians.
The third pessimistic scenario is the "revolution scenario". This is
the least likely of the three, but should not be ignored. It is a revolution
of the poor, socially deprived nations and states, who have gained access to
powerful strategic weapons and nuclear weapons.
Another variation on this scenario is that put forward by the American
researcher Samuel Huntington, that the 21st century will be a century of
wars between civilisations. I shall later reject his theory since I believe
that he is mistaken about the common future of mankind. However, as a
scenario for the transition from one civilisation to another, as a temporary
or local delay to the processes of global reform over a period of about 20
or 30 years, this is entirely possible.
In each of these three "pessimistic" scenarios I can see the
possibility of an increase in terrorism and individual or group uprisings of
isolated and deprived peoples. The danger is that these uprisings might find
support and unifying influences within Islam, fundamentalist regimes or new
utopian doctrines. There is also the real possibility that these three
scenarios might appear in combination. None of them can contribute anything
positive to mankind. One should not forget that it was the idiotic ambitions
of dictators and global messiahs in the 20th century which killed hundreds
of millions of lives. There is a way of avoiding these pessimistic solutions
but it cannot be achieved by conventional means. The traditional solutions
with which we are familiar from recent decades will not help.
The big question is whether we are going back to the Third civilisation
of forward to a new civilisation? Back to the restoration of old
contradictions or forwards to their resolution and the formation of new
global structures. It will in no way be easy to change the stereotypes of
thought and to break the mould of the bi-polar world, protective nationalism
and all the theories and doctrines which supported and continue to support
the waning Third human civilisation. If the new communication systems and
world corporations are the bridge to new forms of imperialism, this will
undoubtedly create a new wave of protective nationalism and regional egoism
based on ethnic or economic factors. This will consequently lead to the
danger of new conflicts and struggles typical of the 20th century - the
century of violent, uncomprehended and savage globalisation, the century of
imperialism and world wars.
Section two
The Fourth Civilisation
Chapter Four
THEORY IN THE TIME OF CRISIS
1. FOREWARNING OF THE END OF TWO THEORETICAL CONCEPTS
Every change of epoch is a change of views of the world. The Third
civilisation not only gave birth to but was also served by theories which
are rapidly becoming a thing of the past. Today it is clear to all of us
that the changes which are taking place in the world can not be explained by
traditional doctrines. The crisis is evident...
T
he 19th and 20th centuries were a time of intellectual supremacy of
certain theoretical concepts and their numerous variations and
metamorphoses. One of them conquered the minds of the activists of the
French revolution, became enshrined in the American constitution and filled
the hearts of several generations of world intellectuals. The 19th century
was the century of liberalism. Its ideas still form the dream of the free
and the wealthy. The second was the theoretical system of Marxism which
appeared as the defender of the deprived and the poor and was a chance of
hope for those who had no property or education.
Or course, the 19th and the 20th centuries did not belong solely to
these two doctrines. The 19th century in varying countries and at varying
times was dominated by restorationism, enlightened absolutism, conservatism
or just reactionary monarchism. On the border between the two centuries a
period of belligerent nationalism and imperialism broke out. The period
between the two world wars saw the strong development of radical ideologies
- communism and fascism and a whole range of statist and semi-statist
doctrines. After the Second World War ideas of the social state (L.Erchard)
and the mixed economy (P.Samuelson) and the national democratic state
(Khrushchev) became popular.
At the same time Marxism as the ideological basis of communism, state
socialism and liberalism as the banner of individual freedoms and capitalism
became the two most powerful driving forces in the world and survived right
up to the present day. Even the "softening" of their ideological systems as
a result of "democratic socialism" and "state capitalism" or their
"hardening" in the forms of communism or fascism did not reduce their
significance as the fundamental ideologies of the Third Civilisation.
Perhaps, I should mention here why I have not included another
important ideological movement - that of conservatism. The conservatives
have always made a cult out of their loyalty to the traditional structures
of life. The conservative values of "hierarchy, order, authority and
loyalty" have not stood up to the test of time and new realities. Communism
and fascism appear to have been conclusively rejected. Monarchism is only
viable as a cultural tradition. Radical and revolutionary theories have lost
their power. Of the old political doctrines, only liberalism and Marxism in
its totalitarian version managed to retain any of their power, at least
until the end of the 1980's.
To what extent, however, can they benefit from the transition between
epochs? Do they answer the needs of the new global realities? Is it
sufficient to say, that liberalism has become a dominant and eternal global
theory, or that Marxism has been reborn in the form of democratic socialism?
Let us look at the first of these. The ideas of liberalism have a long
history going back to the awakening of civil societies, private ownership
and the rights of man. This is its huge historical significance. Hobbs,
Spinosa and Locke in different ways contributed to the creation of liberal
ideas. The geniuses of the Enlightenment gave it a more systematic form and
value system. However, the driving force behind the development of
liberalism was Adam Smith. He saw the state and state control as the main
obstacles to the development of the society in which we live. He was in
favour of the free movement of the work force, the abolition of semi-feudal
remnants and the regulation of industry and foreign trade. He was in favour
of the complete removal of all limitations on trade with land and goods.
A.Smith, D.Riccardo and A.Ferguson as well as all their followers advocated
the limitation of the role of the state to the functions of a "night
watchman" whose job it is to safeguard the freedom of the owners of property
and the means of production. "Anarchy plus a constable, freedom with
security" was the ambition of the first major liberals. At the end of the
18th century and the 19th century, liberalism was already playing a
progressive anti-feudal role, destroying the feudal remnants and opening the
way to civil rights.
For the liberals freedom alone was the basis of social stability.
Following the traditions of A.Smith and considering himself a devout
follower, Jean Battiste Sei idealised the system of free enterprise in the
conviction that the market alone was sufficient to form balance. According
to Sei's well-known law the crises of over-production are temporary and
economic balance is equivalent to the existence of free market relations.
All classical economic doctrines were developed on the basis of such
fundamental conclusions. A century after the appearance of the economic
views of Adam Smith (1776), the basis of the liberal idea - the very idea of
free competition - was consigned to the graveyard. At the end of the 19th
century with the appearance of large monopolies and the worsening crisis of
capitalism, liberal doctrines began to lose their prestige and influence.
Two world wars in the 20th century and the success of more radical and
totalitarian regimes further limited their influence.
Of course, during the first half of the 20th century, liberal ideas
were still exerting influence on many thinkers and politicians. Some of them
followed in the footsteps of William Jevens explaining all phenomena on the
basis of the laws of subjective logic. Others by default became elementary
apologists of the dominant bourgeois views and yet others became advocates
of the views of Menger and Von Viser. All of them, however, were obliged to
recognise that ideas of the automatic self-regulating and stabilising nature
of the free market were mistaken. The world wars, colonial conflicts,
imperialistic conflicts and totalitarianism dealt heavy body blows to the
ideas of liberalism which lost much of its influence for a long time.
Limited, reduced in influence and almost underground, the tradition of
liberal thought continued into the 20th century. This was mainly due to the
hard work of two "long-distance runners" of theoretical liberalism: Ludwig
von Mizes and Friedrich von Haiek. Von Mizes in his "Human Activities"
offers a series of ideas which contribute to the consolidation of the idea
of individualism and individual freedoms. For Mizes the freedom of choice is
at the basis of social development. He believes that economic theory and
structure are entirely subjective. Every expansion of the structure of the
state was regarded by Mizes and Hajek as an anomaly. In the opinion of Mizes
the protection of the rights of hired labour limits freedom and in the
long-term - the natural development of society. He was very critical of
communism and in his work "Socialism" he brilliantly predicted many of the
imperfections of the "socialist experiment".
In the 19th century Liberalism was a strongly progressive science. It
destroyed the foundations of absolutism and opened the way to civil and
political freedoms. It was the theoretical crown of laurels of the modern
age and an expression of the Third Civilisation. Liberalism was the hope of
the ordinary citizen, the bourgeois, the craftsman, the small and medium
scale land owner. It was the ideology of the struggle against the
"unjustified privileges" of the aristocrats and monarchs, the ideology of
those who guarantee the power of the bourgeois above the other members of
society. There is no doubt that in the 19th century one particular rule was
valid - the more widespread the ideas of liberalism, the greater the
authority of the bourgeois class.
Liberalism was a victim of its own success and gave birth to its own
antipathy - Marxism. Someone had to defend the interests of hired labour.
Someone had to bring attention to the plight of a new repressed class with
its own role and problems in society. The freedom of some had turned into
the lack of freedom of others. This was the law of the Third Civilisation,
of the level of progress that had been reached at that moment in the
development of mankind. The collapse of the feudal societies had given birth
to the bourgeoisie and the proletariate and the ideological doctrines which
corresponded to their interests.
Marxism developed as a new wave of intellectual thought but soon turned
into a class doctrine. It was based on the idea of the value manufacturing
output and the capitalist accumulation of wealth which arises from it. Marx
was an undisputed theoretician and thinker. He not only developed the ideas
of Smith but turned them in a completely new direction. While J.B. Sei and
John Stuart Mill absolutised the idea of free enterprise and "Laissez Faire"
economics, Marx took things in a new direction. He looked for the
contradictions inherent in the free market and "proved" that sooner or later
they would lead to monopolism, class conflicts and the objective
transformation of private ownership into public ownership. While Sei and his
followers promoted the capitalism of the 19th century and considered it as
an eternal and balanced system, Marx, on the other hand, described its vices
and called for the replacement of this society with a more just system.
At the root of the theory of the value of labour, he emphasised that
one part of society unjustly exploited the other part in contradiction with
the natural rights of man. The struggle for added value, in the opinion of
Marx, was at the root of class division between the bourgeoisie and the
proletariate. Here Marx is in his role as a theoretician and political
revolutionary. He undoubtedly believed that at some time during the process
of capitalist accumulation, the "Laissez Faire" formula would collapse since
competition would lead to centralisation, monopolisation and eventually,
political and class conflicts. Marx, and later Lenin, frequently reiterated
that monopolisation was a logical consequence of competition. These
conclusions by Marx were indisputedy true of the 19th century and a
significant part of the 20th.
In Chapter 23 of the first volume of "Das Kapital", Marx comes to his
most significant theoretical conclusion. For years to come it was to serve
the interests of Lenin and later Stalin as the keystone of "state
socialism". He believed that the processes of natural accumulation of
industrial capital would not only lead to high levels of concentration but
also objective and inevitable centralisation which would kill the ideas of
"Laissez Faire" and would set preconditions for the transfer of private
ownership to the state. "In a given area", writes Marx, "centralisation will
attain its extreme limit when all the capital invested in it merge into a
single capital. In a given society, this limit will be attained only when
the entire social capital is united in the hands of a single, individual
capitalist or a single group of capitalists."[27] This leads to
the basis thesis which was to be further developed by Lenin - historical
development and progress gradually lead to the increase in the level of
socialisation, in the concentration and centralisation of production.
This conclusion and the conclusion on the historical role of the
working class and its rights to added value (logically - to the sum of
social wealth) are the keystones of Marxist theory. The main conclusion was
that private ownership would be destroyed in order to concede its place to
public ownership. Later on the followers of Marx were to become divided over
this issue. Kaustski considered that the priority of Marxist thought was
that the capitalist society would reform itself and that parliamentary
democracy would stimulate such a process. At the other extreme Lenin and his
followers, motivated by the dramatic situation in semi-feudal Russia were to
raise the flag of the revolutionary struggle for the rights of the poor in
the belief that before capitalism could be transformed into anything else,
inter-imperialistic conflicts would lead to its death and the inevitable
world victory of the proletariate.
This was the main reason why the Marxist tradition divided at the
beginning of the 20th century into two major movements - social democracy
and communism. In both cases, however, they share the same political
doctrines and common theoretical views. Both communism and world social
democracy in the 20th century placed the emphasis on the protection of the
rights of the workers and the socially weak strata of the population and at
the same time the strong regulatory role of the state. Under communism the
role was taken to absurd extreme via the total nationalisation of
production. In social-democracy the role of the state was reduced to its
"natural" dimensions defined by the need for it to protect the interests of
the socially weak.
In 1989-1991 with the collapse of the Eastern European totalitarian
structures Marxism suffered a terrible blow. Of course, it is hardly
possible to identify Eastern European totalitarianism with Marxism, Marxism
with Stalinism, Maoism or Potism. Marx was complex and occasionally even
contradictory but his name will remain forever in the annals of the history
of economic and social disciplines. His conclusions canbe disputed, and only
some of them are valid for the period in which he lived. Others arouse our
admiration even today. Amongst the latter, I would cite his philosophical
ideas of dialecticism and analyses of market prices and competition. Toffler
is correct when he says that to ignore the writings of Marx today is
tantamount to being semi-literate. In my book, I do not reject Marx as a
thinker, but I do reject the practical implementation of his ideas and their
politicisation and transformation into dogma.
The globalisation of the world, the universal crisis of the two bloc
system and the appearance of new technology struck Marxist political
practice a blow to the heart. The total nationalisation of society was in
fact in divergence with the realities of world development. The idea that
capitalist accumulation would lead to a unified, centralised society, to a
single system of production for all workers and to a global proletarian
state were mistaken. The first reason for this was because the consolidation
of the proletarian state as a rule was achieved via violence and secondly,
because such views lead to the repression of individual rights and freedoms
and the limitation of human creativity.
The Marxist intellectual tradition lost its influence to new
technologies and social developments in the 1970's and 1980's which were at
odds with the structures of state property. The West had begun to overcome
class contradictions and they had reached entirely new levels of social
development. Modern generations are now witnessing the disappearance of the
traditional working class, the appearance of new social groups and new
social structures. In actual fact both the politically charged "intellectual
discoveries" of Karl Marx - the theory of added value and the universal law
on capitalist accumulation - have been overtaken by history. Neither his
views on expropriation by expropriators, nor the struggles of the world
proletariate correspond to what is happening in the world at the moment.
This does not mean that the Marxist intellectual tradition has to be
forgotten or rejected. It has played an essential role in the development of
the world during a long period of its development. Marx correctly predicted
that the period of free competition would not last long and that it would
lead to imperialism and the increase in inter-imperialist conflicts. Marxism
became a powerful gravitational force for many people during the second half
of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th since it offered a true
reflection of the tragic position of workers during this period and defended
their interests. "State socialism" as it was called was the transitional
type of social progress combined with exalted utopian views and violent
methods for attaining them. On the other hand state socialism guaranteed
social security (work, wages and a basic standard of living) for millions of
people. There is no other reasonable way to describe the popularity of these
teachings and its influence throughout a large part of the world's
populations in the 19th and 20th century.
The Western European social democratic version of Marxism played a role
as a balancing force, a bridge between the different classes. In Eastern
Europe, Asia and Africa it was a series of generally unsuccessful
experiments. The total nationalisation of Stalin in the 1930's, reformed by
Khrushchev and supported by Brezhnev, the "great leap forward" of Mao Tse
Tung at the end of the 1950's and the senseless purges of Pol Pot were all
justified under the banner of Marxist ideas and the struggle for a global
communist future.
The historical fate of Marxism reveals one important truth. When a
teaching imposes itself mechanically on different cultures and traditions or
when it used simply as a banner, it automatically turns into dogma. Every
attempt at reform in the 1970's and 1980's in Eastern Europe was justified
with quotes from Marx and Lenin and supporting quotations from the works of
the great leaders could always be found even in the most contradictory
situation. This was absurd. We were obliged at every turn to refer to the
classic works. Marxism lost its authority and was turned into an compulsory
state religion.
At first glance with the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in
Eastern Europe liberalism seemed to remain the only gravitational force for
the development of mankind, with no recognition of gratitude to Marx or
Lenin. The semi-statism of the world's social democrats is in crisis,
neo-Keynesianism is under pressure from market expansion in the open world
and modern communications seem to be whispering, "less state intervention,
more freedom". The followers of Mizes and Von Hajek hastily declared after
the death of Marxism that there is nothing left but liberalism. This
illusory triumph found its fullest expression in the work of F.Fukoyama,
"The End of History". In the style of Sei's eternal doctrines of the
"eternal" market balancing force, Fukoyama declared the intransigent
superiority of liberal ideas and subsequently the end of history. He seems
to believe that the market, individualism and the private entrepreneur are
the only quantifiable categories.
For Hegel and now Fukoyama, the "end of history" is the fear of the
unfathomable great future, something which needs to be defined now, despite
the fact that by rights it belongs to future generations. Hegel's
long-dreamed-of modern world will appear at the end of history in the same
way as Fukoyama asserts that the most perfect system is liberal democracy
and that it will bring with it the "last man" and the "end of history".
What I cannot accept in these concepts is that history and its
philosophy have a perceivable end and that social schemes and doctrines can
be written in stone for eternity. I prefer to believe that history is
cyclical and that its follows the laws of the great natural systems of the
universe. We still know too little, to be able to give an adequate answer to
this question. We know so little about our own planet and about the galaxies
which surround it and especially the connection between this and the history
of mankind. Despite the poverty of human knowledge it is clear that there is
no proof of the inevitable end of mankind and earthly nature.
The explanation seems to suggest that the end of history will be
accompanied by the universal domination of liberalism. The modern world is
colourful and diverse enough to support the belief that a traditional
ideology can transform itself in a dominant philosophy. Even the elementary
claims that after the collapse of Eastern European totalitarianism and "a
short, sharp shock" liberal doctrines would win the hearts and minds of
Russians, Bulgarians, Poles or Slovaks were hasty. This did not take place
and because of the inherited economic and cultural realities clearly will
not. However, are the Eastern countries of Japan, South Korea or China
symbols of liberal democracies? Will the countries of Latin America, Asia
and Africa be able to develop in this way? The trends prevalent at the
moment in Western Europe and the USA give no grounds for such "liberal"
optimism. Modern liberal doctrines do not correspond to the most significant
modern processes of globalisation, socialisation or the opening-up of
countries and the mutual interaction of different cultures. The very nature
of private property has changed. It is more socialised and integrated than
at any other time. Humanity is faced with completely new problems which fall
outside the domain of liberalism.
Today's global world is disproportionately developed and traditional
liberalism will hardly be able to change this. If we apply its traditional
ideology universally, the world economy will mutate even further. The
wealthy countries will become even more wealthy and the poor even poorer.
The God of wealth for some will be at the same time the God of poverty for
others, leading to a renewal of liberalism and a revitalisation of some new
form of Marxism and defender of the socially weak.
Today practically no-one has any doubts that classical liberal thought
is part of the glorious past. There is, however, another hypothesis that
after the collapse of totalitarian socialism liberalism will be born again.
Some modern liberals assert that Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher with
their typically liberal policies brought about the collapse of
communism.[28] Others consider that neo-liberalism is but a
rationalist deviation in the era of violence, typical of this century.
"However, if there is any kind of hope for the future of freedom", wrote
John Grey in 1986, " then it is hidden in the fact that towards the end of
century of political insanity, we are becoming witnesses of a return to the
wisdom of the great theorists of liberalism."[29]
With respect for these views, I would, all the same, like to express my
view that history never repeats itself. We must accept the market, human
rights, individual freedom and so on, but will this alone solve the problems
of the modern world or provide a solution to the challenges with which we
are faced? On their own these liberal doctrines are inadequate for the
processes of globalisation. They will as a matter of course lead to the
development of a number of social conflicts for a relatively long time to
come. They will lead to a deformation of world development and a
consolidation of the division of humanity into the rich and the poor. This
will create a new reaction in the poorer countries and the appearance of new
utopias and local wars. A century ago liberalism very rapidly changed from a
doctrine of spiritual freedom into a doctrine of the rich. Today it is
hardly able to return freedom to the poor, or the freedom taken away by the
electronic media. In the context of the global world liberal doctrines are
rather a refuge for those who want to expand their historical advantages and
the historical lead they have over the others and to dominate the world.
The greatest danger in the context of the global world is that
liberalism will be transformed into a bridge for the domination of cultures
leading to the disappearance of national traditions and entire peoples. In
combination with globalisation market liberalism might easily mutate into
cultural elitism. If we follow the ideological concept of liberalism in the
context of the global world we will be faced with the dangers mentioned in
the previous chapter - chaos and disorder, nationalist and ethnic crises,
the reactions of the poor and all the manifestations of the universal crisis
of the Third Civilisation. Both historically and currently the idea of
liberalism is different from the present state of the world. The worst thing
is that with such ideas we will primitivise world development and we will
turn globalisation into a bridge for the mechanical imposition of one
culture onto another. In practice this means the Americanisation of Russia,
the Germanisation of the Czech Republic and Hungary and China and India
simultaneously to imitate the United States and the United Kingdom and so
on. Least of all we want to resemble ourselves. The world can only lose out
and become ashamed of itself.
Of course, it would be absurd and superfluous to ignore the strengths
of liberal theories. Freedom, human rights, private initiative and property
are things which we have inherited through the centuries and which we will
take with us into the future. The problem is, however, that in the modern
world this is far from enough. Neither liberalism nor Marxism-Leninism can
explain the modern processes of world integration, the reduction of the role
of national states, the appearance and the principles of the global world,
mutual interaction of cultures in the context of internationalisation.
These two doctrines appeared during the industrial era, in the
conditions of strong class division and inequality. They served the needs of
the Third Civilisation with their inherent structures - nations and nation
states. Their basic laws and categories were connected to the problems faced
by mankind during the 19th and 20th century. Today, however, all this has
changed as a result of modern technological processes, as a result of modern
social structures and the evolution of ownership.
Marx's working class does not exist, there is no class hegemony,
proletarian revolutions are senseless. At the same time the ideal private
owner in the conditions of the intermingling of millions of private
activities and the increase in the dependence of each individual does not
exist. Just like the new technologies did not find their place within the
shell of state bureaucratic "socialist" governments, in the same way the
socialisation of private property and the globalisation of the world have
destroyed the basic values of liberalism.
It is true that each of these doctrines can adapt and take on board new
ideas. However, this would be a perpetration ofviolence against history and
academic morals. Such attempts are being carried out at the moment stemming
from the political ambitions and inherited from the past but as a rule they
serve only to delay the reform process. Their hypocrycy will be quickly
perceived. In the early period of my academic research I also allowed myself
to indulge in such illusions attempting to imagine the ideas of sweeping
reform in Eastern Europe as the revitalisation of socialism. At that time
this was about as far as we were allowed to go. Today, when we are
relatively free it would much more honest to confess that the time of
ready-made ideas has long since passed. New generations have the right to
their own ideas and the logical progress of history does not mean the
acceptance of old cliches. Neither Marxism-Leninism can be successfully
adapted to individualism, the market or private enterprise, nor can
liberalism accept within its own systems the international and internal
associations created by new communications. It is equally absurd to believe
that ideological doctrines can be based on a priori class status - theories
about capitalists, theories about workers and peasants. This approach was
suitable in the 19th and 20th centuries when the integration of society was
at a much lower level and social stratification was much more acute and
significant.
I expect political liberals and "socialist" movements to begin to adapt
to the new realities. It is sometimes amusing that those who call themselves
socialist may carry out anti-socialist politics in support of the major
monopolies. There may even be liberals and conservatives who preach politics
in the name of the people and social economic ideas. The comedy of make-up
and disguise will continue for another 10-15 years and maybe more. We will
hear more and more frequently that the changes have only served to confirm
the ideas of Karl Marx and L.Von Mizes. This is, however, to insult these
two great thinkers.
This is why I cannot announce the end of Marxism or liberalism, but can
only give forewarning that the end will come - about that there can be no
doubt. History teaches us that new eras give rise to new ideas. We are now
entering such an era.
2 A RETURN TO THE ROOTS OR THE MAIN THESIS
The theory and the practice of liberalism stresses the absolutism of
the individual and private property and hence the monopoly of power of the
strong over the weak. Marxism-Leninism created the total monopoly of the
state by absolutising socialisation and state ownership. I have come to the
conclusion that neither socialisation not autonomisation can be achieved
individually or absolutely...
I
n 1982 when I was writing my doctoral dissertation, I wanted to find an
answer to the question, "Does state socialism justifiably exist?" Why were
its ideas dominant at that time in a number of countries including Bulgaria?
According to Lenin, "State socialism is based on the socialisation of
capitalist production."[30] By the world "socialisation" Marx,
Engels and Lenin meant the development of the social character of autonomous
social processes. In their opinion humanity was progressing logically from
individual to larger mass forms of production, passing through the stages of
primitive labour to slave owning and feudal manufacturing processes, the
development of the factory eventually to reach the large scale monopolies.
Subsequently Marxism-Leninism states that the next step in socialisation
after monopolies is the creation of social ownership or property controlled
by the state itself.
At first glance, this might appear logical: in the stages of its
progress, humanity passes from primitive individual production to enormous
factories and eventually state control within the framework of the entire
society. Marx and Lenin frequently come back to this emphasising that
private property is too limiting for the new productive forces and that it
gives rise to wars and violence subsequently conceding its position to state
control. There is no difference in principle here between Marx, Lenin,
Stalin, Trotski or Mao Tse Tung. They all saw socialisation as a global
process, the basis and pre-condition for the establishment of a world
communist society, of a "single factory for all workers and peasants"
(Lenin). Taking this as the basis and putting to one side (briefly) the
Marxist thesis of the decay of the state, the pioneer politicians of state
socialism unified life and put up barriers to motivation and the progress of
people.
In order to analyse this process, we can take the most simple example -
the example of natural organisms. Organic cells do not only grow when they
develop (unless they are cancerous) but divide and become autonomous. If
they separate from the main body of cells they die. If larger natural
systems attack their independent development, the cells die or cease to
exist in the same form. All growth of organisms in nature is associated with
autonomous development. The other option is decay and inevitable death.
Similarly, if socialisation and centralisation are viewed as a
unilateral process, they (like cancer cells) will automatically lead to the
mutation of the system. It is true that each subsequent stage of human
development leads to the greater homogeneity of human civilisation. However,
if this thesis is not further developed, it become transformed into a
rejection of its own self. For Stalin and his followers, for Mao and Pol Pot
progress meant socialisation, equal to unification, military discipline and
universal obedience to superiors.
This was the very basis for the doctrine of state socialism and the
gradual unification of society. In the 1920's and 1930's the USSR and in the
1950's the countries of Eastern Europe underwent the total nationalisation
of their industry and agriculture. There was a belief in the theory that via
state regulated homogeneity the differences between village and town,
intellectual and physical work and classes would disappear and that this
would be the basis for subsequent "social homogeneity" and
"nationalisation". This was the model for state socialism. It meant death
for individual activities, creativity and motivation. To a lesser extent it
suffocated the diversity of social life. Naturally it also delayed and in
certain circumstances halted social development.
The most important element in my understanding of this matter is that
integration (socialisation) and autonomation are not mutually exclusive but
a pair of categories which develop in parallel and are mutually conditioned.
The same can also be said of other pairs of processes such as globalisation
and localisation, integration and disintegration, collectivisation and
individualisation, massification and demassification etc.. However
paradoxical this might appear at first glance, I believe that these pairs of
processes have developed in parallel and not to the detriment of one
another. Of course, the phases of socialisation and autonomation,
unification and collapse cannot appear simultaneously.
At each stage in the development of human history the socialisation of
production replaces a particular level of autonomy and in its turn gives way
to another. The slave owning state socialised the labour of thousands of
slaves and gradually within the very heart of the system new centres of
autonomy began to appear setting the preconditions for the appearances of
colonies and the early stages of feudalism. Capitalism destroyed the feudal
divisions but in its place a new type of autonomy appeared. However hard it
tried to suppress autonomy, the totalitarian regimes could not destroy the
autonomy of social groups and individual people were eventually to destroy
the monopoly of power.
Let us take the elementary example of the single division of labour.
The idea of the socialisation of labour is based on the fact that the
individual units of labour complement each other within the processes of the
creation of a final product. Craftsmen are divided from the agricultural
worker, the trader from the craftsman etc.. On the one hand they all are
dependent on each other but on the other (and this is particulary important)
they achieve greater professional autonomy and greater freedom of action.
Similar processes develop in relation to the forms of unified labour -
certain economic units are absorbed up by others while at the same time in
the process of capital accumulation yet others become more powerful and more
independent. At a certain stage in their development they divide into
individual autonomous structures. Large companies as General Motors for
example transfer a number of their activities to smaller independent
companies. Each larger production unit is then obliged to autonomise its
internal departments. Moreover, the more developed and bigger the unit is,
the greater the autonomy of its component parts. This process is confirmed
by the decentralisation of management in transnational corporations. In
general the growth of the whole cannot help but bring with it the growth of
its individual parts. The increased process of integration will at a certain
stage in its development lead to division and a certain level of
autonomisation.
Thus, the growth in socialisation does not lead to the death of
autonomisation but to its reproduction and change in its forms. The growth
in integration leads to another type of disintegration, globalisation and
another type of localisation etc.. Each human activity is a form of
accumulation. On the one hand the process of accumulation as both a material
and spiritual process leads simultaneously to two effects: firstly, it
concentrates the material and social forces in one area making them socially
and naturally more independent and autonomous, secondly, this accumulation
leads to millions of new types of manufacturing, economic and social links
between human communities, countries and continents.
If we take the level of autonomy of individual structural units, then
in certain cases their levels of autonomy increase, others decrease and
disappear while yet others appear and continue to develop. In general terms
the socialisation and autonomisation of structures are linked by a complex
series of relations which complement each other at the same time. The main
element is that during the development of the historical processes they
follow a common line of development and growth. Moreover, it is clear that
neither individualism nor collectivism can of their own accounts express the
richness of human interdependence. Separated from one another, these
categories create deformation. Pure individualism without any idea of the
community is antipathetical to the idea of the objective integrational
processes while forced collectivism kills diversity and initiative. By the
same logic, the state socialist collective societies limit individualism and
creativity and delay progress.
I am convinced that history will lead us to a combination of the
elements of the individual and the social: the integration of human
activities unify a series of autonomous production processes, countries and
peoples making the world more united and more mutually dependent. At the
same time there will be growth in the social role of the individual,
autonomous groups and ethnic communities. Material accumulation and the
growth in wealth available to civilisations makes man wealthier better
informed and consequently freer and more independent. The more humanity
develops the more this trend will continue. It will be more difficult to
"entrap" such a person within the monopolistic structures of managed
societies.
I, therefore, believe that in global terms it is possible to speak of
the disintegration of historical distances between the individual (private
relations) and the collective (public relations). History has indisputedly
shown that objective integrational processes are ineffective without some
form of administrative compulsion. The higher the level of civilisation
within society the greater the harmony between the individual and society.
3 MAIN CONCLUSIONS AND A MESSAGE TO A.TOFFLER
Since the 1960's the technological basis of world manufacturing has
changed out of all recognition. So much new technology has entered every day
life that social relations have also changed. One of the best modern
philosophers, A.Toffler, maintains that new technology leads to the
emassification of production. My belief is that the effect is somewhat
different.
I believe that it gives rise to the parallel processes of integration
and disintegration,
massification and demassification and that it is this dual effect which
has influenced the world in this extraordinary way.
T
he existence of a dialectic link between integration anddisintegration,
globalisation and localisation can be summed upin three basic conclusions.
The first conclusion is that these pairs of categories of historical
development are not antipathies but develop in parallel and are mutually
conditioned. This concept is equivalent to the rejection of utopian liberal
theories of absolute independence and the "purity" of private ownership.
However, this is also a rejection of the notions of a future society as a
world without individualism, internal autonomy, local characteristics and
without economic, political and cultural diversity.
The second conclusion is that socialisation, or integration is not the
same is nationalisation or centralisation. If this was a unilateral process
(the persistent unification of autonomous units) then this concentration
would lead to centralisation and would lead to the growth in
nationalisation. The view that autonomisation goes hand in hand with
socialisation means that socialisation is above all a "horizontal" process
based on man, the market and private property. Consequently centralisation
has certain permissible limits beyond which it is ineffective and provokes
reactionary processes. The theoretical conception of the state in the modern
world has changed significantly. It is clear that in modern conditions the
borders of the state have undergone considerable changes. The greater the
level of development on the one hand, the more civic society will be
absorbed up by the state - and vice versa.
My third conclusion[31] is that from an international point
of view, socialisation (integration) gives rise to new phenomena connected
firstly with globalisation and secondly with the appearance of increased
local autonomy and localisation. On the one hand, new communications unite
humanity, on the other hand they create national and ethnic self-confidence
leading to the struggle for the survival of nations and cultures as a
reaction to cultural imperialism.
Liberalism and Marxism-Leninism are unable to provide explanations for
the new realities. Liberal doctrines emphasise individualism, personal
freedom, while Marxism places the emphasis on class and collectivism. When
liberalism and Marxism appeared on the historical stage, their one
dimensional nature was to a certain extent entirely understandable. The
liberals defended the rights of free, private entrepreneurs while the
Marxists defended the working class and the poor. The level of
stratification within civilised societies was so clear and so developed that
such doctrines were inevitable. They were a historical necessity and their
mark in history.
It will be interesting to see whether these conclusions will be
confirmed by the modern technological revolution which is apparently taking
shape at the moment and which will continue to shape the face of the world
for some time to come.
In a number of his books the famous American philosopher and
futurologist, A.Toffler, concludes that new technologies lead to the
demassification of production. "At the present moment", he writes, "We are
passing from an economy of mass production and mass consumption to what I
would call "the demassed economy".[32]" In the opinion of the
great American futurologist, large scale mass production will be replaced by
individualised or small scale production. Identical components will be
assembled in more and more individualised end products.
I wanted to draw attention to this thesis not because it is original
but rather that it has lead to the revival of the illusion that liberalism
and free trade will triumph. The basic idea of Toffler is that the modern
technological revolution will return the demassification of production as
the leading form of economic relations which will in turn mean the collapse
of the large trans-nationals corporations or at least the reduction of their
role, the domination of the small and medium scale sector and the rebirth of
free competition. This thesis refutes my own, or to look at it from another
point of view, my theory refutes his. If what I believe is true, that
integration and disintegration and related categories are developing in
parallel, this means that demassification will not replace mass production.
It will simply lead to new types of mass production and new types of
demassed activities.
There is no doubt that new computer technology has created work for
hundreds of thousands of people in their homes. The computer revolution had
individualised a huge number of social activities and has elevated the role
of the intellect. However, these technologies have also created millions of
new, direct links which stimulate mass production. At the end of the 1970's
and 1980's many specialists believed that small and medium enterprises would
eventually become the keystone of world manufacturing. The basis for such a
presumption was the growth in their relative share of the market. "The
entire economy", writes Toffler, "is becoming demassed."[33] He
gives examples of the thousands of small and medium enterprises in Kiusu,
Southern Japan and in Quebec, Canada.
Only one thing is true in these statements: that with the advent of the
computer age and biotechnology and their practical and universal
applications a large number of small and medium independent companies have
been created. With the use of a computer it has become possible for many
activities to be carried out individually. The same reasons, however, have
provided stimuli for the large scale manufacturers. Over the past 10-15
years, the mass bankruptcies and collapses of trusts and companies which
many people expected, have not taken place. On the contrary, as can be seen
from the annual American rank listings in the magazine "Fortune", the
leading companies in the world have increased their sales and have
strengthened their positions in the world economy. Over the past ten years
they have increased their position in world trade, manufacturing and
particularly in the area of new technology.[34]
Without doubt the majority of them have changed their structures by
diversifying and delegating their activities to subsidiary companies and
internally autonomous systems. Nevertheless, mass production has not
disappeared. It has simply changed its form. One reason for this is
globalisation and the opening up of new markets for the leading world
companies. Another reason is the production of myriad new forms of
communication - mobile telephones, telephone exchanges, satellites, new
audio and video technology, cable systems etc.. This new technology has
reached unsuspected levels with made enormous profits for their owners. A
similar boom has been experienced by transport manufacturers and providers -
cars, aeroplanes, ships and helicopters etc.. People have begun to travel
more. Together with the construction of the necessary infrastructure,
transport and communications will be the most dynamic growth sectors over
the next 10-20 years.
Who can produce such goods? The small or the medium companies, the
"demassed" producer? On the contrary. This is only within the power of the
large companies, capable of allocating large amounts of money for science,
research and development and personnel training. The globalisation of the
world economy has allowed these companies to maximalise their profits and to
spread their experience and influence to many countries in the world. Even
in the cases, when a large company subcontracts to thousands and tens of
thousands smaller companies, their labour is united in a single end product.
It is difficult to accept the statement that the mass production line
will disappear and that the world is entering into a period of industrial
manufacturing and individualised products. Indeed, modern machinery -
computers, cars, planes, trains, ships requires the use of non-standard and
individualised creativity. However, they all use more and more standard
products - microchips, microcircuits, electronic and mechanical elements
whose manufacturing requires unified labour and unified means of production.
The greatest developments in the last 20 years have not lead to the
demassification of production but have autonomised and socialised it. In
other words, from an organisational point of view, these manufacturing
processes have become more autonomous but in social terms they have linked
many more people within new national and international communities. Even
when they are juridically independent, small and medium scale enterprises
have become incorporated into larger companies via a system of industrial
cooperation. While the technology of the Third Civilisation lead to mass
production and large open workshops, new technology has produced a
completely different type of mass production. The integrating effect comes
from the use of goods or services, from the repeated application of
identical manufacturing or financial operations over the entire world.
Let us take for example the fast-food chain of "MacDonalds" or
"Kentucky Fried Chicken" or the American software company "Microsoft", these
are symbols of success. The majority of their products are produced
individually or by a small groups of highly qualified specialists. There is
hardly a more individualised profession in the world than the creation of
software programmes. On the other hand, look at the enormous "mass" effect.
For the past ten years the profits of Microsoft have increased annually by
62%. In the USA alone more than 50 million people use Microsoft products.
Today the company has sales offices in 31 countries around the world and is
essentially a global company.[35]
New technology allows for more autonomy for the individual worker
requiring more individualism and intellect. At the same time, labour becomes
more socialised, more integrated into a more general and large scale
national and, frequently, global society. To this extent, more and more
people are becoming dependent on the labour of the individual person and
company but at the same time the level of national and social labour
integration is also developing rapidly.
Whatever example we look at - the manufacture of modern transport,
communications, packaging, commerce, banking, the effect is the same. The
modernisation of these branches requires the parallel growth of
individualism and socialisation. My general conclusion is that the modern
technological revolution has demonstrated the parallel action of both these
processes: autonomisation and integration (socialisation). One of these
processes leads to the demassification of certain types of human activity
and their individualisation, while the other links the manufacturers of
different countries within new types of relations, making them more
"massive" and more international.
Demassification appears through the growth in the role of individual
creative activity, regional and ethnic economic communities, the growth in
the number of small and medium companies and the application of individually
produced and consumed products and services etc.. Massification takes place
through new communication and transport infrastructures, mass consumption of
standardised products, the interdependence of common energy and ecosystems,
through the use of common resources, banks, funds and stock exchanges, the
mutual interaction of currencies, fashion and culture.
My message to A.Toffler is not intended to show that modernity does not
provide us with a limitless number of examples of demassification, but to
show that this phenomenon is only a part of the process. It is not isolated
from the globalisation and massification of world production, or the mass
participation of millions of new producers in mutual economic and ecological
dependence. Massification and demassification, globalisation and
localisation, integration and disintegration are paired concepts. Their
modern interdependence is one of the most important pre-conditions for us to
recognise the character of the emerging new civilisation and its political
and economic structures.
4. A SIMILAR MESSAGE TO S.HUNTINGTON
If Toffler believes that the new era will lead to the demassification
of production, then another American - Samuel Huntington, has predicted that
the new era will cause conflicts between civilisations. Are the pogroms of
Sarajevo or the wars in the
Caucuses proof of his conclusion?
T
he processes of integration and autonomisation are taking place on an
international scale. Moreover, international and internal integration are
indivisibly linked processes. The major question is what is the nature of
the world which we are about to enter? Will it be dominated by Western
Cultures, divided into new cultural communities or something else? What will
triumph? Integration or autonomisation, modernisation or specific national
values?
In response to these problems, S.Huntington in 1993, laid the
foundations for a new, rather pretentious line of discussion. In his
opinion, the "major foundations of conflict in the modern world are not in
the main ideological or economic." They are based on culture and
civilisation. "The clash of civilisations", in the opinion of Huntington,"
will be the last phase in the development of world
conflicts"[36]. Although these ideas are controversial and many
writers have rejected them, they should not be ignored completely. In 1995
the East-West Research Group organised a discussion on the theme, "Europe in
the 21st Century" at which the former Prime Minister of Poland, Yan
Belietski defended just such a thesis. Many politicians, intellectuals and
journalists throughout the world have similar views.
S.Huntington believes that the conflicts of the future will result from
the divisions between Islam, Eastern Orthodoxy, Western culture,
Confucianism, Japanese, Hindu, Latin American and a number of other
cultures. In Russia, Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece there a number of leaders
who are determined to struggle for the authority of Orthodoxy. Europe is
divided between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. The East-West border of the
united Europe separates Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Poland and the three Baltic states from the Orthodox nations.
Similar borders divide Islam and Christianity and Confucianism and Hinduism
etc..
If we recall the theoretical approach which was mentioned earlier, then
we shall have to reject the view of Huntington and his followers. In general
terms, modern academic research after the end of the cold war has been
dominated by two common approaches, each of which either absolutises
integration or autonomy and separatism.
1. Immediately after the collapse of the communist regime, it was
generally accepted that Western culture had triumphed. Western, or to be
more precise, American culture, in the opinion of the editor of the Wall
Street Journal, R.L.Bartley, for better or worse is spreading over the
entire world.[37] The integration of the world, in the opinion of
many researchers is based on Western culture. They believe that it will
assume dominance of the world and provide as proof the popularity of
football in Japan, Madonna and Michael Jackson in Thailand and the fact that
the crowned heads of state from the East are being educated in Harvard and
Berkley.
2. The second point of view belongs to S.Huntington himself.
Integration in his opinion is of no value when faced with the boom of
civilisations. The disappearance of the violence of the bi-polar model led
to a revival of primal cultural identity. Cultural differences and cultural
autonomy instead of ideology became the basis for conflicts. Thus,
Huntington provides explanations for the collapse of Yugoslavia and the USSR
and predicts a similar future for the rest of the world.
By following the logic of the entire book and of my basic theoretical
approach, I believe that both these views are extreme and belong to types of
thought which were typical of the period between the 17th and 20th
centuries. In my opinion neither Western Culture will be able to dominate
the world categorically, nor will the world become divided into a number of
indigenous cultural civilisations. There is little doubt that after the
collapse of the Berlin wall the old ideologies lost much of their former
significance. Here Huntington is right, although this will hardly revive the
threat of new cold wars, a return to the former state is not entirely
impossible and the world agenda will have new geo-political structures.
Directly after the removal of ideological interdependency, and taking
the lid off long-suppressed accumulated national energy, the explosion was
inevitable. In certain cases this was a manifestation of crushed national
pride, in others this was a struggle for cultural survival, while in yet
other cases this was simply the search for a spiritual foundation for
something to replace totalitarian ideology. How, for example, could the
communists have remained influential after 1989, except by exploiting
nationalism and the struggle against Western influence? Was it not
completely natural for the Tadzhiks, Armenians, Azeris or the Slovaks and
Slovenes to engage in emotional expressions of their long-suppressed
national identities? To this extent all the conflicts along the borders of
the former Eastern Bloc were reactions against the limitations, insults and
repression of cultural identity. It is also the same with the insoluble
problems of ethnic and religious self-identification in Northern Ireland,
Kurdistan (Turkey and Iraq) and Quebec as well as many other places in the
world. Nevertheless, Huntington is not correct in his view that modern
ethnic conflicts are the seeds of large-scale conflicts between
civilisations. He absolutises autonomy and ignores the global processes of
integration. The parallel action of integrational and autonomising processes
mean that such conflicts are rather a feature of immaturity and backwardness
rather than of the future. If we accept the thesis of S.Huntington, then we
have to accept that during the entire 21st century we will continue to find
ourselves in a situation of transition between old and new civilisations, in
a state of chaos and disorder. I tend to believe that the enormous bodies of
governments and peoples will choose progress, new technology and open market
societies to seek confirmation of their cultural identity. On the other
hand, what will happen with the transnational corporations, global
electronic media and world financial markets? The dividing lines between the
civilisations predicted by Huntington mean the collapse, no more and no
less, of the world economy, the establishment of new walls in place of
international highways, barriers to communications, the flow of transport,
goods and millions of people. This was possible in the 19th and 20th century
but it is absurd for the future.
I believe that the conflicts in Bosnia, Nagorni Karabakh, Georgia and
Tadzhikistan are temporary and will fade with the integration of these
countries into the world economy. In a similar way, the pretensions and
extremism of the catholics and the French-speaking minority in Quebec will
also fade. Their origins are not in the collapse of the totalitarian regimes
but in the reduction of the role of the nation state and in their struggle
for identity. When I say that cultural contradictions will "fade", I do not
mean that they will disappear. When I reject the "autonomist", Huntington, I
also reject the "Western integrationalist", R.Bartley. The world will
neither disintegrate into separate civilisations, since this would be to
deny 6000 years of integration, nor will it be dominated by mass American
culture which would be to reject the self-perpetuating nature of cultural
autonomy. If immediately after the collapse of the Berlin wall American
cultural influence did indeed grow in leaps and bounds, then, I believe,
this process will soon be compensated by the cultural progress of Japan,
Europe, Russia and other countries. American culture itself has been
subjected to the serious influence of Latin American, African, Asian and
European cultural products and has become pluralistic rather than purely
American. The cultural identity of each people and ethnic group can be
defended in two ways in the modern world: the first of these is via
isolation from the world -- the second is via the processes of modernisation
and the "forced" promotion of cultural identity. The experience of countries
which have isolated themselves from the world is lamentable. In modern
conditions this is impermissible. The only positive experience which remains
is that of those nations who are the standard bearers of progress.
I believe that the future will be defined by three parallel processes
directly linked to the mutual relationship between integration and autonomy.
The first of these is the globalisation of world culture the
constituent elements of which will be defined not by a single or group of
larger nations but by a more universal process.
The second is self-identification and the rebirth of a large number,
about 50--60, of local cultures which will become part of the process of
global change. They will find their niches and will complement global
cultural intergration.
The third process is perhaps most important -- that of the hitherto
unseen intensive processes of cultural mixing between revitalised national
cultures and global culture as a whole.
Some of these concepts will be examined in greater detail at a later
stage and I will provide further evidence. What, however, remains of the
newly reborn "civilisations" of Huntington? Nothing. They will be subjected
to the same structural changes (integrational and autonomising) to which
them entire modern civilisation has been subjected. Some of these will
flourish in global relations, others will complement the existing global
culture.
Is it really possible to compare two Islamic countries such as Morocco
or Iran and would they possible cooperate in the event of a future cultural
conflict? Hardly. I am also convinced that the Eastern Orthodox countries
will become integrated into Europe rather than form their own independent
cultural and political community. All the civilisations described by
Huntington are in actual fact cultural and religious communities involved in
common integrational processes. Integration is no stronger than autonomy but
is no weaker either. It is stronger, however, than isolationism and
confrontational cultures and religions. Of the cultural characteristics of
Huntington's civilisations the only thing which will remain will be that
which can adapt itself to the global processes of integration. It will be an
addition and continuation of a new global culture which I predict will be
the spiritual conduit of the new civilisation.
5. THE NEED FOR A NEW THEORETICAL SYNTHESIS
Liberalism is based on private property. Marxism rejects its
significance and absolutises collectivism and integration based on state
coercion.
The main conclusions of these great teachings have not stood up to the
test of time and there is now a need for a new ideological and theoretical
synthesis.
M
arxism-Leninism, Maoism, Trotskiyism, albeit in different ways
emphasised the abolition of private ownership and coercive nationalism. The
experiment was unsuccessful and retrospectively is seen in negative terms.
On the other hand, however, liberalism supported private property but
underestimated the role of socialisation and integration. Despite its
attempts to triumph over the corpse of Marxism, the liberal idea is unable
to provide adequate explinations for the modern era. For almost two
centuries, humanity has vacillated between these two approaches to social
thought. Neither Marxism, however, nor Liberalism were sufficiently
convincing. Marxism-Leninism aimed to give social guarantees to all but
destroyed and limited in the process all freedom of private initiative and
progress. Liberalism and capitalism were based on the absolutism of
"private" ownership which did not bring harmony or equilibrium but divided
the world into the eternally poor and the eternally rich.
No-one today denies the need for the protection of human rights or the
right of all to organise private production: Neither the Chinese communists
who have lead the reform process in China guaranting long-term economic
growth, nor the Russian communists now in senior management positions in
private banks and companies. No-one would dispute the need for the
opening-up of societies and free competition between companies from
different countries. Who, on the other hand, would oppose the idea of the
social state, the struggles of the poor and the deprived for a better life
or the battles of the enviromentalists to halt the production of
environmental pollutants?
When 120 years ago the representatives of the classical bourgeoisie and
Marxist political economics first crossed swords, the English cotton mill
workers and Silesian miners were working 16 hours a day while their
employers lived in resplendent luxury. The profound social gaps, the
inter-imperialist wars and conflicts not only divided people but also the
theoreticians and politicians who defended their interests. What were the
reasons for the divisions between liberal and conservative doctrines and the
social democrat and communists? Above all this was the question of private
ownership, the exploitation of hired labour, the origin of value and market
equilibrium etc.. The gap between ideological views was widened further by
the ambitions of leaders and politicians and reaching its height during the
fifty years of the 20th century when political radicalism appeared on a
hitherto unknown scale. Communism and fascism became the extreme forms of
class opposition and world wars - the bloody result of radicalism and
totalitarianism.
After the Second World War, perhaps, frightened by the extent of the
destruction, politicians began to search for ways to mitigate extremism.
Despite the cold war, a process of gradual and sometimes contradictory
rapprochement began to take place. Khrushchev accepted the principle of
peaceful co-existence and began to speak of the replacement of the
dictatorship of the proletariate with the national-democratic state. In 1948
Tito and in 1968 Kadar in Hungary breathed life into the processes of
"socialist" private property while retaining the single-party system. All
the Eastern European countries began to search for the possibilities of
change. In the West, first of all L.Erchard and then a number of other
leaders accepted the idea of the social state and guaranteed significant
benefits for their workers and employers. The anti-monopoly legislation in
the USA and Western Europe allowed millions of small and medium producers to
prosper. One of the most effective areas of new legislation was that which
allowed for the participation of workers in the management and ownership of
the factories in which they worked. The West began to speak of "peoples'
capitalism" and the East spoke of "socialist self-management": ideas which
were much more close to each other than the class and political foundations
from which they originated. This gradual rapprochement came not only from
the insight of a number of politicians and researchers but above all the
changes in the technological base of production and the mutual influence of
the two blocs. Of course, as I mentioned a little earlier the adaptation to
the new realities was much stronger and effective in the West than in the
East where it was more cosmetic and superficial. The slow rapprochement of
ideological concepts was also an expression of the common crisis engulfing
the world and which was a crisis of the values and ideas which had dominated
over the past two centuries.
If one looks at the evolution of the parties within the Socialist
International, one loses all concept of the traditional left. The Italian
party of the Democratic Left (the former Communist Party of Italy) declared
itself in 1995 in favour of a movement towards liberalism. The Japanese
Socialist Party made a similar declaration. The Spanish and French
Socialists underwent a similar ideological evolution as did the British
Labour Party. Similarly the wave of new programmes and declarations made by
the conservative and liberal politicians calling for more social guarantees
and assistance for the poor is also deceptive. It is no secret that during
the last 20 or 30 years both the left and the right have begun to resemble
one another. In 1995 Jacques Chirac lead his presidential campaign with
promises of social involvement while at the same time the leader of the
British Labour Party, Tony Blair, called for a rejection of the ideas of
nationalisation. After a painful rapprochement of the basic ideas over the
past 30 years and "great compromises", there is a clear need today for a new
theoretical synthesis.
With the large-scale economic and geopolitical changes of recent years
the world has entered a new era which offers not only new ideological
concepts but a new synthesis of academic thought. When I speak of synthesis,
I mean the mechanical fusion of existing doctrines which has been already in
progress over the past 2 or 3 decades, leading to a new basis from which new
doctrines on the social and political development of the world will be born.
The synthesis which will produce new political ideas does not require
the rejection or the justification of either the qualities of liberal or
socialist ideas. Human rights, private property, the civic society, market
economics - these are the undisputed achievements of liberalism. Social
harmony and justice, solidarity, the dialectics of development, the
aspirations for social balance on the other hand are rooted in the different
variations of Marxism. These are all forms of our modern existence which are
of major significance for the future of mankind. This should also include
the more specific issues of social benefits, for example.
Such an ideological synthesis, however, should in no way mean the
unification of socialist and liberal ideas. In my opinion it is incorrect to
speak of social-liberal theory, or of some mechanical unification of parts
of Marxism and other parts of liberalism. The synthesis I am speaking of
does not come from the unification of political and academic views but from
the objective processes which affect humanity as a whole. They relate to new
realities which are formed on the basis of new social phenomena and
processes.
Above all, this raises to the question of the character of the present
transition, the crisis of the Third Civilisation and its historical fate.
There is no doubt that modern mankind is faced with an entirely new set of
problems essentially different from those of the doctrines of the 19th and
20th centuries. The entire basis upon which we have to formulate our views,
notions and ideas has changed. The new world economic order, global
ecological problems, the intermingling of cultures, changes in the role and
the position of the nation state, new social and professional groups,
require another type of thinking and other types of ideological connections
and systems. In what way will the globalisation of the world take place -
via new forms of imperialism or via a new world order? What will this order
be? Neither liberalism nor Marxism, nor any other theory can provide an
exhaustive answer to these questions. Firstly, because these theories were
constructed on the social problems of the 19th century and secondly, because
all theories which have attempted to explain the world over the past 300
years began their life based on the culture of individual nation states and
individual classes.
The new theoretical synthesis of which I am speaking will have a global
character. It will have be based not only on those liberal and social ideas
of the 19th and 20th centuries which have stood the test of time but also on
those which have come from other ideological influences. It is no longer
possible to ignore the achievements of Japan, South Korea or Thailand in the
organisation of labour. We cannot ignore the historical legacy and economic
and philosophical achievements of these countries as well as a number of
countries in Asia and Latin America.
Thus, this new theoretical synthesis cannot be purely social-liberal
nor purely Marxist or Euro-Atlantic. It will be global, multicultural and
will appear gradually in the coming decades. Today, a number of avant-garde
researchers are looking for projections of this synthesis. Some of them
involuntarily fall under its influence while others have simply realised
that all the traditional notions of man and society are inadequate and
outdated. Any interpretation of contemporary life requires new methodology,
concepts and categories.
The new theoretical synthesis is far from being a formulation of a
unified global theory for the future of the world and much less is it a
single doctrine of a social model which will lead to the "glowing future of
communism" or the even more "glowing future of the capitalist future". This
is to look back to the situation of the 17th-19th century when the advent of
the modern age and the renaissance of the human spirit raised about 25-30
cardinal questions and stimulated the development of social theory.
At that time a number of generalisations were made, firstly at a
philosophical level and then on an economic and political level which led to
a principle change in the evaluation of history and world development. After
Kant, Hegel, Hobbs and Smith came Marx, Sei, Mill, Bernstein, Lenin,
Trotskiy, Von Mizes, Stalin and many others. Despite their arguments and
mutual refutation they were all theories from the era of the Third
Civilisation. They followed the laws of the emerging processes of
industrialisation and the domination of the world by a small number of
states. The theoretical synthesis of this period was limited to "the
domestic problems of individual countries and regions" which were then
related to the common geo-political regions. The problems of freedom and
private property, exploitation and the rights of the proletariate, value and
market price were resolved in the context of groups, national or class
interests. Today such an approach would resolve nothing. For the first time
it is clear that without a global view, without a global approach, the
questions of the modern era will remain unanswered.
The next few years will see the gradual formation of a new theoretical
foundation as a result of the world entering a new period of its
development. This synthesis is closely linked with the new problems which
the world is facing today and attempts to find new solutions for existing
and emerging problems. When I mention the global approach, I mean problems
such as global warming and the condition of the oceans and the seas etc.. I
also mean the way in which global life is organised, the general principles
of its formation at a moment when no single country or people can be
isolated from on another.
The new theoretical synthesis will pose the question of the world
economic order in a new way and will re-examine the concept of "private
ownership" and its place in the system of human relations. It will also
raise the question of an entirely new notion of the limits of the nation
state and its relationship with local and global power structures and new
approaches to the problem of the rights of man and the protection of his
privacy. In other words, the new theoretical synthesis will at one and the
same time raise new problems and new views. This will not mean severing
links with the past, nor separation from the theoretical legacy of the 19th
and 20th centuries. However, this will mean the renewal and restructuring of
systems of academic categories and the laws which provide explanations to
the further processes of human development.
A number of new theories will appear out of these new theories. There
will be those who will want to protect different national, regional and
cultural interests. There will no doubt be those who will want to defend the
interests of the new world elites and those parts of the world population
which are in crisis. It would be wonderful if the new theoretical synthesis
could lead to the establishment of general principles of human development
while at the same time avoiding mass ideologisation.
At the end of the 18th century the French bourgeois revolution thrust
Europe along the path of liberalism. At the end of the 19th century free
competition was replaced by militant imperialism and opposed by socialism.
At the end of the 20th century we are witnessing the end of an entirely new
era and the aspirations of humanity to take a decisive step in the direction
of something new and better. We are living in a time of new movements
towards a renewal which requires new theories. New ideas are born at times
of crisis and change such as the industrial revolution in England at the
beginning of the 19th century, or immediately after the First World War.
Each social and world crisis stimulates the birth of new ideas.
During the plague in the Middle Ages there was an increased interest in
music. Perhaps this was an attempt to prove the triumph of life over death.
Today at a time of cataclysm and economic chaos, of cruel pragmatism and the
murderous processes of consumerism, new ideas might be the equivalent of
spiritual rebirth. These ideas will not appear out of the blue and from one
single source. It is important, however, that they are able to interpret the
new realities, to predict the risks and the dangers with which we are faced
and to continue the traditions of renewal of the human spirit.
Let us then look at the dimensions of the new theoretical synthesis and
apply it in an examination of the most important contemporary phenomena.
Chapter Five
THE FOURTH CIVILISATION
1. WHY A NEW CIVILISATION?
"If we begin now, we and our children will be able to participate in
the exciting reconstruction not only of out-dated politicalstructures but
also of civilisation itself."
Alvin Toffler
T
here is no doubt that the changes in Eastern Europe and the subsequent
geopolitical crisis are the greatest historical events at the end of the
20th century. Some academics have even compared these events with a
re-examination of the results of the Second World War. Indeed the end of the
cold war overturned the results of Yalta and Potsdam. Even so, I feel that
such an evaluation is insufficient. I believe that the collapse of Eastern
European state socialism was an essential sign of the beginning of the end
of one era and the beginning of another in the development of civilisation.
Of course, these two eras cannot be defined on the basis of one particular
event. These two eras are not divided by revolutions but a series of
qualitative changes.
Am I exaggerating? Have I succumbed to the influence of A.Toffler and
his technological waves or J.Lukac who maintains that after five centuries
of democratic aspirations we are experiencing the end of the modern age? I
want to be careful not to allow my imagination to run wild with facts and
events. I have examined them and re-examined time after time and I am
convinced that the changes which we have witnessed are not local but
historical. This is not only the end of the cold war and not only a
technological revolution, it is something more.
Could we have avoided these changes? If Gorbachev had not begun the
reform processes of perestroika, the changes in the USSR might have been
delayed a little longer. If Gorbachev had used a different tactic, the world
might have followed the path of reasonable convergence rather then chaos and
local wars. Nevertheless the replacement of the two-bloc system was
inevitable and sooner or later it would have happened. The changes at the
end of this century are not only industrial, political or spiritual but a
combination of factors affecting not only one or another state. They are
universal.
Let us look are technology. A.Toffler, albeit extreme in a number of
cases, is correct here. He was the first to describe the comprehensive and
epoch-making consequences of the emergence of new electronic communications
and bio-technology. In the same way as the industrial revolution in England
in the 17th and 18th centuries led to a chain reaction throughout the entire
world, today this is being done by the microchip and the robot, the
satellite dish and cable television. As a consequence of computers and
avant-garde communications technology not only have production processes
changed radically, but also the nature of labour itself. Knowledge and
information are undoubtedly substituting physical labour and revolutionising
all social relations.
The processes of technological renewal have lead to profound changes in
the social and class structure of society. It has reduced and is continuing
to reduce the number of traditional workers throughout the world. We have
become witnesses to a combination of changes in the social structure not
only of Europe and America but also such countries as South Korea, Thailand,
Brazil, Australia and New Zealand. The changes in the social and class
structure have been caused by evolutions in the type of ownership. This
series of related processes: new technologies, property, social and class
structures has revolutionised all social relations and has prepared the
transition from the Third Civilisation to the New Era.
The geo-political renewal is profound and universal. In the space of
just a few years one of the two world systems has ceased to exist. The
flagship of this system, the USSR has broken up, followed by the collapse of
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. A series of local wars erupted. The
unification of Germany put an end to the sad years of post-war reality and
turned it into the largest European economy. Both Germany and Japan now find
themselves in new situations with much greater opportunities than before.
All the most significant political and economic alliances of the world,
including the USA, Canada, the EU, China and India are faced with new
realities.
Perhaps some people regard these changes as a temporary phenomenon with
perhaps a dulation of perhaps 2 or 3 years and that the processes ended with
the collapse of COMECON and the Warsaw Pact. These are mere illusions. In
1989-1991, we experienced only the beginning of the reform processes arising
from the common crisis of the two-bloc system. After the first phase of
rapid reform, 1989-1991 the world will experience to a greater or lesser
extent a period of global disorder, tormented "equilibrium" and only after
this - the complex process of the formation of a new world order as an
alternative to the two-bloc model. At the end of the 20th century humanity
has not only destroyed the iron curtain but has also built new bridges in
order to live on the basis of new principles and standards. At the same
time, humanity has rejected Utopias and the theoretical dogma upon which it
has been developing for more than a century.
After the collapse of the Berlin wall, politicians, philosophers and
economists found themselves in a theoretical vacuum. Concepts became
confused, traditional doctrines were beginning to lose their grasp of the
new realities. In some cases extreme pragmatism limited the possibilities
for development allowing only momentary personal benefits and egoism. In
other cases all manner of religious and semi-religious sects tried to fulfil
the vacuum. We have clearly consigned to the past not only the era of the
traditional industrial technologies and related lifestyles but also the
two-bloc world dominated by state socialism and traditional capitalism.
After technology, social class and geopolitical factors, the modern
spiritual and ideological crisis is the third main reason for us to claim
that at the end of the 20th century an entire civilisation is disappearing.
Perhaps the most significant new reality is the globalisation of the
world and the birth of an entire series of new world phenomena: from changes
in the role of the national state to the internationalisation of culture,
sport and daily life. The entire Third Civilisation after the 16th and 17th
centuries has been a time of war and violence. The period of international
integration and later globalisation in the 19th and 20th centuries took
place as a result of the violent imposition of particular cultures and
authority over others. For a century and a half the struggle between the
classes has been the uppermost. Today, however, this is at an end. Because
of the nature of arms and the senselessness of wars, violence is becoming
ineffective. At the same time the imposition of specific cultures, nations,
races and power over others will give way to entirely new types of
relations.
Many people find it hard to believe that the changes will be on such a
large scale and universal. Toffler calls this fear "the shock of the
future"[38] Such people should take a look at the consequences of
new technologies in factories, around them, in their homes and the way in
which their lives have changed as well as the information which surrounds
them. These epoch-making changes which have taken place in the short space
of a few years are affecting, above all, the countries who are the main
proponents of progress, but with the globalisation of markets they will soon
spread throughout the entire world. Thus:
- The end of the era of nation states and the appearance of the global
world;
- The end of the two-bloc system and the end of centuries of violence,
international and inter-imperialist conflicts;
- The end of the domination of the major ideological and political
doctrines which characterised the political and social life of the 19th and
20th centuries;
- The end of the traditional industrial manufacturing processes and the
advent of new technology;
- The end of the class divisions of labour typical of the past 200-300
years;
- The end of traditional private property and its socialisation;
- The end of the domination of certain cultures and the appearance of
global culture and multicultural formations
All this does indeed mark the end of one and the beginning of another
civilisation within human development. These processes affect the whole of
human development as a consequence of the hitherto unseen levels of mutual
interdependence of countries and peoples and the overall processes of
forthcoming change.
But why a New Civilisation?
Why after the era of huge slave-owning states, medieval wars and
migration, after the crisis and collapse of the modern age is the world
entering a period of change in technology and manufacturing, economic and
political order, culture and education. The main feature of the Third
Civilisation - national self-awareness and the appearance of nation states
is changing. After the three major periods in human development, a fourth
period is now beginning whose characteristics are still to be revealed and
examined.
2. SOME THOUGHTS ON THE TRANSITIONS OF CIVILISATIONS
From an historical point of view civilisations cannot be separated by
revolutionary dates and events. They tend to merge with one another as an
embodiment of the character
of human progress. The process is smooth rather than rapid,
humanist and natural rather than subjective and coercive.
T
o a large extent the existing processes of human development have been
interpreted as the transition from one system to another, from one social
structure to another. History has been "divided" into various types of
social and political structures, models and formations. William Rostow in
his search for an alternative defined the various stages of economic
development. Alvin Toffler in a more moderate form expressed the changes in
world development on the basis of three large scale technological waves and
the relevant social relations.
Up to now the dominant aspect of world social and political thought has
been the division of societies into separate models and systems. Capitalist,
communist, fascist, socialist and other models have been the vehicles for
the expression of the passions of nations, parties and politicians for a
particular type of social development. To a large extent this tradition was
conditioned by the imbalanced nature of world development and the fact that
the great thinkers of the 18th century to the present have based their
conclusions only on European culture.
For a long time, world development was interpreted only on the basis of
the traditions of one small part of the globe. European civilisation paid
little attention to the achievements of the Asian peoples and in the rare
cases when their achievements were recognised their assesments were
permeated with European provincialism. The accepted feeling was that
civilisation included only Europe and the European way of life. Over the
last two centuries more attention has been paid to the Asian methods of
manufacturing but European writers still viewed them as inferior to European
methods. I am not extolling the virtues of the Chinese or the Japanese, nor
am I exaggerating the achievements of the Indians, Persians or American
Indians. I just consider that globalisation requires us to change our
approach to research and to look at the world through the prism of
universality and the mutual dependence of the various world cultures.
In modern times the tradition of dividing society into separate
formations and models is becoming less and less adequate. It restricts
thinking and ideologises life. It presupposes the coercive implantation of
ideologies and idols. Such violent forms were used to impose catholicism,
Islam, capitalism and state socialism. One king, one idea, one leader, one
formation, one belief - this is the beginning of coercion and spiritual
debilitation. The unconditional belief in ideological systems has always
evolved into a type of slavery and overt or covert violence.
When in accordance with Marxist doctrine many nations were called upon
to build communism, this in practice meant the coercion of millions of
people and subsequent generations to follow one idea. As the rejection of
the injustices of capitalism, these ideas inspired many people. Later, when
these ideas became state policy and a compulsory credo, they gradually
became transformed into a yoke placed upon free thought and the freedom of
the individual. The Bulgarian people have a marvellous saying, "Who does not
work, shall not eat!" I shall never forget at the end of the 1970's a
Bulgarian communist leader paraphrasing this saying, "Who does not believe,
shall not eat!" Belief and convictions had been converted into a monopoly
and condition for existence.
Those who advocate the system of capitalism and who consider the fall
of the Eastern European regimes to be a conclusive triumph for world
capitalism are in a similar situation. They are also slaves to tradition, to
redundant systems and the belief that Eastern Europe has undergone a
revolution from socialism to capitalism. This is just not the case. What has
happened is something completely different: the releasing of the forces of
the new civilisation, the new world order and new relations between nations.
During periods of transition in world development only the civilisation
approach can save us from new illusions, the inventions of artificial social
models and their forced imposition. In practice this means a gradual and
evolutionary approach to reform and the slow coalescence of the future with
the present. No-one can deny the role of revolutions in history but at the
same time one must take into account the sad experience of the violence and
destruction which they bring with them. The more radical the revolution the
greater the probability that it will lead to "restorationism" or that it
will consume itself. The extremes and the violence of the French Jacobites
allowed Napoleon to become Emperor, dictator and aggressor. The extremes,
violence and Civil War in Russia after the October Revolution transformed
Stalin into the most loved leader and teacher of the world proletariate.
For a number of reasons revolutions have become anachronistic: the
rising level of integration of peoples and societies at the end of the 20th
century, the colossal opportunities for the ideological enslavement of
people via the media and for reasons of complex technological and market
relations. Rapid change, revolutionary leaps and sudden U-turns in the
modern world are inevitably destructive in nature. This has happened in a
number of Eastern European countries which have thrown themselves headfirst
into attempts to restore capitalism and the total rejection of their past.
All they succeeded in doing was to destroy half of their economies.
Today we are witnessing huge levels of dynamic social change which have
been hitherto unknown. Given the dynamic nature of these changes, each new
forced imposition of the civilisation approach to change leads to a usurping
and constriction of ideas, renders social relations inadequate and deprives
emerging new generations of freedom of choice. Hitler's unified world Reich
and the single world factory for workers and peasants promised by Stalin
lead to the loss of enormous human potential and tens of millions of human
lives. Today we are constantly barraged with ideas about eternal and
unchanging models with standard views of the "glorious future", of
capitalist and socialist ideals as the only salvation for the world.
These ideas seek to provide coming generations with outlines and
definitions of what they will have to do, what their truth will have to be
and what their faith will have to be. Such advocacy of a model of
development denies the right of the free creativity of coming generations.
This is not only undemocratic but dangerous. It means that the new stages of
human progress will have been set out beforehand and that our sons and
daughters will have to follow us and mindlessly carry out the will of their
forebears. I entirely support the proposal of the World Federation of the
Future Studies (I believe it was proposed by B. de Juvenal) to talk not of
the "future" but of "futures". No-one has the right to impose a single model
for tomorrow or to delineate a categorical one-dimensional future. Each
subsequent generation shall be entitled to its own present and future,
changes and solutions and how to overcome the problems of its own
time.[39]
The downfall of standard theoretical models and social formations is
also inevitable. The new era will not consist of attempts to find
substitutes for socialism, capitalism and liberalism but to find humanist
principles upon which the existing models, ideas and cultures can give
meaning to new life styles. If we accept the opposite idea and follow the
line of division of the world into social and political formations, if we
define some of them as leaders and the others as insignificant, this will
lead inevitably to the restoration of confrontation and will open the way to
denial and the transformation of differences not into stimuli for
development but into destructive forces. The advocacy of the division and
models of the 19th and 20th centuries or the division of the world into
capitalism and socialism, liberalism or social democracy will turn the clock
back and reject the opportunity for the creation of a better world.
Does this mean that development needs to its own devices like a free
flowing river or a chaotic melee of currents? Such an extreme thesis is as
dangerous and inadequate for the new era as the theory of previously defined
social and economic formations. If the division of the world into systems
and models gives rise to confrontation and kills freedom and continuity then
the lack of ideology and the absence of rules will cause chaos and the
widening of the gap between the rich and the poor. In both cases we will
remain within the embrace of the Third Civilisation instead of creating
solutions for tomorrow. Evidently, humanity cannot accept either the
coercive, cabinet models of society or chaos and chaotic development.
History has frequently shown that periods of great chaos sooner or later
give rise to dictatorships and vice versa.
The 20th century was a century of systems, of the gaps between them, of
confrontation and a century of war and violence. It is time that all this
was replaced with principles and laws which would embrace the universality
of the world and guarantee the processes of globalisation and reject the
interdependence of imperialism. We could overcome the contradiction between
the globalisation of the world and the evident need to preserve the wealth
of national and local cultures by combining the differences and transforming
them into a mutually complementary system rather than repressing and
destroying them. This would be the main distinguishing feature between the
outgoing civilisation and the emergent Fourth Civilisation.
Modern humanity does not need to invent artificial models and to impose
them on individual countries, but it does clearly have to sustain universal
principles, standards and laws which are adequate to the level of
globalisation. This requires the provision of conditions within which the
different cultures can combine and mutually complement each other in order
to achieve the reconciliation of cultural and civilisational contradictions.
My conclusion entails the rejection of the divisions of world development
into models, formations and social strata etc.. The more correct principle
is to replace such opposition with the acceptance of the common principles
of human life and with the relevant legislation to define the standards
required for all countries and peoples.
International law already contains a whole series of such principles
and legislation and it is gradually becoming an ineluctable part of global
awareness. Human rights are one example. This includes the rights of private
initiative, personal choice in life, labour and a dignified existence.
Another group of principles are connected with the free exchange of goods,
people, services and information and with the opening-up of countries and
peoples to each other. Another entire group of principles has arisen from
the common recognition of borders and their inviolability, the unification
of border and customs regimes and the joint efforts in dealing with
international crime. In practice this means the rapprochement of national
legislations, the mutual recognition of the rights of citizens and
organisations. I am not convinced that the concept of "democracy" is
sufficient to explain what needs to be done. Parliamentary democracy and
pluralism have existed for a number of years and they have been unable to
stop the processes of violence, poverty, wars, over-armament and all the
other chronic problems of the Third Civilisation. Democracy clearly is
merely a starting point from which development needs to be continued.
I am convinced that the new civilisation will be integrated slowly and
gradually into the heart of the old one. This will take place first of all
in the most developed countries and subsequently in those countries which
until recently resembled the Third World. This will be not be a socialist,
capitalist, liberal or conservative model but this will be a process of
development from differinent starting points to common principles and
trends, a development which resolves certain difference in order to give
rise to others. To this end the Fourth Civilisation may base itself on
universal principles and legislation and the combination of different
cultures and traditions.
It is unlikely that these principles will develop all of a sudden or
that they will be accepted by all. Together with human rights and the laws
of world economic and cultural relations there is a need for many more new
solutions. The arsenal of conventional methods available to the Third
Civilisation is inadequate to give a chance to the poor and we will be
unable to resolve the contradictions between the rich. Moreover, we will be
unable to create new, just principles of international economic and
political competition. The chaos and the conflicts will continue and
together with this, the danger of the restoration of confrontation and the
bloc model, and consequently the artificial continuation of the Third
Civilisation.
There is no doubt that mankind is aware of the end of the Third
Civilisation and can feel the buds of the new era. The sounds of the new
millennium are coming from the signals of space ships, the countless
satellite dishes, from the electronic pulses of hundreds of millions of
computers and the global awareness which is opening up a path into the minds
of the people of the world every minute of every day.
3. THE DISTINGUISHING FEATURES OF THE FOURTH CIVILISATION
The most significant distinguishing feature of the Fourth Civilisation
is linked to the processes of globalisation. For several millennia, tribes,
ethnic groups, cultures and nations have reflected the specific features of
their natural environment. The Fourth Civilisation not only combines these
features but also unifies the diversity in order to recreate it...
E
ach era in human development has its own features. The civilisation
approach allows for the characteristic features of the new not to be severed
abruptly from the past but to be appreciated as constant and gradual factors
of influence. Just as during periods of transition in the past the new
appears within the old era and spreads gradually to become the predominant
essence of the new civilisation.
When we speak of the characteristics of the Fourth Civilisation it
should be born in mind also that they are not only political, or only
technological or only cultural. Changes in technology, culture and politics
exert mutual influences and the influence of new civilisation frequently
appears on the borders which separates them. Such is the case now at the end
of the 20th century when an enormous intermingling of cultures, economics,
traditions, habits and customs is taking place. This is the most important
characteristic of the Fourth Civilisation.
A.Toynbee is an opponent of the unity of civilisations. In his analysis
of the life of the Assyrians and the Egyptians, he is undoubtedly correct.
However, this cannot be said about the end of the 20th century when the
mutual interdependence of nations has reached a hitherto unknown level.
During the first three civilisations we observed the slow consolidation of
autonomous cultural civilisations. The three great eras in human existence
showed a growth in homogeneity and almost universal coordination. During the
first cultural civilisations (from the 5th millennium BC to the 4th and 5th
AD), the first great migration of nations (4th-9th centuries), the
appearance and domination of nations and nation states (15-10th centuries
A.D.) humanity has been ruled by one constant logical requirement - to live
in the conditions of growing economic, cultural and political dependence.
Table 2
The Distinguishing Features of the Fourth Civilisation
First Civilization
(5000 BC-4[th]/5[th] AD)
Second Civilisation
(300-1400 AD)
Third Civilisation
(1400-1900 AD)
Fourth Civilization (2000...)
Technology
Agricultural instruments and irrigation.
Crafts and Agriculture
Industrial technology
Information technology and communication
Manufacturing Structures
Slave ownership
Colonies Feudal structures Manufactories
Factories and Concerns
Internally autonomated technologies and communications
Major forms of ownership
Slave ownership
Feudal
Private, Private monopolies
Socialised multi-sector
State forms of government
Empires
Migration, collapse of empires, city states
Nation states
Global world, local regional societies
Geo-political structure
Autonomous forms
-
Colonial system
bi-polar world
Polycentrism, global regulation
Culture
Autonomous civilisations
Cultural mixing via violence
National cultures
Multicultural society and global culture.
Table 2 shows that the common content is the result of new technology
but that it also affects the manufacturing structures, the forms of
ownership, political systems, culture and spiritual life. This also leads to
profound changes in the methods and forms of human interaction:
manufacturing forms, the means of exchange of the product of labour and the
definition of human consumption. A typical feature of the Fourth
Civilisation will be the trans-national corporations but not those of the
20th century. They will have a strongly decentralised and localised
structure. There may also be a boom of small and medium scale local
business. Another feature of the new era will be the parallel globalisation
of one part of manufacturing processes and localisation of other processes.
The entire analysis of the collapse of the old civilisation shows that this
process will be combined with the further development of international
cooperation of labour of the transnational and multi-national corporations.
Moreover, there is an emerging tendency for technological monopolies to
disappear and the decision making processes and profit allocation to be
decentralised. If this trend develops, the interdependence of the world will
not lead to a growth in international economic monopolism but to the
combination of globalisation and the development of local economic
structures.
I believe that the main feature which has undermined the Third
Civilisation and which will embody the Fourth is the growth in
communication. While the First Civilisation was characterised by primitive
agricultural technology, the Second Civilisation introduced a number of
crafts and the Third introduced industrial technologies, the main
determining feature of the new civilisation is the appearance of new forms
of communication and modern information and computer technology which have
revolutionised life. It is modern communications which have led to
globalisation and the gradual disappearance of the geo-political and
economic structures which were typical of the outgoing civilisation.
The Second half of the 20th century was a time of colossal development
in international transport, radio and telephone. During the last couple of
decades the most powerful new technologies of the new civilisation -
television and satellite communications, have begun to dominate the entire
world. Today there are over 1 billion televisions and 2.5 billions radios in
the world which are constantly bombarding us with information. Satellite
links have connected almost all the countries and peoples of the world in a
single flow of information. This phenomenon has also played an enormous role
in the areas of manufacturing and culture as well as in the social and
political life of almost every country in the world. There is practically no
area of life in which global communications have not exerted a renewing
influence. The environment in which the people of the Fourth civilisation
shall live is thousands of times more satiated with information than at any
time before and will lead to a qualitative change in the entire life of man,
his opportunities for work and participation within the cultural process of
life.
There is little doubt that the Fourth Civilisation will be
distinguished by a series of profound changes in the form of property
ownership. The typical type of ownership in the First Civilisation was
slavery. The Second Civilisation was dominated by Feudal Relations and
peasant farmers tied to the land. The Third Civilisation opened the way to
private ownership and monopolism and the exploitation of hired labour. The
key element of the new civilisation will be cooperative socialised ownership
and the integration of hundreds of millions and billions of people in common
forms of ownership and the simultaneous reduction in economic monopolism.
The key distinguishing feature of the Fourth Civilisation is the
emerging new world political order. During the First Civilisation the most
advanced ethnic groups and nations formed or established their own empires.
To this extent the First Civilisation was a time of great empires, permanent
wars and colonisation. Babylon and Greece, India and China, Macedonia and
Rome were typical examples of this. The collapse of empires was a result of
the crisis of the slave owning era. The entire Second Civilisation was the
time of the great migration of peoples, the destruction of certain states
and the appearance of new. During the period of the Third Civilisation, the
migration slowed down and stopped and the world population became stabilised
within the borders of nation states. It was at this historical moment that
the spiral of history once again began to revolve demonstrating that
rejection gives rise to further rejection and that epochs tend to reproduce
many of their qualities time after time at higher levels.
The end of the Third Civilisation is connected with a much large
migration of people than has hitherto been seen. This is the result of the
new forms of communication, transport, the opening up of countries and the
needs of world business. This trend has led to a reduction in the role of
the nation states and has made their borders more formal. After a process in
which the nation states united the whole of the world population within
their borders and after the stronger nation states established a world
colonial system based on expansionism, the opposite process is now
beginning. This process will lead to the gradual optimisation of the super
powers and the creation of more and more states which will play the role of
regional centres. I believe that political polycentrism will replace the
bi-polar world and will give rise to the need for global and mutually agreed
political and economic regulation.
Finally, I believe that there is another essential feature of the new
civilisation which deserves attention: the intensive cultural mixing and
formation of a global culture for the first time in the history of the
world. Together with this unique product of globalisation we will be obliged
to accept the principle of multi-cultural societies. This will lead to end
to violence and the imposition of certain cultures over others and the
creation of conditions for the mutual interaction of different cultures and
traditions. For the first time, today, but even more so in the future, we
shall be witnesses to the appearance of cultural and economic values which
will not belong to any one country. These will be phenomena which both in
terms of their origin and consequences will have a global character.
4. INEVITABILITY AND WHEN IT WILL HAPPEN.
I do not believe in the absolute determination of events. People have
not yet come to grips with the strength of their common creation. They are
still too weak in the face of nature. Nevertheless there are processes which
no-one can avoid...
I
t is quite clear that the Fourth Civilisation will not appear overnight
nor is it possible to specify a date when it will. It will appear gradually,
reshaping our daily lives, political and economic systems and geopolitical
and cultural processes. It would be frivolous to specify a deadline for the
advent of the new era. None of the civilisations which have existed until
now have appeared suddenly despite the dates and events which historians
like to use for their convenience.
There is also no doubt that the entire 21st century will be a time of
restructuring of the economic and political structures of the Third
Civilisation and of the narrowing of their influence and the increase in the
influence of the new civilisation. It is true that the nature of social
processes today is incomparably more dynamic than at any other time in
history. One of the main reasons for this is the fact that global
communications are much more rapid and widespread than ever before. This
facilitates the processes of globalisation and the restructuring of the
world economic and political life.
At the same time these dynamic processes could be stopped in their
tracks or rejected by a whole series delaying factors. I do not support the
idea of a priori optimism about the future and even less so the illusion
that the emerging new phenomena will impose themselves automatically without
direct human involvement. The inevitability of the advent of the new
civilisation comes from the complex character of its driving forces, from
its incessable expansion, its avant-garde technology and the irreversible
nature of the social and political reforms which began this century. Is it
not already clear that the Third Civilisation is collapsing in front of our
very eyes? Is it not evident that the dictatorial regimes and closed
national states are vaingloriously dying? Economic prosperity is possible
only when peoples are open to one another and the combined manufacturing and
cultural processes in the presence of new structures of ownership.
Almost the entire modern population of the world will experience
several decades of transition. In the most industrialised nations this will
last for 30 or 40 years. For the rest of the world about twice as long.
No-one can say exactly, since the rate of change depends exclusively on the
human factor and the level of our common awareness. These transitional
decades will be exciting but very difficult. There will be people who will
greet the changes with triumph, others will see only the difficulties and
will predict the end of the world. In reality the period oftransition will
be at the same time both progressive and difficult, dark and light, exciting
and dramatic. It is very important whether mankind will become aware of the
new direction or whether the modern intellectual elite of humanity will
understand the nature of change and will unite around it to recognise its
own responsibility.
If humanity and the world political and intellectual elite understand
the need for common activities and the coordination of efforts and if this
understanding is on a global rather than provincial and national level then
the laws of the Fourth Civilisation will be consolidated relatively quickly
and probably by the beginning of the 21st century we will be able to speak
of new geo-political and economic structures and specific dimension of the
new civilisation. There is another possible direction for world development
- for the changes to be disputed and halted, for us to continue to live with
the mentality of violence and the instincts of national domination. In this
event we will experience a multitude of conflicts, disputes and larger or
smaller wars. Each collapse of geopolitical structures creates not only the
powers of progress but also the conservative powers which delay and halt the
processes. This is also the case with the Third Civilisation. There is no
doubt that at the end of the 20th century and during the final years of the
second millennium, humanity is entering a new age. The main question is
whether we will be worthy of this new age - this interesting and complex
time in which we are living.
Chapter 6
THE PARAMETERS OF THE NEW SYNTHESIS
1. THE SOCIALISATION AND DEREGULATION OF OWNERSHIP
Private ownership will be a characteristic element of the Third
Civilisation. All attempts at the nationalisation of private ownership have
been purely illusory. Despite this the nature of property, including private
property, is changing.
W
hen I speak of the new synthesis as the methodology of analysis of the
modern world, I mean above all the changes in the way of thinking which were
typical of the 19th and 20th centuries. The new theoretical synthesis is a
result of the real processes taking place in society in the 20th century,
the consequence of technology and ownership. Here I support entirely the
theory of Karl Marx who was the first to prove beyond a doubt the link
between technology (manufacturing powers) and ownership (manufacturing
relations). There is no doubt that this methodological connection is also
supported by modern social phenomena and processes. Changes in technology
render certain forms of management ineffective and replace certain forms of
ownership with others. The mass of small scale producers of goods in the
19th century were connected with factory production. The large investments
in rail transport, the production of steel and electrical energy at the
beginning of the 20th century stimulated the development of trusts and large
scale enterprises leading to the domination of monopolistic ownership. At
the end of the 20th century new computer and communications technology gave
rise to integrated and decentralised production. In this way ownership has
been a driving force in the development of social systems.
The authors of the theory of the management revolution believe that in
the modern world the significance of ownership has declined and that
authority is now only linked with direct management. In other words, it is
not the class of property owners but the class of managers which governs the
economic life of society. George Galbraith saw ownership only as one of the
sources of power. "Ownership today," he wrote, "does not have the same
universal significance as a source of power, but this does not mean that it
has lost all its significance."[40] A.Toffler went further. In
his book "Forecasts and preconditions"[41] he reached the
conclusion that ownership is just a left-wing mania and that in the society
of new technology the main thing is not property but information. I find
such notions inadequate In an analogous way the ideologues of communism
believed, and many of them today persist in believing, that during the
processes of economic development ownership would disappear and take with it
the class divisions of society. In the communist meaning of the word,
ownership disappears completely because the "entire ownership of property
shall become public" and the products of labour are allocated "from everyone
according to his possibilities and to everyone according to his needs". I
believe that there is no point in criticising a viewpoint which was never
sustained by the realities of life.
In place of the determining role of ownership in power Alvin Toffler
substitutes the role of information. This idea indeed deserves further
attention. He who considers himself the source of information is the bearer
of power rather than he who is the owner of the means of production. It
should, however, be noted that this approach is still concerned with
ownership as something which guarantees power. Therefore, we are not
speaking of the removal of ownership (property) but a change in the object
of this ownership. In the First Civilisation, people owned the primitive
instruments of labour, in the Second Civilisation ownership attained the
level of manufactories and in the Third Civilisation ownership to the level
of large scale industrial complexes.In the Fourth Civilisation, however, the
question of ownership will relate to the means of information gathering and
provision and the means for the conservation and transfer of this
information. But is this not once again some form of ownership or some form
of property? Managers of modern corporations exercise their rights of
ownership upon thousands and quite frequently, hundreds of thousands of
other owners. They are the combined expression of these rights not only
because they own management information but also because this property by
being divided between many people is integrated by the owners themselves.
Consequently ownership has not disappeared but has taken on new forms which
will lead to new social consequences.
While people and society exist there will always be forms of property
and ownership. While production and consumption exist there will always be
relationships of possession, use and disposal, or in other words, ownership.
It is no accident that such categories have been preserved from Roman times
to our days. Ownership is and remains the foundation for the construction of
social structures, including the structures of power, the structure and the
nature of human society. For this reason, when we speak of the transition
from one civilisation to another and a new ideological and theoretical
synthesis this is also inevitable in ownership relations. Thus, just as in
ancient Rome where the ownership of large numbers of slaves meant greater
power and in the 19th century the ownership of machinery and factories
equated to greater social authority, then today the ownership of new forms
of technology guarantees new forms of authority within society itself.
Therefore, when speaking of the dimensions of the new synthesis then we
ought also to speak of the trends and changes in the ownership relations.
Modern changes in ownership can be examined both globally and
nationally, micro-economically and macro-economically. Moreover, these
changes should be examined historically as trends which were born during the
Third Civilisation and will come to fruition with the advent of the Fourth
Civilisation.
Why should the evolution of ownership give us grounds to speak of such
fusions and synthesis? As early as the middle of the 19th century when
private ownership was already established as the dominant force, a series of
theoreticians were aware that private ownership was undergoing change. The
greater the accumulated material benefits of ownership the greater the
integration of large numbers of property owners which eventually lead to the
concentration and centralisation of property in the hands of fewer people.
This trend persisted throughout the whole of the 19th century and
undoubtedly lead to the transition from the stage of free competition to the
stage of monopolisation of the market and its division amongst the
wealthiest owners.
The conclusion which the followers of Marx arrived at in response to
this issue was for the specific period logical. They concluded that
monopolisation destroys free competition, mutates development and opens the
way for the socialist revolution. For Lenin, Trotskiy and, in particular,
for Stalin the socialisation of ownership was tantamount to nationalisation,
for all private property to come under the control of the authority of the
workers peasants. It is now clear that this approach led to the real
desocialisation of ownership and its alienation from people. In Western
Europe and the United States the ownership development trends moved in the
opposite direction. Anti-monopoly legislation was introduced and the
practice of stimulating small and medium scale business was developed along
wtih the expansion small shareholder.
I find this process a brilliant confirmation of the thesis of the
dialectics of socialisation and autonomation as well as the unity of the two
categories of globalisation and localisation. However, there is also another
possible conclusion which is equally important - the process of
socialisation can and must develop not by means of nationalisation but by
means of market forces. Lenin's prediction that the over-concentration of
capital would increase the contradictions of capitalism which would collapse
of its own accord did not come true. The concentration and centralisation of
capital have a definite limit beyond which the process of autonomation and
deregulation begins anew. The whole of the history of mankind is filled with
such waves of concentration and then autonomation of social structures.
Let us take a look at a number of major trends in the development of
property during the last three or four decades. The first of these is the
change of environment in which the private property owner finds himself. At
the end of the 20th century the private owner in Scandinavia, Germany,
France or the USA has nothing in common with the private owner of the 19th
century. A whole series of social laws oblige the private entrepreneur to
observe the laws of a minimum wage, health and safety, social security,
environmental requirements, training and re-training of staff etc.. Small,
medium and large-scale property owners have found themselves in an entirely
new market and social context. Their activities are influenced by consumer
councils, quality control, trade unions, independent media etc..
The totalitarian regime persisted in maintaining a distance between
"national ownership" and "the ownership of all workers and peasants" and its
citizens. The industrialised nations of the West, however, shortened the
distance between ownership and the mass of the people. The change in the
environment, control via market forces and anti-monopoly legislation
increased the unilateral nature of private and social interests. In the
1980's the owner of small shop in Bordeaux, Boston or Gutheburg was much
more socialised and integrated within society than the director of a state
shop in socialist Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia. The "private" owner is subject
to more social rules than his counterpart in a state shop. The private owner
cannot change prices at a whim, he has to observe very strict rules relating
to discipline, hygiene, the police and, most importantly, competition which
requires him to aspire to the highest possible levels. On the contrary, the
director of a state shop is dependent only on senior management and is
little interested in the consumers or local public opinion.
I remember a shop in the suburb of Sofia where I lived in the 1970's
and 1980's. It was dirty and inconvenient. The staff were impolite and rude.
Everyone in the area was dissatisfied but they were obliged to do their
shopping there. There was no other choice and little possibility of the
staff being replaced. Similar examples can be given in all areas of state
owned bureaucracies. The conclusion is obvious: nationalisation does not
mean socialisation. Administrative and bureaucratic control is not a
guarantee for citizens to assume ownership responsibility.
This alienation was the specific basis for the collapse of the Eastern
European totalitarian regimes but emphasises the general trend which is
taking place in the West as well. This is a trend towards the socialisation
of ownership or, in other words, the more complete integration of private
owners into civil society. This process manifests itself via the increase in
horizontal control upon free private activity: through competition;
international integration of millions of owners and, what is by far and away
the most important element, the direct involvement of millions and millions
of citizens as owners and co-owners of the means of production.
In the East powerful state ownership isolated the majority of its
citizens from the ownership of the means of production, in the West, as a
result of the opposite process, people felt more involved in the system and
in society. Albeit to varying extents, citizens' involvement in private
ownership was the most common feature of all the developed Western
countries. Initially, this was a faltering process, resembling "peoples'
capitalism", but with time this trend became more and more tangible and grew
in strength. In 1929, there were a little over 1 million shareholders in the
USA with a share value of about 1.5 billion dollars. By the mid 1980's there
were 42 million individual share owners[42]. Although they mainly
represent small share packages, the trend is indicative. On the other hand,
through their involvement in pension funds, the citizens of the USA own a
significant part of the share capital of the country. It is a relatively
well-known fact that the pension funds of the USA own about 25% of the
shares of all the major companies traded on the major world stock exchanges.
We might take a look at the shareholders in the large industrial
companies in Germany (see table 3). Although as in the USA, France or the
UK, the majority of shareholders are small and their votes exert hardly any
influence on company management, these figures are very indicative. They
show a stable trend affecting all sides of life.
Table 3
The number of individual shareholders in the ten largest German
companies.[43]
Branch
Company
No.Shareholders
Share of ind.shareholders
Other major owners
Automobile, aviation, electronics
Daimler Benz
470,000
62.7%
Deutsche Bank (24.4%) The Government of Kuwait (12.9)
Electronics, telecommu-nications
Simenz
607,000
over 90%
The Simenz family (7%)
Automobiles
Volkswagen
none
over 80%
The government of Lower Saxony (16%)
Energy production, Transport
Bebe Holding
405,000
none
Allianz Holding (12%)
Energy production, petrol
RWE AG
210,000
none
Local governments
Chemical industry
BASF
370,000
over 85%
Allianz Gruppe (14.4%)
Chemical industry
Bayer AG
295,000
over 60%
Banks and Insurance companies (38%)
Mettalurgy, commerce
Tissen AG
240,000
64.9%
Foundations and families (35%)
Machine production, telecommu-nications
Manesman AG
200,000
Over 95%
-
Energy Production
Chemical Production
Transport
WIAG AG
100,000
45-50%
Government of Bavaria, banks
Although differing in some specific details, the situation in Japan is
somewhat similar. The anti-monopoly measures introduced in Japan directly
after the Second World War changed the economic structure of the country and
deprived the most powerful Japanese families (Mizui, Mitsubishi, Sumimoto
etc.) of direct control over management. Over the past 30-40 years the
Japanese directors have used their joint efforts to create a number of very
powerful conglomerates combining the concentration of resources with strong
decentralisation in the decision-making processes. Moreover, from a formal
point of view, private ownership has been separated from management via a
tiered system of share-holding involvement. I would like here to mention a
Japanese study carried out in the 1970's but which is still applicable
today. In a classification of 189 large Japanese enterprises carried out on
the basis of type of ownership, 90% of them were controlled by senior
management on the basis of long-term empowerment rights entrusted to them by
the shareholders (table 4). Of course, here as everywhere in the
industrialised world, the "ownership" was distributed amongst hundreds of
thousands and millions of people making it expedient for it to be conceded
to management. I relate these trends in the development of the world in
general to the changes in what we refer to as democracy and technical
progress. The new trends in ownership on a world scale have been stimulated
throughout the 20th century by the clear impossibility of guarantee
uncontroversial development without the need for bridging the enormous gap
between the poor and the rich and the exploitation trap. On the other hand,
changes in ownership have been stimulated also by the need for greater
efficiency and also the technological changes of the past 20-30 years.
Table 4
Classification of 189 major Japanese corporations according to type of
ownership
Type of ownership and control
Number of companies
% of the total
Private ownership
0
0
Ownership of the majority of the capital
3
2
Ownership by shareholders owning up to 10-50% of the capital
17
8
Control by senior management
169
90
Total
189
100
Source: T.Kono. Strategy and Structure of Japanese Enterprises
McMillan, 1987, p.51.
On the basis of an analysis of the experience of the most developed 7
or 8 countries the following generalisations can be made:
First. The world is undergoing a slow but steady process of
socialisation of private ownership or the transition of private ownership
into a new social framework as a result of the development of labour
legislation, competition, market structures, financial capital and the
intermixing of millions of enterprises and their finances. To this extent
the socialisation of ownership is inseparable from the progress and the
development of history in general.
Second. If private ownership is subjected to constant socialisation
this is due to the involvement of a growing number of people as owners and
co-owners of the means of production. Through the involvement of a growing
number of shareholders the ownership of the large economic structures
becomes diffused and the significance of the large family properties becomes
reduced.
Third. The management of ownership is subjected simultaneously to two
trends - socialisation or the combination of millions of owners in common
systems (or common regulations) and deregulation caused by the impossibility
of large socialised ownership to be centrally managed. Ownership is divided
between more and more people in the world. It is managed in a more
decentralised manner but it is also socialised through the voluntary
combination of millions of individual properties.
Fourth. The technological and social processes came into conflict with
the alienated form of ownership which existed in the Eastern European
countries until 1989. Inequality amongst the people living in the conditions
of totalitarian socialism led not only to a lack of stability and social
guarantees but also to alienation from authority and ownership. From a
purely formal point of view, all the citizens of these countries were the
owners of the means of production but in reality ownership was exercised by
a minority.
Fifth. The opening up of the world and globalisation have provided the
stimulus to international forms of ownership, to the intermixing of more and
more private, share-holding and mixed forms of capital.
These five irreversible trends are a direct expression of what I would
call a new synthesis. Private ownership in the manner in which the classic
proponents of political economics of the 19[th] century portrayed
it is dead. Social ownership or the "ownership of the people" as advocated
by Lenin, Stalin and Brezhnev no longer exists. It is practically absurd to
make contrasts between social systems divided on the basis of private versus
socialised ownership. Other forms of ownership which typify the genesis of
the Fourth Civilisation are coming onto the agenda. It is easiest to refer
to this type of ownership as "mixed". When in the 1950's and 1960's
P.Samuelson first used this term, it appeared at the time to be correct. At
that time the level of socialisation and autonomisation of ownership was at
such a level that the processes of "mixing" had indeed begun. However, this
was rather a fusion of state and private property (Western Europe and Japan)
and the large family enterprises and millions of private owners in the USA.
In the 1970's, 1980's and 1990's the process of deregulation and
socialisation of ownership entered a new phase caused by the acceleration of
globalisation, the appearance of new integrating technologies and the
related social processes. For this reason, to continue to use the
intermediate term "mixed ownership", in my opinion is inappropriate. There
is little doubt that today and in coming decades we shall have many, many
types of "mixed ownership". Mixed ownership is a recurrent theme during the
entire duration of the transition from the Third to the Fourth Civilisation.
Nevertheless it is a remnant of the past, a combination of the two
predominant forms of ownership which existed in the 19th and 20th centuries.
A typical feature of the Third Civilisation was private individual
ownership. For the duration of the transition between the Third and Fourth
Civilisations, the typical features will be the differing forms of mixed
ownership. A typical feature of the Fourth Civilisation will be integrated
(socialised) and multi-sector ownership.
By the term "integrated ownership" I do not mean corporate ownership
but the completion of the processes of corporatisation. Integrated ownership
is maximally individualised and maximally socialised ownership.
Individualised - with individualised rights (decision making, control,
profit sharing). Socialised - as a system of juridical, economic, social and
moral standards which each owner is obliged to observe and which places
individual, group, national and global interests in a common dimension.
Today the thousands of computerised companies involved in management,
software, legal services provide a prototype for the future. Their success
is due to the horizontal structures of management, share-holding involvement
in ownership, mutuality and the realisation of a commonality of interests.
These have been the dominant trends within the majority of modern companies
since the 1980's. They no longer have a single distinct owner as a result of
the appearance of a multitude of new industrial and institutional ownerships
in the industrial and financial corporations. Modern corporations, however,
are not only losing their single family owner, they are at the same time
restoring many of the rights of the professional shareholders and, most
significantly, control over management and allocation of profit.
To give an illustration of this I will use the well structured approach
of the American researcher D.Margota (table 5). While during the period from
the 1930's to the 1980's responsibility (management) and control gradually
passed into the hands of the managers, after the 1980's the predominant
trend has been for control to pass into the hands of the shareholders.
Computer technology and modern management schemes have allowed for these
developments. In general terms, modern corporations have been obliged
constantly to increase their capital. One result of this has been the
closure and disintegration of family ownership, the decentralisation of
management and control and the impositon of more and more rules from
"without". In the 1930's - 1980's we underwent a management revolution.
After the 1980's the revolution developed into two parallel revolutions -
globalisation and the blue collar revolution. The role of the highly skilled
worker has become more prevalent in ownership and control and will continue
to increase in significance in the coming decades.
Table 5
The development of control and responsibility in modern corporations.
Corporations pre 1930
Corporations 1930-1980
Corporations post 1980
Owner/Manager
Ownership, control, responsibility, (management)
-
-
Managers (non-owners)
-
Control
Responsibility (management)
Responsibility (management)
Owners of shares, employed in corporations
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership, control
Individual external owners
Ownership
Ownership
Ownership
Source: D. Margotta, The Separation of Ownership and Responsibility in
the Modern Corporation.
Business Horizons, Jan-Feb, 1989
What is happening in the millions of small and medium juridically
independent companies? In Western Europe, Japan and the USA they have been
appearing as spin-offs from the larger companies or entering into the
periphery of large-scale production processes within the distribution,
commercial or financial systems. The ideal private owner died at some time
between 1950 and 1970. The era of the old Grandee or other Balsacian hero
who spent every evening counted out his profits has passed. The time of the
standardised and integrated owner has come. He buys his franchise from
"Pizza Hut" or makes plastic mouldings for "General Motors" or sells pears
to "Kaufman". Everything and everyone is already involved in integrated and
intermixed forms of ownership. All are already socialised to some extent. If
anyone remains unintegrated, he will either die or become a member of the
group of social outsiders who are of use to no-one.
I have been speaking here of the determining trends which have come to
us from the industrialised nations and about what drives the transition and
defines tomorrow. Why do I believe that despite the enormous differences in
the economic levels of different countries these trends will impose
themselves? The reason is that these are trends which have appeared as a
result of modern technology, from the character of globalisation and which
have been valid for four fifths of world manufacturing history. Of course,
different societies will approach the common features of the Fourth
Civilisation gradually from different starting points and on different
paths. There is no doubt, however, about their common fate. This is the fate
of progress...
2. POST-CAPITALISM
In November 1989 when the Berlin Wall came down everyone proclaimed the
victory of capitalism. In actual fact, capitalism was itself beginning to
draw its last breath - slowly and quietly dying like a victorious warrior.
T
here are no frozen social systems, or eternal mechanisms of government.
The most dynamic element is technology and the least dynamic - economic
relations. The most lasting and conservative elements are the political
systems. However, there is no such thing as an eternal system. Capitalism
passed through an early feudal stage, reached its height when free
competition dynamised the whole system and then fell victim to the struggles
between empires, two world wars and hundreds of colonial wars.
Daniel Bell quotes a quite remarkable thought by the Arab philosopher
Ibn Haldun, "Societies pass through specific phases whose transformations
are a symptom of their own fall[44]. This is true of every
society. They develop, they achieve a certain level of progress and reach
their own heights of development. Then all . societies destroy themselves.
This does not always happen through revolutions, turbulence and violence but
through reforms and reformation of the roots and culture of life. Capitalism
in Western Europe and North America was different from capitalism in Japan
and probably more distinct from the forms of capitalism in Latin America.
Today there are similar processes taking place everywhere. They are perhaps
more rapid and remarkable in the USA, Europe and Japan, more anaemic in
Brazil and Argentina and more accelerated in South Korea etc..
What were the typical characteristics of capitalism? In the 19th
century and up until to the middle of the 20th century they were the
division of society into the bourgeoisie and proletariate: the growing
differentiation between the poor and the rich; the domination of economic
and political life by a group of monopolists and nationalism and colonialism
aimed at the economic and political division of the world. There are no
doubt many other features of capitalism which could be added. However, these
are the main features of what remains of classical capitalism.
The transformations of ownership mentioned above demonstrate clearly
that the bourgeoisie which existed 40-50 or even 100 years ago practically
no longer exists. It is not a homogenous class with a dominant place in
society or a single, unified attitude to the means of production, as Lenin
might have called it. The class of the rich has not disappeared in the USA,
Japan or in Germany. However, it is different in essence and character. Most
importantly, the traditional owners of the means of production are of much
less significance and have been replaced by managers, associated groups of
small and medium owners, media magnates, the stars of show business and
innovators. The division, diffusion and socialisation of ownership has lead
to the decay of the bourgeoisie. It has disintegrated into different groups
sometimes with conflicting interests. Significantly, the origin of ownership
is no longer based solely on inheritance. Indeed, the majority of the
wealthiest people mentioned in "Forbes" have not inherited their wealth but
have accumulated it as a result of their own enterprise. The most famous
example of this is Bill Gates, the creator and owner of MicroSoft. The old
bourgeoisie has its successors in the same way as the feudal aristocracy has
its own exotic representatives. None of these, however, fall within these
categories. One group of the former bourgeoisie which has not managed to
adapt to the requirements of modern competition has begun to resemble the
middle class in terms of income and way of life.
There have been more serious changes in what Marx and Engels referred
to in the 19th century as the "proletariate". In the 1930's and 1940's the
proletariate in the USA and Europe was still an homogenous group with a
clear place in society. Today, this class and even such a social group does
not exist. Technological progress has led to the disappearance of the
proletariate and divided it into different social groups. A large number of
former proletarians are now involved in the growing services sector. Today,
the number of traditional factory workers has declined to 20-25% of the
active population in the majority of the industrialised countries. The
workers themselves are more diversified and many of them are now employed in
intellectual rather than physical labour. "Intellectual workers and those
employed in the services sector", wrote P.Drucker with justification, "are
not classes in the traditional meaning of the word".[45] Neither
are they the proletariate in the Marxist meaning of the word. It is no
accident that the movements of employees and trade unions in the most
developed industrialised countries during the last 15-20 years have reduced
significantly.
In the most developed 24 countries of the world there is a large group
of citizens, in some cases more than 50-60% of the population with
relatively stable middle-incomes which permit a high standard of living. On
the other hand the ratio in income between the richest and the poorest has
begun gradually to reduce. 60 or 70 years ago the incomes of the richest
families were ten or more, even hundred time greater than the average
incomes of the poor. According to the statistics of the World Bank at the
end of the 1980's, the ratio of income between the richest and the poorest
20% of the population was as follows: USA 7.5; Japan 4.3; Germany 5.0;
Belgium 4.6; France 7.7 and Italy 7.1. The number of the extremely wealthy
and the extremely poor has begun to reduce significantly. There have been
changes in the social conditions of the unemployed. Social benefits for
pensioners and young people in Austria, for example, have reached levels
unheard of in Eastern Europe.
I am far from convinced that the developed nations of the West and
Japan have resolved all their social problems or that they have created an
harmonious society. I can, however, state clearly that the foundations of
capitalism have been destroyed and that the Western European countries have
outgrown capitalism. They are now in the process of transition to something
different, something new and clearly demonstrated by the evolution of the
market and market relations. The liberal market of the 19th and 20th
centuries was the basis of mature capitalism. Its zenith was symbolised by
the boom of electricity, internal combustion engines and the charm of Paris
by night. The main feature of the market was the free exchange of goods, the
formation of market values and, consequently, the stimulation of one or
other type of production. Monopolisation of production has modified the
basic categories of the market but has not abolished its role as the main
regulator of economic life. The major question is the development of the
market after the boom of small and medium scale business, demonoplisation
and the computer revolution. I believe that we are at the beginning of a
process of transition from post-monopolistic market to a situation of
horizontal market relations. I believe that J. K. Galbraith was the first to
turn his attention to such an idea. Many people who clearly seem to be used
to the concept of the market find it difficult to believe that this great
invention of the Third Civilisation might be replaced by something else.
Indeed, the market will not be replaced by any form of ready-made
committee-designed model. The market will simply be revolutionised by new
technology and the replacement of traditional supply and demand by the
super-organised planning of consumption, its stimulation and satisfaction
with a perfect system of organised manufacturing. In the developed countries
entire sectors of the markets are already being traded as futures; stock
exchanges react to the smallest of changes, managers act within the tightest
of limits and if they get it wrong they simply leave the game. This is true
of the automobile and plane building industries, space technology, computers
and practically types of high technology as well as many other sectors.
Credit cards, smart cards, cash dispensing machines and all methods of
electronic payment have been extremely influential on the transformation of
the market. They may by some be considered as merely new forms of market
mechanisms. However, in my opinion these technological innovations have
outlined a trend towards a transition from the basic market mechanisms to
principally new social relations and a new state of the market. For the
moment these are still only trends in the most developed parts of the world.
However, the improvement in efficiency which they offer will lead to their
inevitable expansion to other parts of the world in the same way as
electricity or the radio and television.
New computers and communication technologies have a multiplying effect
on all countries and markets. They are the basis of the fundamental changes
in the way in which business in done. This has led to a change in the nature
of supply and demand and the transition from the "trade in goods" to the
"trade in ideas". It will not be too far into the future when new computer
networks will allow consumers to place their orders even before a particular
article is produced, at the stage of its inception and design.
Consumers will become the managers of production. They will reject what
they consider unnecessary and predetermine the type, quantity and quality of
goods. In California there is already a computer trade network where
consumers can order goods in this way.The stage of exchange will become
strongly modified and the market will become a bridge between demand and
manufacture.
At the beginning of the 1950's Joseph Stalin in one his most
"remarkable" works[46] predicted the disappearance of the
relationship between goods and money. His approach of destroying money
through total nationalisation inflicted heavy damage to many Eastern
European nations and Asian peoples. By destroying the market and money
through bureaucracy, Stalin and his followers also destroyed freedom and man
himself. In 1986 in one of my early works I wrote that "money-goods
relations will disappear only when they reach the peak of their development,
when the market itself reaches a stage of perfection and not by moving
against the current of development." I believe that a similar process is
taking place today. With our new computer networks we now have the
exceptional opportunity of changing the nature of exchange and removing
inequality and monopolistic profits. I do not doubt that the new computer
networks (such as the Internet) will create a revolution in the market and
will transform us into an amazingly well organised environment for the
exchange of needs, ideas, opportunities and goods. Such possibilities are
being predicted for the financial markets and relations between banks and
between banks and their customers. At the beginning of 1996 the founder of
MicroSoft, Bill Gates outlined in one of his articles some exciting new
ideas which would revolutionise banking. No-one, not the bankers or the
corporations or small and medium business, not even show business or the
individual can ignore these changes.
What is happening to the capitalist society? Gradually, slowly, it is
become uprooted and changing its basic nature. P.Drucker came to the
conclusion that capitalist society is being re-born into a society of
knowledge and a society of organisations. I agree entirely with his use of
the term "the post-capitalist society".[47]
The question whether the most developed societies in Europe, America
and Japan have turned into societies of organisations is clearly much more
complex. Undoubtedly the process of globalisation which is taking place at
the moment via the transnational corporations (organisations) limits the
nation state while increasing their own role. However, I feel that this is
an inadequate description of post-capitalist societies under change.
I would make the following generalisation: there four major processes
which have changed and will further change the nature of capitalist
societies. The first of them is the socialisation and re-distribution of
ownership. The second is the profound nature of the changes in the social
and class structures, the disappearance of traditional classes and the
appearance of new social strata. The third is the integration of the market
economy and the replacement of the typical capitalist market with a highly
organised system of exchange and distribution of goods. The fourth is the
limitation of the role of the nation state and the globalisation and growth
in the role of organisations (manufacturing and non-manufacturing).
All these processes have progressed so far at the end of the 20th
century that it is possible already to speak of the evolutionary renaissance
of the capitalist society and the existence of post-capitalist relations in
all the industrialised countries (with the exception of the ex-communist).
Of course, there are slight structural exceptions, e.g. the management and
structural models of the USA and Japan. I also accept the distinguishing
features of the American and the Rhine model (Germany, France, Austria
etc.). There is, however, no doubt that all four processes are taking place
in the industrialised countries and a consequence of the global market is
that the differences between them are constantly reducing. They will not
disappear completely, in fact some of them may produce other differences.
Nevertheless, the common movement towards a new civilisation will continue.
Capitalism is indeed dying. Proudly and quietly, like a victorious
warrior in a pyrric victory.
3. POST-COMMUNISM
The post-communist countries had three possible directions of
development: backwards to the ashen illusions of neo-communism; forwards to
primitive capitalism; or towards the challenges of the Fourth Civilisation.
D
uring the first years after the collapse of the Eastern European
totalitarian regimes, certain more avid supporters of the former communist
parties began to state publicly their beliefs that communist ideology after
all was not such a bad thing and that in reality communism had not really
been implemented properly. The systems which had existed in Russia and the
other smaller Eastern European countries had been a mutated form of
socialist ideas. They developed their beliefs that at some time in the
future communism might reappear. These are not only the ideas of demagogues,
but hypocrites. It is true that the society which existed in Eastern Europe
was, according to official doctrines, not "communist" but "socialist", and
that this was the "first stage of communism", the "first, lowest stage of
communism". All of us who lived at that time in Eastern Europe had to
believe that sooner or later the "glorious future" would arrive. I mention
this at the beginning since I have met critics who categorically reject the
term "post-communism". Nevertheless, the term post-communist means that
communism has been overcome and that it will never return. It is not only a
rejection of a doctrine but also a specific way of thinking.
The post-communist period for the whole of Eastern Europe, Russia and
to a large extent such countries as China and Cuba is indeed unique. Not to
understand this uniqueness is one of the greatest errors of the 20th century
which has caused and will continue to cause much damage to the Eastern
European nations. When I speak of uniqueness, I mean that at the end of the
1980's the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Russia possessed an
integrated material and technological infrastructure. At that time the GDP
per head of population in Eastern Europe was between 2 and 6 thousand
dollars, i.e. at the level of the medium developed countries. At the time of
the changes these countries had a well-educated population, highly developed
culture and significant social benefits.
Should the post-communist countries have accepted the ideology and
forms of development more typical of primitive capitalism? Everything which
I have said until now is a clear indication that the global changes at the
end of the 20th century have a common, civilising approach not merely a
change of regime in Eastern Europe. There were two main choices for the
post-communist countries after the failure of perestroika: either to reject
their past and begin afresh with the development of capitalism or to join
the common movement towards a new civilisation. The first of these paths was
more attractive in terms of ideology but much more short-sighted. The second
meant to accept the forms of development of post-capitalism and on this
basis to begin the conscious reconstruction of the former socialist
societies.
In practice the revolutionaries of 1989 did not stop to ponder this
dilemma. The collapse of perestroika threw the Eastern European countries
into political battles, conflicts and the collapse not only of the
totalitarian structures but also of the major management, industrial and
social mechanisms. This collapse in practice led to the universal
predomination of emotions and political conflicts over rational and sensible
economic changes. In the first few months after the fall of the Berlin wall,
in Prague, Sofia and in Bucharest nothing was sacred. Their entire past
history was rejected - decades during which several hundred million people
had lived were rejected. The old nomenclature was purged in the most
impulsive manner and replaced by new, inexperienced leaders. It took some
time for emotions to settle and for the stress of the "gentle revolutions"
to subside.
On the whole 1989--1991 in Eastern Europe was the beginning of an
abrupt, impulsive process of capital accumulation. For a certain period a
number of extreme anti-communist movements gained popularity. Some wanted
revenge, other wanted radical revolutionary reforms. The movements copied to
greater or lesser extents the solutions and models of the beginning of
capitalist development. As a result, all the Eastern European countries
found themselves facing similar phenomena - falling production, the
destruction of regional economic links, widespread crime and corruption and
the indiscriminate re-distribution of capital. These phenomena were
particularly marked in Russia, Bulgaria, Albania and to a certain extent in
Rumania. The countries of the Visegrad group and Slovenia were less
affected.
The greatest contradiction of the "liberal" anti-communist model was
the re-distribution of ownership. For half a century (in Russia 70 years)
the citizens of Eastern Europe had lived in conditions of uniformity and the
domination of egalitarian ideas. To a large extent the gentle revolutions of
the end of the 1980's were based economically on the fact that the communist
elite had accrued vast privileges for themselves and had become transformed
into an economically dominant social stratum. This was the pre-dominant
propaganda which was used in the majority of the Eastern European countries
in 1989-1990.
For the same reasons the populations of these countries did not accept
the rapid disintegration of society into rich and poor and the usurping of
former "socialist" property by a small group of the nouveaux riches.
Legislation guaranteeing the restitution of property in Bulgaria, Rumania,
Hungary and elsewhere created in many people a sense of revenge. Even after
the processes of mass privatisation in the Czech Republic and Russia the
majority of the population felt deceived and did not receive any direct
economic dividends from the economic changes. It was not so much the
absolute scale of poverty but the nature of social differentiation and the
collapse of social guarantees which led to a tangible level of
dissatisfaction amongst the populations and a move towards the left. After
the return to power of the former communist parties in Poland, Hungary,
Slovakia and Bulgaria, however, the processes of social division continued.
The new capital accumulated at the beginning of the 1990's attempted to play
the leading role in the processes of privatisation and to accrue more and
more wealth. Mass privatisation, most significantly in Russia, led to the
concentration of privatisation vouchers in the hands of a small group of
extremely wealthy owners who acquired the ownership of enormous production
potential for a fraction of its real value. To a lesser extent the same
thing happened in Czechoslovakia and a similar picture of social division
can be expected in Bulgaria after mass privatisation.
The post-communist countries are experiencing a common crisis of
identity and profound political contradictions. If they lead to a
stratification of society into a small group of wealthy people (5-7%) and a
large group of people deprived of any ownership of the means of production,
this will be a backwards step. In reality these countries will return to a
state from which the industrialised countries have already progressed and to
outdated social models. If the division of ownership in Eastern Europe
creates class divisions then it is extremely possible for this to create a
chain reaction with exceptionally adverse consequences for the process of
reform and the transition to a Fourth Civilisation. Clearly the collapse of
the Eastern European societies into classes will not send them into the New
Civilisation but will hold them back in the grips of the old. The peoples of
these countries will have to experience its contradictions and to struggle
with the problems which the Western countries have already overcome. This
will cause difficulties for the socialisation of ownership and will render
the reconstruction of the market impossible leading to a revival of
bureaucracy and the bureaucratic state. We should not be surprised that such
a transition will not only return the former communist parties to power but
also the "strong hand" governments of corrupt politicians and combinations
of the two. This will be extremely unfavourable for the development of the
Eastern European states and at the same time it will be a retarding factor
for the whole of world development, especially if such processes are allowed
to take place in Russia, China and other larger countries.
The question arises whether it is at all possible for the former
totalitarian states to make the transition directly to the Fourth
Civilisation. My response is entirely positive. The relatively good material
infrastructure of the Eastern European countries, the high level of
education and culture of the population as well as the experience of
communism as one type of social development are all factors which create a
basis for the transition to new types of relations without passing through
the phase of initial capital accumulation. The technology of such a
transition has been inadequately researched but it is absolutely applicable
on the basis ofthe results of the period between 1990-1995.
Above all, in order to accomplish such a process of development and to
approach the level of the industrialised countries and the trends of the
Fourth Civilisation it will be necessary to achieve some sort of minimal
political consensus. If confrontations and instability continue, and if
behind the facade of the "political struggle" corruption and crime is
allowed to flourish, the post-communist countries will regress at least
30-50 years into the past. Only common will and the consolidation of society
will redirect their material and cultural heritage towards the framework of
the emerging new civilisation.
The second great problem is the redistribution of ownership. As I have
already mentioned, this process has begun with restitution, or the return of
property nationalised at the end of the 1940's. This process, if it takes
place within real limits, will throw the post-communist states into serious
conflicts which are unnecessary at the end of the 20th century. The example
of the Bulgaria is particularly indicative. However, even if privatisation
is carried out without restitution, as in Russia and if it is carried out
with the out-dated methods of the time of "wild capitalism", this will not
lead to any positive results. The main aim of privatisation is to dynamise
the post-communist societies, to form civil societies and for the majority
of the citizens to receive some form of ownership of the means of
production. A society of voluntarily associated owners is the alternative to
totalitarianism, the class society and primitive capitalism. In order to
achieve this a number of specialised privatisation methods will be required.
The most successful experience has been demonstrated in the Czech Republic
and Slovenia and, albeit under different conditions, in the former East
Germany. The main aim of these methods in my opinion should be: firstly to
demonopolise the large-scale enterprises inherited from totalitarian times,
to preserve those with the greatest potential and to transform them into
trans-national corporations; secondly, a reliable stock exchange system
should be developed wherein a significant part of these enterprises can be
sold by means of mass privatisation, market methods and the substitution of
debt against ownership; thirdly, the necessary legislative framework needs
to be developed to allow for privatisation by management teams as well as
the possibility for as many small and medium enterprises as possible to be
established for the use and gradual purchase by citizens; fourthly, the
possibility for workers' collectives to receive without payment ownership in
the enterprises in which they are employed.
The eventual aim of such policies will be for the majority of the
population within 5-10 years to integrated within the structures of
ownership in the aims of establishing the economic basis for a civil
society.
The third major problem of the post-communist countries will be their
integration within the world economy. As can be seen from table 6, between
1985-1993 and 1989-1993 five Eastern European states which were analysed
achieved an increase in their trade with the EU. Although slowly, the market
share of these countries in the European market began to increase.
Nevertheless the processes of rapprochement analysed using the Maastricht
criteria are extremely contradictory and slow (table 7). This shows that on
the whole the process of the integration of the Eastern European countries
into the EU will be delayed. The initial predictions of 10-15 years to
integration have been revised to the years 2005-2010 at the earliest.
Table 6
Trade in industrial goods between the EU and the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe.
(millions of ECU at current prices, market share in % of the
entire trade of the EU with other countries).
CEE
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Poland
Rumania
Volume
Market share
Volume
Market share
Volume
Market share
Volume
Market share
Volume
Market share
Volume
Market share
Import EU
1980
1985
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993*
5146
7532
8222
9303
10525
13598
16736
12674
3,56
3,23
2,80
2,76
3,06
3,63
4,43
4,55
242
362
350
398
441
600
762
572
0,17
0,16
0,12
0,12
0,13
0,16
0,20
0,21
1139
1875
1950
2228
2401
3678
5102
3840
0,79
0,80
0,66
0,66
0,70
0,98
1,35
1,38
1131
1616
1816
2182
2547
3138
3554
2468
0,78
0,69
0,62
0,65
0,74
0,84
0,94
0,89
1709
2149
2552
2842
3962
4973
5984
4662
1,18
0,92
0,87
0,85
1,15
1,33
1,58
1,67
924
1530
1555
1654
1174
1209
1334
1132
0,64
0,66
0,53
0,49
0,34
0,32
0,35
0,41
Export EU
1980
1985
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993**
6808
8648
8412
10079
10522
15213
18875
15914
3,53
2,63
2,58
2,73
2,84
3,99
4,79
5,27
681
1378
1300
1323
818
895
977
777
0,35
0,42
0,40
0,36
0,22
0,24
0,25
0,26
1126
1730
1969
2142
2343
3428
5628
4582
0,58
0,53
0,60
0,58
0,63
0,90
1,43
1,52
1424
2254
2123
2673
2624
3136
3745
3173
0,74
0,69
0,65
0,72
0,71
0,82
0,95
1,05
2206
2324
2460
3299
3717
6663
6967
6051
1,14
0,71
0,75
0,89
1,00
1,75
1,77
2,00
1371
963
559
642
1021
1091
1557
1332
0,71
0,29
0,17
0,17
0,28
0,29
0,40
0,44
Eurostat and European Commission Services
(see Transforming Economies and European Integration, UK, 1995, p. 63).
* January--September
** January--September
Table 7
Do the countries of Central and Eastern Europe fulfil the criteria
for membership of the EU as set out in Maastricht?
Criteria
Bulgari
Czech Rep.
Hungary
Poland
Rumania
Slovakia
Complete convertibility
Strong Central Bank
Low inflation
Low public debt
Low budget deficit
Low interest rate
Convertible currency
no
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes
no
no
no
no
no
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
no
no
yes
no
yes
no
no
no
National sources; OECD -- estimates and projections, Qvigstad, 1992;
(see Transforming Economies and European Integration, UK, 1995, p. 39).
The fourth problem is the integration of the technology of the Fourth
Civilisation and the reconstruction of their own industries. The opening-up
of the markets of the Eastern European countries and the invasion of
competitors from all four corners of the world has created a danger that
some of the more progressive sectors of the economy will collapse. In
certain countries, Bulgaria for example, there is evidence of a process of
detechnologisation or the reduction of high-technology production in
comparison with the 1980's. The high level of outdated and worn-out
industrial machinery in Slovakia and Bulgaria has delayed progress. This
criterion is proof of how important it is to have a correct policy for
foreign investment and skilfully to combine the pre--1989 achievements with
world markets and technological structures.
The fifth problem is the development of a market infrastructure
adequate for the New Civilisation. To this extent the countries of the
Visegrad group and Slovenia are undoubtedly in a position of advantage in
comparison with the other former socialist countries. There is no doubt that
after the fall of the Berlin Wall the Eastern European peoples began a
process of rapprochement and integration with the world economy. The
universal processes of globalisation and the spirit of the Fourth
Civilisation have not left the post-communist countries untouched. The great
choice with which they were faced between 1989 and 1990 was totalitarianism
or democracy and a market economy. The great choice between 1993-6 and the
end of the century will be primitive capitalism or new civilisation.
An analysis of the economic and political situation shows that the
former members of COMECON are no longer an homogenous regional group. This
is due not only to the collapse of the common Eastern European market but
also to the different policies which the different governments have been
pursuing. In the mid-1990's the division between Central and Eastern Europe
was an artificially imposed concept. Now, however, it seems more realistic.
The Central European countries, sometimes referred to as the Visegrad Group
and Slovenia, are integrating significantly more rapidly than the remaining
countries and economically are becoming quite distinct. The second group has
a slightly different fate - the three small former Baltic republics of the
USSR who are seeking a channel into Europe by means of developing closer
ties with the Scandinavian countries, Germany and the U.K. Finally, there is
the third group of the Balkan states - Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia,
Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia where internal disputes and conflicts have
delayed their development significantly. The division of the former members
of COMECON into separate regional groups could lead to delays in their
integration the European Union and increase in the internal disputes.
After the post-communist countries, Russia and China are of particular
significance. With their size and resources they have an independent and
significant geo-political role. In Russia the problems of transition are
many time more complex than those of the smaller countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. Political stability, the expansion of the market
infrastructure and the redistribution of ownership are, in my opinion, the
strategic problems of this great power. It is very likely that as we
approach the beginning of the Fourth Civilisation Russia will for a long
time remain in the orbit of state, corporative capitalism. Arguments in
support of this are the concentration of privatised giant state industry in
the hands of a very small group of the population and the close connections
between this group and the state bureaucracy. China without any doubt will
increase its role in the world which in its turn will increase its political
stability and the continued awesome development of its massive economy. A
open question for China will be the choice between a single party system and
political pluralism with the preservation of the stability and integrity of
the country.
As can be seen, the post-communist countries are divided not by
criteria of democracy-communism but by types of democracy and their
closeness to the Fourth Civilisation. Some of them will become integrated
quite quickly into the directions of progress, others will turn back to the
era of corporate, semi-state capitalism. There is no doubt that the
transition will be complex and drawn-out and will take place in stages and
with the deepening differentiation between the Eastern European countries.
The direction of this transition in the long-run will lead to integration
with the economic and political systems of the most developed countries in
the world.
4. THE APPROACH AND THE END OF THE "THIRD WORLD"
Integration leads either to imperialist violence or the rapprochement
of social systems and the improved conditions of life.
U
ntil the end of the 1980's politicians and academics divided the world
into three parts: capitalist, socialist and the Third World - the world of
the economically backwards countries. Ideologues on the two sides of the
Berlin Wall divided the Third World into those countries with capitalist
systems and those with socialist orientation. Today, this "structure" has
entirely lost any meaning. The socialist world has evaporated and capitalism
has become transformed into something else. The "Third World" has changed
and no longer represents a community of countries with similar
charasteristics.
Until 6 or 7 years ago the Third World was defined as something
unspecific which would eventually merge with the first or the second. Today,
however, one has to use different criteria in evaluating any particular
country. In my opinion these criteria are based on the outlines of the new,
Fourth Civilisation, from those processes and phenomena which symbolise the
leading trends of modern progress. I would place the accent on three of them
in particular: 1. the share of high-technology production and activities
within the GDP; 2. the structure of ownership and social groups;3. the level
of socialisation of ownership and the integration of the market;4. the
openness of countries and the stability of their national manufacturing and
culture; 5. the GDP per head of population.
By using these criteria quantitively and qualitively we can propose
another global structure to the countries of the world. The first group is
of those countries which are symbols of human progress and which are in
transition from the Third Civilisation and to a large extent are the basis
for the Fourth Civilisation. For them the advent of the new civilisation is
already irreversible. I would include here the members of the European group
with the exception of Greece and Portugal, the USA and Canada, Japan,
Australia, New Zealand, the Czech Republic, Switzerland, Iceland, Malta and
a number of other states. The second group is of those countries which on
the basis of certain factors are on the edge of the Fourth Civilisation or
remain within the traditions of the 20th century. They are on the threshold
of the new civilisation but are essentially at a different level of progress
from those countries within the first group. I could include here the new
Asian Dragons - Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea,
Taiwan as well as countries like Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Costa Rica,
Greece, Portugal and Cyprus. The third group would include such countries
which have an industrial or semi-industrial structure and state capitalist
or some form of oligarchical or monarchist social structure.: Russia, China,
Rumania, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the
UAE, Pakistan, the majority of Latin American countries, Tunisia, Egypt,
Morocco, the Philippines, South Africa, Indonesia, Mexico and a number of
others. These countries have not yet achieved political stability and
economic balance. The fourth and last group includes countries whose
manufacturing and social relations are partially within the third and
partially within earlier structures of civlisation. These are the majority
of the African, some Asian nations and a number of countries of the Near
East. These countries are sometimes referred to as the "forgotten" nations
and need special help and programmes to link them to the rest of the world
and to overcome problems of poverty and illness.
Is it possible to speak of a common transition of civilisation when no
more than one fifth of the world's population lives in conditions similar to
those which we refer to as the transition to the Fourth Civilisation and
more than one third in conditions typical of the transition from the Second
to the Third? The basis for a positive answer to this question is
integration, the speed at which countries are coming together in the
conditions of globalisation. As a consequence of the openness of the large
majority of countries and the expansion of the world market the transfer of
new technologies and the management model is much easier and faster than at
any other time in the history of mankind.
The example with the countries of South East Asia shows that given a
suitable political climate countries can penetrate world markets and achieve
significant results. The rate of development in South Korea over the past 30
years has allowed it to overtake many of the Eastern European countries
which in the first half of the 1960's were significantly more
advanced.[48] The example of the Asian Dragons will be followed
by a number of individual states in Northern Africa and the Near East. Thus
we can speak of the collapse and the restructuring of the countries of the
"Third World". The Eastern Europeans have great potential. Other countries
such as Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile and South Africa also have strong
possibilities. They and a dozen or so smaller countries will gradually begin
to approach the highly developed countries - the leading figures in the new
civilisation.
For more than half a century, many of the leaders of the Third World
have been looking for their own direction in the struggle to combat poverty
and make progress. Ghandi and Neru in India, Mao and Dun Saopin in China,
Castro in Cuba, Sengor, Tutu and Kenyatta in Africa have conducted their own
experiments with varying degrees of success. The main question for all the
poorly developed nations is not to demonstrate their uniqueness but to
become incorporated into the trends of progress and the post-industrialised
Fourth Civilisation. The fear that foreign investments, progress in the West
and the open commodity and financial markets will undermine national pride
and specific cultural features is not always justified. Such dependence
exists only in the most corrupt regimes and where an imperialistic type of
dependence has been allowed to develop.
Technological and social progress even in the conditions of the open
market does not inevitably lead to the death of national cultures and
identity. In fact the opposite is often the case. The experience of China,
South Korea and Singapore has shown that only against the background of a
well developed economy can national and ethnic culture be preserved for the
future.
In the global world national identity and specific cultural features
will manifest themselves only at a certain level of economic development
when poverty and backwardness has been overcome. Nevertheless it will be
difficult for the dreams of the apostles of Black Africa or Che Guevara to
come true. The closed nature of the societies, corrupt regimes, the lack of
law and order and ethnic calm will continue to maintain the countries of the
"Third World" in the orbit of the past.
When I refute the division of the countries of the world into three
groups within the bi-polar model of the world, I, naturally, realise how
important it is to adopt a clear position in support of an alternative for
future development. The current lack of order and chaos has made many
proponents of change wait to see what direction change will take. My
understanding of this question is that for the next few years we shall live
in a multi-sector world with an enormous diversity of economic and social
conditions with enormous differences in economic levels. When I speak of the
multiplicity of sectors, I mean a multiplicity of political and economic
forms, political systems and specific governmental decisions.
At the same time I can see no other prospect for development apart from
growing integration and the gradual reduction of differences conditioned by
the integration of world financial markets. To this extent the multiplicity
of sectors is a transitional state despite the relative stability of the
world. The differences inherent in the form of ownership and political
systems will gradually disappear. On the other hand economic advances will
allow for the protection of the cultural diversity of the world and
spiritual identity.
5. BALANCED DEVELOPMENT
Post-capitalism and post-communism are stages inthe process of the
collapse of the Third Civilisation. The major question is what will replace
it? I believe that it will replaced by the societies of the Fourth
Civilisation -- societies of balanced development.
R
epresentatives of individual historical eras are bound to the limits of
their own time and are unable to see the world as a whole. All the major
ideological doctrines of the last few centuries have been linked to the need
for the resolution of group, regional or class contradictions. Global
thought was and continues to have little attraction for philosophers and
politicians. Even in the 20th century when world globalisation is gradually
on the increase, ideological and political doctrines have developed in
accordance with the conditions in one or a group of countries and specific
ideological models have imposed themselves through force.
Marxism-Leninism claimed to be a teaching for the whole of humanity.
However, despite Marx's attempt to evaluate the Asian methods of production
his doctrine did not take into account the cultural and historical
development of China and India. The imposition of Marxist or western
bourgeois models upon completely different cultural and historical roots was
a manifestation of philosophical and ideological monopolism. The 20th has
century provided us with many forms of Marxism and Liberalism but with the
increase in democracy more local cultural features have begun to dominate
over ideologies.
Today, while the Third Civilisation is in a process of disintegration
many things have not yet changed. The global approach has made its mark and
is no longer considered absurd or abstract challenge. The UN has taken on
more responsibility and increased its role in the world. A number of new
formations involved in global issues have arisen. One major result of such
processes was the summit meeting in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 at which
politicians from all over the world gathered in the name of the survival of
humanity. However, up to now these efforts have not yet produced any serious
results. Despite the conflicts evident in the world, despite the complete
irrationality of manufacturing structures, despite the continuing
destruction of forests and cultivable land, humanity continues to exist in
the condition of nationalist thinking or class, social and other types of
doctrines.
While global reseach is mainly directed towards environmental and
philosophical problems, there are still those who aspire to defend one
system, one model or one culture. In the risk of repeating myself, I
consider such attempts absurd. Neither socialism, nor capitalism, not the
political models of the countries of the Third World can serve today as
universal models for life on earth. There is little doubt that globalisation
and global culture will continue to penetrate the common principles and
standards of life. However, this process will take place through
manifestations of local culture, as well as specific national, regional and
ethnic features.
The modern world will no longer accept unified "military" models of
development. The dialectics of globalisation and localisation, the advent of
the new civilisation can offer a new model. If it is democratic and not
imperialistic as in the 20th century. There is no longer any room for
universal doctrines in the new era. Universal principles and legal standards
-- yes, universal ideologies and models -- no. "Yes" because of the
inevitable integration and mutual dependence of countries, "No" because of
the resolute and growing diversity of human life.
The 20th century was a century of imperialism and forced globalisation.
The 21st century will be a century of intermixing and synthesis of different
cultures and ideas. I am convinced that the time has come to pose the
question of the type and the direction of general world development and of
the main principles and trends of the Fourth Civilisation. In this way the
danger of global chaos and the resolution of global contradictions through
myriad local wars, tension and never-ending disputes may be avoided.
At the end of the 20th century, humanity has reached a stage in its
development wherein no single nation can impose itself on others and no
single country can exist in isolation from the others. This is the effect of
globalisation and the constant increase in mutual dependence while on the
other hand there is a marked growth in the role of local cultures. After the
fall of the Berlin Wall three quarters of the population of the world now
live in conditions of free economic initiative and more than 90% of the
countries of the world have multi-party democracies. Human rights, the free
movement of information and people are becoming more and more an integral
part of life. Communism, fascism, Moaism and Polpotism have collapsed.
Liberal capitalism is being gradually eroded by the growth in new
technology, the growing role of small and medium business and anti-trust
legislation. Socialism as it was once known by so many nations has been
consigned to the past.
What then will be the typical features of global development n the 21st
century? Over the past few years many of the industrial nations of the world
have begun to speak of "sustainable development". This was initially an
environmental concept, a combination of the models of the developed Western
societies and the desire to preserve life on Earth. A number of writers have
attempted to use this concept to make more comprehensive evaluations of
future economic growth, types of manufacturing and the challenges facing
future generations.[49]
However, the concept of "sustainable development" is still unclear and
unnecessarily generalised. It is useful in that it links many varied
national models to the common problems of humanity. Its inadequacy is that
it does not analyse such fundamental questions such as global political and
economic structures, the re-distribution of ownership and authority and
control over the media etc.. However, the concept of sustainable development
does not provide an answer to the major question -- what comes after
post-capitalism and post-communism? What will be the result of their fusion?
I would link the answer to this question with the concept of balanced
development. From a micro-economic and regional point of view it is not new.
The new aspect which I have added is to link it with the global transition
to the new, Fourth Civilisation.
The first general theory of economic balance was created by L.Walras
and V.Pareto, (the Losanne school of political economy). Their aim was to
create abstract mathematical models which provided a ratio between supply
and demand. In the 19th century and the first half of the 20th A.Kurno,
W.Jevans and A.Marshall made significant contributions to the formation of
the classical views of market balance. During the second half of the 20th
century, G.Hicks and P.Samuelson formed a "political synthesis" based on the
studies by the great Swiss economists nd the classic writers on bourgeois
political economy. The Hicks-Allan model is perhaps the best expression of
market balance.[50] It combines the process of the maximum use
for each consumer within the limitations of his income and the maximum
profit for each entrepreneur within the limitations of his produce to
produce a balance between supply and demand.
L.Walras come to some particularly valuable conclusions on the role of
the state in the establishment of balance and his advocacy of the principle,
"balance of opportunity against imbalance of the the factual
situation"[51]. Walras considered the liberal "Laissez Faire"
doctrine as a pure illusion and included the regulating role of the state in
his balanced system. He supports the cooperative movement and is the only
one of many like-minded thinkers to tackle the question of ownership. To be
unaware of the work of L.Walras is to be unaware of one of the most
brilliant writers on economic and political science.
The balanced economic theory of the Lauzanne school and to a lesser
extent the school of the neo-classicists is an initial pre-condition for
what I refer to as balanced development. At a theoretical and methodological
level a number of Marx's conclusions on ownership and the state are also
useful.[52] This can also be said of the ideas of "cooperative
socialism". In contrast to L.Walras, however, I do not see balance as an
ineluctable state or a description of the market but as part of the general
reforms of civilisation. The difference is that I approach balance not from
the point of view of the conditionally limited market but from a global
point of view. In my opinion, balance is not an ideal model but a trend.
There is no eternal balance, there is politics and specific historical
conditions within which it can be achieved. Moreover, I believe that balance
is not only an economic category but a tangential point for economic,
political and cultural processes.
The great modern significance of balanced development comes from the
bankruptcy of "communist nationalisation" and the inadequacy of liberal
doctrines. During the entire period of the 20th century these two concepts
did not contribute either balance of harmony. In fact the opposite -- they
caused innumberable contradictions and hundreds of wars. Pure liberalism
divided the world into the rich and the poor and will clearly continue to do
so as long as it is predominant in the world. Communism, in its very first
stage, brought about the total nationalisation of life and killed freedom
and civil societies. The idea of balanced development is an expression of
the new theoretical synthesis and the link between it and the globalisation
of the world.
From a national domestic point of view balanced development is a trend,
as well as a supporting policy, towards the redistribution of ownership
amongst the largest possible number of citizens and the gradual limitation
of the monopolistic role of families and individuals. Balanced development
is not a revolutionary but a reformist concept -- an expression of the
post-capitalist and post-communist development of the world. To this extent
it is a generalised expression not only of the division and redistribution
of ownership but also its socialisation. Integration and mutual dependence
within the manufacturing processes and financial operations, the transition
from a chaotic to an organised and computerised market presuppose the
interweaving of interests of the traditional and the new social groups and
strata. The gradual, logical and deliberate balancing of the market provides
above all for general economic balance. It is here that the Hicks-Allen
equation needs significant enhancement to take into account the increased
consumption of services and the role of new art forms in the industrialised
states.
At high levels of economic balance the objective role of the state in
the redistribution of ownership is reduced and vice versa. In a balanced
society the state fulfils a supportive and regulative role up to the moment
of the establishment of self-regulation and the horizontal balance of the
system. Neither the state, nor the civil society has permanent limits but
gradually during the processes of its maturation society overwhelms the
state, not the other way around. Of course, this does not mean that
centralised regulation will die or that the nation state will disappear
tomorrow.
Balanced development presupposes "balanced" human rights for all. The
basic pre-condition for the consolidation of balance is the provision of the
individual rights of citizens, their freedom to choose, to associate and to
be protected from the hindrances of bureaucracy. For this reason the corner
stones of democracy -- the freedom of speech and the press, the free
movement of people, goods and capital are the fundamental basis for balanced
development. This also requires the involvement of the state in the economy
and other areas on the principle of minimal sufficiency, as a guarantor of
civil rights and a factor in the formation of a dynamic social environment.
In contrast to liberalism, however, balanced development is possible only
with the redistribution of ownership amongst the growing part of the
population and its socialisation and integration. There are clear
differences between balanced development and the traditional (until the
1970's) concepts of social democracy. While the foundations of social
democracy defined a priori the role of the state within society and
presupposes nationalisation and greater or lesser levels of state control,
balanced development presupposes the minimalisation of the role of the state
with simultaneous horizontal socialisation. This excludes monopolism by a
small group of the extremely rich and the state bureaucracy. Only in this
context can there be any "balance" of difference social groups or relative
"balance of opportunity" (L.Walras) and social justice.
Balanced development presupposes the association of different ethnic
groups and cultures within the framework of the national state and the
global world. In general this concept is an expression of the expansion of
the relations within a civil society and the current notion of human rights.
Balanced development is inseparable from the legislative resolution of a
series of social rights (life, health, work, education, maternity, pensions
etc..) not only as the responsibility of the executive authorities but as
the responsibility of civil society. This takes the form of social funds,
companies, charitable organisations etc. which are independent of the state.
This also leads to the need for the protection of the private life of the
individual. There can be no balanced development if the social security of
citizens is not guaranteed in a new way. This concerns the protection of the
family, women and children, pregnancy and maternity, personal, genetic,
ethnic and behavioural information.
Balanced development presupposes the existence of any specific feature
which does not negate any another, the combination and mutual harmony of all
the features of mankind and social and ethnic groups. The political regimes
and the cultures of the Third Civilisation imposed their models and cultures
through violence. The Fourth Civilisation and its main features -- balanced
development means the rejection of such practices. Most significantly, this
doctrine could become a common reality only if applied globally. It is
already clear that any further increase in the gap of imbalance between
indivual nations stimulates chaos in the world and will cause even greater
damage within the most developed countries. I recently heard someone say in
a small Bulgarian town, "How can I live peacefully, when there is poverty
all around me and rising crime?" These were the words of a well-off man who
was aware of the simple economic truth that if you are richer than others,
you become the object of their dissatisfaction. This is something which will
have to be understood in the industrialised western countries. Otherwise,
sooner or later they will be obliged to isolate themselves and to experience
the hatred of the poor.
The outcome is clear: gradually and inexorably, in accordance with the
norms of the global world, economic levels will balance out. In other words,
balanced development is only possible and necessary in the international
aspect, both as a consequence of and a precondition for the global market.
This requires changes in the international economic order and global
regulation which I will mention at a later stage. Balanced development
presupposes the creation of an environment for intermixing, cohabitation and
development within the universal market and legislative frameworks of
different cultures. Instead of cultural imperialism there will be a
muliticultural society, instead of enmity between countries with different
political and economic regimes, there will be rapprochement and a reduction
of the multiplicity of economic sectors. There will also be an new trend in
geo-politics: instead of imperialism and the domination of one or a group of
states there will be a gradual process of policentrism.
In the next chapters I will attempt to prove that the trends emerging
at the beginning of the Fourth Civilisation and its main outlining feature
-- balanced development -- are irreversible. At the same time I realise the
strength of the inertia inherited from the past and the strength of other
factors which want to delay global change. When I set out my views on
balanced development before a mixed Bulgarian political auditorium I
received two profoundly different reactions. The representatives of the
former communist party said, "You've gone too far to the right." The other
half of the auditorium occupied by members of the anti-communist groups
commented, "This is left-wing babble".
In reality balanced development is neither one nor the other. It is not
me who has gone to the right or to the left but time and human progress
which have gone forward.
Chapter Seven
OBSTRUCTIONS
1. THE DEFENDERS OF THE THIRD CIVILISATION
During the entire period of the 20th century, the representatives of
different classes, nations and blocs have battled with each other. They
created the industry of confrontation and the belief in its eternity. Today
these same people are the defenders of the Third Civilisation.
E
very historical phenomenon has its own driving forces as well as its
own obstacles. The advent of any phenomenon on the historical scene does not
come as an overnight victory -- this is the illusion of revolutionaries --
but as the result of the gradual propulsion of the driving forces against
the obstacles which always exist to the new. This is also true for the
Fourth Civilisation. The Fourth Civilisation could be accelerated or
hindered by a series of political, economic and moral factors. Although we
are living through the last years of the Third Civilisation, it still has
many adherents. The inertia of the past is alive and its advocates
constantly refer back to the old formulae, "How good it used to be in the
past." I once discussed this issue with one of the initiators of the process
of perestroika in the USSR, A.Yakovliev.[53] I asked him what was
the reason for the conservatism of the older population in Eastern Europe.
He joked in response, "Well, their wives were younger then!"
There is perhaps something a element of truth in this joke.
Conservatives in principle support the regimes and systems for which they
have struggled all their lives. They always tend to over-dramatise the
difficulties of the transition and consider any changes a deviation from the
true belief. Moreover, conservatives are not only divided according to age
or to party membership. There are pensioners who support the coming of the
new and young conservatives with opinions set in concrete. In Eastern Europe
the conservatives are concentrated mainly amongst the former communists, the
former security forces but also amongst many members of the old bourgeois
class who are involved in the struggle for political revenge and the
re-establishment of the political status quo from the time before the Second
World War. In the West the defenders of the old civilisation recognise only
the collapse of communism as a symbol of change and their own thoughts do
not go beyond their own privileges and global domination.
This is an historical paradox. The defenders of the Third Civilisation
are not divided into countries and ideologies. They are all enamoured to a
greater or lesser extent of the structures of the bi-polar model and the
cold war. Masses of anticommunists and anticapitalists, Liberals and
Marxists, capitalists and party bureaucrats, generals and spies piously
believe in their correctness and their way of life. Of course, it would be
improper to reject their past, or the struggles they waged, not the fact
that each one of them in his own way may have been an honourable defender of
his native land. However, this is not the most important element. The most
signicant thing is that they are defending models and attitudes which have
crippled the 20th century and transformed it into the most bloody century in
the history of mankind.
The 20th century will be the last century of belligerent nationalism,
imperialism and the domination of one nation over another. However, albeit
with weakened authority, those political forces who advocated such phenomena
have not disappeared. There are still insufficient guarantees that
globalisation will not give rise to imperialism or that the reaction to this
will not provide more opportunities to nationalism and autarchy. While
thought and ideological criteria remain within the framework of egoistical
national iterests, while global awareness is still undeveloped, the
conflicts of the passing century are still possible.
The question is whether we are for or against the structures of the old
civilisation -- for or against the emerging structures of the new time.
Those who dream of the renewed domination of one nation over another, of
imbalanced international economic conditions, of party and nomenclature
leaders, of media monopolism, of the eternalisation of differences in living
standards are on one side of the barricade. Yesterday the party bureaucrats
and the capitalists were opponents. Today they might even become allies in
the struggle for survival and the survival of the structures of the Third
Civilisation. Still prisoners to their old ideologies and international
confrontations they maintain those ideas and structures which could still
return us to the time of the Cold War or grant us a period of Cold Peace.
Fighting with each other, the proponents of the Third Civilisation can only
renew fears, thoughts and activities which leave us in the grips of the
past.
In Spain there is a monument to the memory of both the supporters of
Franco and the Republicans. In one and the same place, under one and the
same cross are gathered the honour and the debt, the errors and mistakes,
the greatness and the perdition of people who killed one another. The names
of the killers are illumiated by those of the victims, whatever side they
may have fought for, whatever side of the barrier they may have belonged to.
In Spain the reconciliation of history is already a fact. In Bulgaria, the
former Yugoslavia and partially in Poland there are still many people who
believed that Gorbachev was a CIA agent while in the USA there are those who
consider Clinton an American communist.
The sooner such thinking disappears, the sooner we shall become awards
of the problems and the greatness of the new civilisation. In order to
understand the new, we must forget the old language, the old categories of
division, the old enmities and prejudices. The Cold War is over but the Cold
Peace and mistrust could unknowingly lead us back to it. Unfortunately this
is not all. The life of the Third Civilisation could be prolonged via the
maintainance of the economic and political structures which were typical of
the 20th century. In most general terms, these structures can be united into
two mutually conditional phenomena, which albeit in different forms have
supported the current world conflicts. These are imperialism and nationalism
and their modern manifestations. As paradoxical as it might seem, these two
satellites of the 20th century are supported by one common culture -- that
of violence and confrontation. The alternative to violence and confrontation
is tolerance -- the recognition of differences, respect for the problems of
others, responsibility to help those who are worse off. Perhaps, it is
indeed tolerance as an alternative to violence which is the most important
feature of the political culture of the Fourth Civilisation.
2. THE GREAT THREAT -- MEDIA IMPERIALISM
With the passing of the Third Civilisation it is also possible that the
imperialist dependencies between nations will disappear. However if the
abstract liberal trends of the past continue to develop this may lead to new
forms of imperialist domination -- less overt but with equally dangerous
consequences.
T
he first manifestations of the global world were inseparably linked
with the ambitions of empire and the growing power of the most developed
countries of the time. The colonial system, international trusts and
cartels, the redistribution of the world into zones of influence and two
world wars was an expression of imperialist domination. The division of the
world into two systems and the cold war was also a form of international
imperialism.
The main slogan used by Lenin, Stalin and their followers was the
"struggle against imperialism". They, however, created a system closely
based on imperial allegiance. If Gorbachev with his power had begun a
process of the gradual reconstruction of Eastern Europe and the world,
imperialism could have been replaced by the agreed establishment of a new
world economic, informational and legislative order. I am convinced that
such a policy would have found support amongst the majority of the political
and intellectual circles in the West.
Gorbachev's failure was to allow the Eastern European regimes to
collapse without any dignity opening the way for the globalisation of the
world without removing the danger of new imperialism. The gap between the
poor and the rich remained as wide as ever. The differences in political and
military power were so different that the danger of imperialist domination
remained. Of course, it would be imprudent to suppose that imperialism might
return in its old colonial forms or to the time of the Cold War. Although
the wealth of the world is divided as unequally as 150 years ago, many
things have changed. The colonial model has been rejected by history.
Anti-monopoly legislation has put down deep roots, major changes have taken
place in peoples' awareness and the infrastructure of the UN and other world
non-governmental organisations have expanded guaranteeing the rights of all
the citizens of the earth. Thus the old type of coercive, belligerent
imperialism has for ever been consigned to the past.
I ask myself, however, whether imperialism as a method of domination of
certain nations over others has finally died. I do not think so. In fact,
the opposite may even be true. Together with the globalisation of the world
there are now new pre-conditions for a new type of imperialism, of a new
type of domination by one people over another. This, without doubt, is one
of the greatest dangers facing world development and the establishment of
new relations within civilisation. The most powerful modern force for
globalisation is the trans-national corporations. Their roles can be as
positive for development as they can lead to its deformation. At the
beginning of the 1980's the trans-national corporations accounted for one
third of the world's industrial production. Their appearance in Russia and
China after the democratisation of their regimes made them, especially in a
number of specialised branches, the absolute rulers of world production. As
a rule the trans-national corporations take national legislation into
account but in global terms they are uncontrollable. This allows them to
redistribute enormous funds and to exert influence in all spheres of social
life. In recent years the trans-national corporations have tended to
decentralise their activities and adapt them to the conditions of the
countries in which they are operating. A typical example of this are the
European operations of Ford and a number of Japanese corporations.
This, however, is insufficient. If the present state of the
distribution of global production and products is allowed to persist then
the imbalances in world development will worsen. If the status quo remains
without significant changes in the world economic order then the rich will
become richer and the poor even poorer. International imperial power in this
case will not be guaranteed by armies and conquests but via financial
operations, technology and the structures of the trans-national
corporations. The finances and management structures will remain in the most
developed countries of the world. The countries which provide cheap labour
(predominantly in Asia) will manufacture products without seeing any
significant improvement in their life while a groups of other countries
(equatorial Africa) will remain for some time to come in the grips of
poverty.
It seems as though the imperialism of the 20th century and the
domination of the super powers is on its way out. Or does it only "seem" so?
If the structures of the old civilisation are preserved for any longer this
will not only serve to delay the reform processes but it may also lead to
serious new local and world conflicts. Imperialism which was the main cause
of the crisis of the Third Civilisation might simply mutate its form.
Imagine a world in which 80% of the news, 70% of the technology, 60% of the
films and 50% of all profits are created in two or three countries. Imagine
that all other countries are dependent on those news broadcasts and that the
awareness of their peoples is modelled by a group of media magnates. Does
this not closely resemble some of the predictions made by George Orwell?
Will it not lead in the long term to reactions from the majority of
countries and peoples?
I would call this phenomenon electronic or media imperialism. By this I
mean the monopolisation of the world's media and culture by individual
nations and trans-national groups. The danger of such a system dominating
the world is evident. If globalisation proceeds in this way, if the global
world does not turn into a world of mono-truths and mono-cultures
disseminated by one or a number of centres than this will lead to a mutation
of human development and will render us dependent on new empires. Today the
ambitions of empire are not manifested through wars of conquest and battles
for resources but in the endeavour to dominate as many sectors of markets,
cultures and media regions as possible. There are only a few countries and
corporations in the world which can afford the development of world-wide
television networks. Only few can survive in the sphere of super
investments. National legislation is powerless. This allows for unbelievable
global power. It can make people accept standards, buy goods and accept
truths broadcast from the screen by a group of media magnates. I do not
think I am oversimplifying the situation. I am convinced that the majority
of the owners of the world media are conscious of their responsibilities to
the citizens of the world. I believe that Ted Turner the founder of CNN is
one of these. His company promotes respect for the culture of all the
countries of the world. However, despite the efforts of such people the
consequences of media imperialism can be dramatic. The danger is that the
television and radio channels of the world are monopolised by the
representatives of those countries who have the historical advantage over
the rest of the world. The USA, Europe and Japan are the leading countries
in this respect. Russia, China and a number of other countries are
relatively well protected because of their scale and their capabilities. But
what about the rest? What will happen to the culture of the smaller and the
poorer nations, their culture and their identity?
If the trend of the 1980's and early 1990's continues and if global
media continue to express the positions and the cultural policies of but a
handful of countries this will strike a serious blow to many other countries
and peoples and will have a general delaying effect on the processes leading
to the advent of the new civilisation.
To begin with a large number of small cultures will disappear taking
with them the identity of many peoples. As can be seen in a number of
countries this will cause defensive reactions and lead to protective
nationalism. In the end this will cause complex political conflicts and will
turn the world into a world of a small group of dominant nations. Electronic
or media imperialism is the remnants of the Third Civilisation, reborn into
its final possible form of the domination of one people over another.
I see the solution to media imperialism in pluralism and the gradual
construction of national electronic media in the poorer countries and in
multicultural policies of the world television media. For at least the next
20--30 years cultural and media production will be concentrated in the hands
of a small group of countries. During this period it will be necessary to
form a new attitude which takes into account the interests of the smaller
and poorer nations and cultures. The problem does not end here. It also
concerns the cinema, video, cable television networks and satellite
television. Clearly the new media technology can be used to stimulate world
development, but at the same time it could lead to the destruction of the
traditions of many peoples. A major question, especially in the conditions
of the transition, is how will we use the new technologies and what will be
the consequences for world development.
3. POST-MODERN NATIONALISM
Nationalism as we knew it in the 20th century is the antipathe of the
new civilisation, the global world, the intermixing of national cultures.
Its chances of survival depend on it changing its limits and forms.
T
he Fourth Civilisation will be a time of openness hiterto unseen in the
world. However, it will also involve a difficult, sometimes painful
combination of different cultures and economics. We would be completely
naive, however to believe that this "intermixing" will come about
automatically simply because culture and economies are becoming globalised.
If the processes are left to blind chance, the world will find itself beset
with many local and regional conflicts, local wars between ethnic groups,
religions and cultures.
In practice this means the artificial blocking of globalisation, new
contradictions and in the long run, the restoration of confrontationalism.
Although such a danger is also posed by the "march of the poor" and by the
reaction against media imperialism, the major resource of such a gloomy
prospect is undoubtedly nationalism. John Lukac defined nationalism as the
greatest political force on the planet. Although I doubt whether this
conclusion is absolutely precise, I find myself concurring that nationalism
is still very stubborn and persistent especially when one takes into account
the inertia of the political thinking of the past. For the whole of the 20th
century nationalism has been the driving force, notwithstanding the official
"domination" and propaganda of communist, liberal, socialist and other
ideologies. Very frequently these ideologies have been but a facade for
nationalism. Stalinism and Nazism are perhaps the best examples of this.
Can globalisation and nationalism be reconciled? This appears possible
only if we equate nationalism with something new, if it changes from what it
was in the 20th century and does not stand in the way of globalisation.
Otherwise nationalism will find itself in very serious conflict with
objective trends in the development of the modern world. On the other hand,
globalisation will either be a bridge leading to the resolution of total
poverty of billions of people or it will stimulate the most mutated forms of
nationalism. Let us think for a moment about this important mutuality.
Globalisation which unifies the world by destroying local customs and
traditions and by killing small cultures cannot avoid causing mutation and
reaction. Consequently, only globalisation based on and stimulates diversity
can be an alternative to reactionary nationalism and stimulus for the
structures of the Fourth Civilisation. At the end of the 20th century after
the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the dominant factor of world development is
openness. There is now only a small groups of states (e.g. North Korea)
which maintain policies of isolation and the absolutism of their own
traditions.
At the end of the 20th century, nationalism might reappear as an
ideological movement protected by culture and religion. Ideological
nationalism is a relatively rare phenomenon in the modern world although in
a certain number of poorly-developed countries of Africa and Asia it might
seen as a panacea for the resolution of serious problems. North Korean
communism, for example, is ideological nationalism wrapped in a mask of
dead-end ideology. A more widespread and typical form of nationalism at the
end of the 20th century is defensive nationalism. This may appear in any
country which feels under threat, for the survival of its economy from the
invasion of imported goods, its culture -- from the invasion of foreign
information and cultural products. Defensive nationalism is not necessarily
cultural or religious. It often appears as a result of economic reasons or
is linked with historical and political aims of particular nations. The
question is not whether this is the "defence" of an individual small culture
from the invasion of foreign media or "protection" against an undisputed and
powerful culture from the presence of foreign immigrants. In both cases this
leads to conflicts, isolation, blocks the processes of globalisation and
gives rise to chimera and xenophobia. Ethnonationalism is similar in
character and is also widespread. The explosion in ethnic self-confidence
and self-determination is a direct and explicable reaction in the struggle
for survival in the conditions of globalisation. When, however, this
self-awareness has specific historical, cultural and religious roots it can
give rise to serious conflicts.
Why is nationalism on the rise? Why has this happened despite the
continuing intensive processes of globalisation? Why in many places has
nationalism taken on extreme forms and lead to military conflicts?
The reason is that the surge of nationalist feelings is a reaction to
informational and cultural imperialism, to the invasion of the world media
and trans-national coporations. In such conditions is has become convenient
and fashionable for politicians and ordinary people to re-identify
themselves as the members of a regional family. In the poorer countries the
rise in national self-determination is a result of former humiliations and
repressed ethnic awareness. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall the new
nationalism was less important than the struggle between the two world
systems. Today, however, this is not the case. National survival and
self-determination has replaced Marxist and Leninist teaching in the East
and the liberal-conservative doctrines in the West. They have filled the
emotional, spiritual, economic and political vacuum almost totally
unhindered. Finally, self-identification and its consequent nationalism
within modern conditions has become possible as a result of the reduced
authority of the nation state as a consquence of globalisation.
Nationalism is not the only, but undoubtedly the major reason for the
possible new division of the world into opposing economic or military and
political blocs. The regrouping of countries into new economic alliances is
a part of the geo-political restructuring of the world. Here the danger is
in the trend for the divisions to turn into confrontation and the bi-polar
model to be replaced with a new bi- or tri-polar oppositional structure.
What will predominate in the future the global prospects for the Fourth
Civilisation or new regional isolation? Nationalism, combined with regional
autarchy or forms of the new open world society? I believe that the answer
to this question will still be unclear for the next few decades. There is an
undisputed trend towards global integration and the advent of the new
civilisation. It is inevitable and it will continue. However, the question
whether this process will involve a new phase of world conflicts and
collapses, whether there is a danger of evil egoism dominating the world
will depend to a very great extent on the means and forms of globalisation.
4. THE EGOISM OF POLITICIANS
The responsibility of politicians is not to incite conflict but to
resolve them, not to serve the people of the past but to open up the
potential for the future.
T
he advent of the New Civilisation is indisputably irreversible.
However, when it will come and what controversies it will bring with it
depends to a large extent on the modern political leaders. There is grounds
to speak of the possibility of the formation of new global elites in
accordance with the great structural changes on a world scale. They will be
above all the leaders of the trans-national corporations and other
international companies, international traders, representatives from the
world of show business and intellectuals who identify their lives with the
progress of the whole world.
Would it be correct to say that the majority of contemporary world
politicians are the defenders and advocates of the Fourth Civilisation?
Hardly. The mass of people seem to be conservative defenders of the Third
Civilisation. There are exceptions, of course, such as Jacques Delor, Hans
van der Bruk, Leo Tindemans and other architects of European integration.
Other exceptions include those politicians who have contributed much to
world peace such as Bill Clinton, Itsach Rabin, Edward Shevardnadze and many
others whose world view is more global than local.
Unfortunately, the majority of modern politicians are influenced not by
global responsibilities but purely local and national interests. This local
egoism is above all a product of the political structures themselves. In
every country where there is a pluralist structure the party leaders have
the responsibility to their own parties or at best to their countries while
members of parliament are responsible to their constituents. Even when the
level of education and intellect of the politicians makes them aware of the
interests of others their dependency on the national and local systems
renders them powerless before the challenges of the New Civilisation.
Minimal efforts are necessary to bring a halt to infant mortality all over
the world and the funds needed to finance this are less that 1% of the
budgets of the industrialised world. Young people at universities are more
interested in the resolution of environmental problems than the elected
representatives of the nations. However, the egoism of politicians is a
product of the electoral systems and the necessity for each politician to
defend first and foremost the current interests of his electors. In this way
the richest countries and peoples of the world are protecting their own
interests above all and the problems of the starving and childrens'
illnesses remain in the periphery of their thoughts.
The political forces which should work to establish the Fourth
Civilisation are not yet clearly identified. They are somewhere amongst the
different interests and competition of the trans-national corporations,
amongst the group of leaders of the major nations and the representatives of
the intellectual community and environmental movements etc.. Despite the
successes of the New Civilisation, despite the growing global awareness,
these forces are insufficient. Clearly, for an indefinite period of time the
majority of politicians will play a conservative, rather than a progressive
role in the furtherment of global relations. Today the political awareness
of the majority of people involved in such activities goes as far as
agreeing to inter-state positions almost exclusively on the basis of
national interests. The expansion of global problems is still in no-man's
land.
There is a clear need for changes in the culture and the awareness of
the political elite as well as changes to the political systems. One has to
admire the majority of modern European politicians for their constancy and
stubborn resilience with which they have built the European Union. It is not
customs mechanisms nor the development of a prototype European parliament
which should serve as shining examples to the rest of the world but the
gradual development over a period of forty years of the dynamic processes of
the European idea. However, even here there are a number of examples where
the European idea has been compromised by national ambitions and prejudices
or has been used demagogically for local political interests. British,
French and German members of the EU parliament acknowledge the interests of
those who do not want to give up its privileges and to accept their
challenges of economic and political integration. Analyses have shown that
these are people who put priority on the interests of the manufacturers in
their constituencies or a simply victims of limited political thought.
The main reason for the egoism of politicians is inherent the nature of
the political systems, in the national limitations of the concept of
political responsibility, in the weakness of the link between the electoral
mechanisms and the concern for future generations.
5. MILITANT RELIGIONS
When a shell exploded in the market place in Sarajevo and killed dozens
of people, a young woman cried out, "Allah, have revenge for me..." A friend
of mine from Serbia told me how a detachment of Muslims in Bosnia raped a
group of women and them murdered them... The hatred which he spoke was
enough to last him for the rest of his life.
T
he ethnic war and cleansing in Bosnia, the religious attacks in
Algeria, the fundamentalist attacks in Egypt, the victory of the Islamic
party in Turkey, ethnic and religious problems in Iran, Iraq, Northern
Ireland, Israel and Palestine, India and dozens of other places all over the
world are all steeped in the blood of continuing religious conflicts. They
are sometimes referred to as the militant religions. Perhaps this is
correct. Religion and faith is the greatest unifying principle, the
strongest mass feeling overwhelming emotions, traditions, indignation and
interests and unites them under a common will. Whoever captures this will
shall be victorious. It is true that there is no life without faith just as
there is no matter without spirit. No-one can deny that the major
traditional religions have survived for many thousands on this earth and
they will clearly survive for many more. Religions have learnt how to adapt
to new processes and phenomena, to demonstrate flexibility and to
acknowledge the needs of the people. Some call this pragmatism, others call
it hypocrisy.
The great challenge of the modern day which faces all world religions
is should they adapt to the global world or should they continue to fight
over their old conquests. The dilemma is either to adapt to the open and
modern world or to defend the life and traditions of the past, to integrate
religious symbols into a modern, open economy or isolation and a war of
cultures. Another great challenge is tolerance between religions. Will they
continue to fight with each other or will they allow co-existence with other
faiths and the free choice of people?
The militant isolationist and totalitarian religions are in opposition
to the New Civilisation. They and their representatives form part of the
obstacles to the advent of the new. There is little doubt that the conflicts
arising from the conflict of open societies and cultures will frequently be
based on religious principles. I and inclined to think, however, that the
role of the militant religions will grow only if this is allowed for by
certain preconditions such as poverty and nationalism and the spread of new
utopian ideas.
When in 1991 President George Bush and his aides unexpectedly halted
the American invading force en route to Basra and Baghdad many people could
not understand why he did this. Five years later it is now clear that the
Americans had to choose between the consequences of religious conflicts or
the preservation of the regime of Saddam Hussein. Militant religions can
take power, as they did in Iran or they can halt the processes of
modernisation of entire regions. However, they can do little more since for
the same reasons for which I reject the thesis of S.Huntington I believe
that religious modernism will prevail over fundamentalism.
6. A CUP OF COFFEE IN APENZEL
The defenders of the Third Civilisation do not only live in the poor
countries. A large number of them live in resplendent luxury and comfort or
in conditions of social harmony alien to four fifths of the world. These
people live in the West and do not want global change...
H
ave you ever been to Apenzel? It is a Swiss Canton with a capital of
the same name on the road from the lake of Boden to Liechtenstein. It is the
smallest, best ordered and quietest of all the cantons in the Swiss
confederation. There are no large factories as there are in Basel or the
vanity of the financial centre of Zurich. There are none of the bank
employees forever in a hurry or the limousines of the major banks. Apenzel
has the the cleanest cows in the world, the most beautiful green fields
merging in the distance into the majesty of the Alpine peaks. It is a land
of peaceful, almost invisible work where everyone knows what to do and when
to do it. If you get the chance to go to the capital of the canton, take a
walk across the bridge and a stroll through the little town and you will
feel as though you are in a fairy story. The flowers in the windows, the
decorated roofs of the houses and the hidden little backstreets.
My reason for writing about this is because Apenzel is not only the
smallest and most comfortable canton in Switzerland but also the most
conservative. Here the majority of the people do not want any form of
change. For them Switzerland's membership of the European Union is a
dangerous event with unforeseeable consequences. I stopped in Apenzel for a
cup of coffee and a cake in the summer of 1993 and my contacts with the
local people made a strong impression on me. This was not only because they
had voted against Swiss membership of the EU but for the reasons which they
explained to me.
The people passionately and convincingly did not want to become part of
the united Europe since they were afraid that the underdeveloped European
countries would hold back their development and their towns "would be
invaded by immigrants" and that they were "getting on very well without the
Common Market" etc.. I would not have bothered to mention this event if this
attitude was not repeated in other wealthy parts of the world. One of the
main sources for the rising xenophobia in Germany, France and Austria is
this unwillingness to share their wealth with others and to experience the
risk of cultural intermixing.
In contrast to the supporters of Zhirinovski in Russia who admire his
defence of traditional Russian values or Erbakan in Turkey who advocates the
traditions of Islam against the modern processes taking place in the West my
experience in Apenzel has completely different origins. I could call it
result of "resplendent comfort". Millions of people in Western Europe and
North America are entirely satisfied by their lifestyles and do not want to
jeopardise the status quo. Employment, security, mistrust of other cultures
are reasons for which they prefer nationalism to the open world and the
advent of the New Civilisation.
Do not be angry with the conservatives of Apenzel. This is not an
emotional but a widespread cultural and political phenomenon. It manifests
itself in many forms of protective nationalism and is the social basis for
potential serious conflict against the Fourth Civilisation. About ten years
ago the French Nationalist, Le Pen, seemed a political curiosity, now,
however, he is accepted as something real and necessary by many
intellectuals. Such is the case with the Austrian Nationalist J.Heider whose
party categorically won third place in the country and has even greater
political ambitions.
Thus the defenders of the old civilisation come not only from amongst
the ranks of the fundamentalists, the supporters of Islam or the
ultra-nationalists from the lesser developed countries. They also come from
the West, from its more conservative circles, from people who are frightened
of losing the luxury which they have achieved. Undoubtedly the New
Civilisation will involve the intermixing of cultures and economies, the
global redistribution and harmonisation of resources, production and
benefits. This will also lead to structural changes and even cause
difficulties in the most developed countries of the West. Will the people of
these countries be prepared to concede some of the privileges which their
current state of economic and political advantage allows them?
This "drowning in luxury" will continue to hold back the progress of
the New Civilisation and lead to a variety of conflicts and other hitherto
unknown phenomena. Together with the slow and gradual opening-up of the
world and its cultural intermixing we will also become witnesses to
processes of temporary "closing-up" and the victories of nationalists and
fundamentalists. If in the richer countries of the world those who live in
states of "resplendent luxury" win this battle imperial or neo-colonial
thinking and fundamentalism will inevitably increase.
Section Three
The Alternatives to the Fourth Civilisation
Chapter Eight
THE NEW ECONOMIC ORDER
1. THE ECONOMIC HEART OF THE GLOBAL WORLD
Throughout the whole of the 20th century the economic dependence of
nations grew to become what is the now the nucleus of the New Civilisation.
One essential part of the modern infrastructure is the supra-sovereign
control of nation states. The main question is whether this will lead to a
new economic order or will it revive the familiar conflicts...
T
he economic interaction of countries and peoples is at the basis of
each human community. "Economic interaction" is not always the leading
factor but is does always dominate. It challenges not only the autonomy of
particular communities but also their unification into nation states. The
new elements of the 20th century is that the modern global economy is
becoming less and less an object of control of national governments and is
tending to form its own, independent relations.
This process has been taking place throughout the 20th century. Between
1870 and 1913 world trade increased by 6% annually. Between 1918 and 1938
there was practically no growth. This can be explained by the slow processes
of reconstruction after the First World War, the Great Depression
(1929--193) and the self-imposed isolation of the USSR, Germany and a number
of other countries. After the Second World War international economic
exchange reached it highest level of progress. This was mainly driven by
Western Europe, America and Japan. Between 1946 and 1973 world trade was
increasing on average by 10% and doubled n volume from 1980--1995.
Notwithstanding wars, political confrontation and the accompanying
protectionism, the entire period of the 20th century was a time of expansion
and global economic strengthening. By resolving their conflicts countries
began more and more to see or were forced to see the advantages of the
"open" economy and to accept bi-lateral and multi-lateral customs and trade
unions. The Genoa conference in 1922 and the World Economic Conference in
1927 are of great significance despite the non-implementation of their
decisions as a result of the crisis of 1929 and the Second World War.
On the 30th of October 1947 the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs
(GATT) was ratified. This was a milestone leading to the removal of trade
discrimination, the consolidation of the principle of "most-favoured nation"
status and the formation of customs unions. Between 1964--1967 the "Kennedy
round" of talks in which 54 nations took part lead to a 35% reduction in
trade tariffs. A further round of talks held in Tokyo in 1979 helped to
further develop this process.
Together with progress in trade there was also significant progress in
economic integration: the complete economic opening of the American states
with each other; the German customs union (1871), the Belgium-Luxembourg
economic union (1921), the European Iron and Steel Agreement and the Rome
Treaty of 1957 on the creation of a Common Market within Europe; the
Committee for Economic Cooperation (COMECON) in Eastern Europe (1949) and
the European zone for free trade (1960). Despite the political, class and
military confrontation of the 20th century there has been a constant process
of opening-up and a reduction in the significance of national borders. This
has expanded with the ratification of the Latin American Association for
Free Trade (LAFTA) in 1960 the Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM) in 1973. At
the beginning of the 1990's a new stage in European integration began with
the reatification of the Maastricht treaty. The NAFTA agreement on free
trade in North America was also signed in 1993.
I mention these facts in order to show once again the constant increase
in the integrational processes taking place within the entire world. As a
result total world trade has grown from 1635 billion USD in 1979 to 1915
billion USD in 1984 to 3667.6 billion USD in 1992. Through the exchange of
goods and services the entire world has become linked within a single
system. The major factor for integration is the exchange of goods in the
area of:
-- communications, including satellite television, international
telephone links and electronic mail, these advances are particularly
significant;
-- petrol which despite a marked decline has continued to account for
one third of world energy consumption;
-- food and raw agricultural products .-- trade with grain, sugar and
coffee are amongst the most important factors;
-- metals and ore;
-- transport and machine building -- planes, cars, ships etc.. the
production of which is continuing to increase.
A significant new phenomenon in recent decades has been the linking of
the financial systems of practically all the countries of the world into a
unified system. In the 16--18th century world trade was carried out on the
basis of national currencies, gold and silver. During this same period
international trade was also based on trade credits and exchange of goods
for goods. It was only in the second half of the 19th century that the most
industrialised countries accepted the gold standard and the predominance of
the British Pound Sterling. Up until the 1930's this system remained, in
general terms, in force.
Later it was replaced by the Brenton Woods agreement and the domination
of the American dollar. At the beginning of the 1970's the Brenton Woods
system gave way to floating exchange rates and open financial and currency
markets. The predominance of the British Pound was undermined as a result of
the reduced importance and the collapse of the British Empire. However, the
reason for the changes which took place in the 1970's was the impossibility
of any single national currency to monopolise international markets. This is
a further demonstration of a common phenomenon, globalisation does not
stimulate monopolies but, on the contrary, it creates the conditions for
their destruction.
In recent decades the world has witnessed the hitherto unseen linkage
of countries and nations via currency and financial mechanisms. The
replacement of the Brenton Woods system was in fact the removal of the last
barriers to the multi-directional fusion of national currencies and exchange
rates and to banking and stock exchange operations. Floating exchange rates
served as a shock absorber for the resolution of differences and a bridge
for overcoming global economic imbalance. During the last 20 years the trade
in securities reached previously unknown levels. The trade in international
bonds has increased from 76.3 to 167.3 billion dollars[54]. In
practice this has meant the growing mutual dependency of capital markets. We
can add to this the enormous increase in Euro-dollar markets. After the fall
of the Berlin Wall the processes of linkage of the capital markets in all
the countries of the world has become undisputed and to a large extent
irreversible.
Another particulary important indicator of this are the currency
policies of practically all the countries in the world. Through a system of
mutual convertibility, the maintenance of official reserves in varying
currencies and the greater independence of commercial banks, the national
economies of countries over the world have become more dependent on each
other. After the beginning of the 1970's the international role of the
dollar began to subside slowly. This could be seen in the reduction in the
size of the official dollar reserves of the industrialised countries to be
replaced in the main by the German mark and the Japanese yen.
Perhaps the clearest indicator of the economic growth of the Fourth
Civilisation is the level of direct investments and the development of
trans-national corporations. In the world today there are 37,000
trans-national corporations with over 170,000 branches. Of these, 24,000
corporations are based in the developed countries, 2700 in the developing
countries (mainly, South Korea, Hong Kong, Brazil and China) and less than
500 in Central and Eastern Europe. In 1992, the global volume of direct
investments reached 2 trillion dollars accounting for a level of sales by
the foreign branches of the trans-national corporations of 5.5 trillion
dollars.[55]
As each year goes by the internationalisation of industry increases
which will lead to the intermixing of cultures, manufacturing structures and
changes in the awareness of billions of people. Everywhere in the world, the
USA or France, Russia or Rumania, Kenya or Ruanda people are becoming more
and more aware of the influence of the world economy on their day to day
life. Most significantly the houses in which we live and the services which
we use are becoming more and more internationalised. I do not know whether
it is an exaggeration to say that the modern citizen of the world is a
"product of the world". Everywhere in the world, even in the most isolated
of countries you will come across cars from the USA, Japan and Germany,
household goods from Italy, coffee and fruit from Latin America, electrical
goods from Hong Kong and Japan, carpets from Iran or Bulgaria and clothes
from China and India etc.. If you take a look at the raw materials used in
the production of the finished goods then you will see the labour and the
talents of millions of people from many countries.
All this might be summed up as two basic phenomena which show the end
of one human civilisation and the beginning of another.
The first of these phenomena is that the mutual dependence of countries
has reached a level at which nation states, autonomous religions and
cultures can no longer historically dominate the processes of integration
and universal human interests. It is true that the danger of new class,
cultural and religious divisions is still possible but the trend towards
world integration is becoming more and more irreversible.
The new factor is that the most integrated regions in North America,
Europe and Japan have created sound economic and financial links with each
other. This has also lead to the involvement of all the remaining countries
in the world in the global economy. If we take foreign investments as our
criteria, we will see that at the beginning of the 1990's the three main
economic centres of the world had direct influence over about 50 other
satellite countries which accounted for over 3/4 of the world economic
product. Today, there is not a single country which can exclude itself from
the world economy without causing serious damage to its own development. The
attempts by North Korea, Iraq and in the recent past, Albania and Cuba to
develop independently in conditions of self-sufficiency have lead to their
economic collapse. The huge level of economic inter-dependence in the world
has lead to more than just closer integration. When different systems grow
closer they form a common, more universal community which is more vital than
any individual national or regional, economic or political force.
The second phenomenon is the formation of economic forces for which
national identity is more formal than essential. Not only in terms of
behaviour, interests and structures these forces belong more to the world
than to any particular nation state. Above all, these are a part of the
trans-national corporations whose economic activities are spread throughout
a number of countries and whose connections and dependencies upon national
governments are of less significance than, for example, the state of the
London Stock Exchange. We could also look at the large number of financial
institutions who operate on a global level not as the citizens of any
particular country but as citizens of the world.
I believe that both the level of mutual economic dependency of
countries as well as the several thousand trans-national manufacturing and
financial corporations form the economic nucleus of the new civilisation. At
the end of the 20th century these structures which control the majority of
world manufacturing and trade are the most powerful globalising force in the
world. The 20th century was a time when the global world was born but also a
time of the creation of supra-national economic structures and the essence
of a new civilisation.
When I speak of the economic nucleus of the Fourth Civilisation, I mean
the influence it has on all areas of life and that the objective changes
brought about by the integration of manufacturing and finances have imposed
profound changes in the world economic order.
2. NEW GROWTH AND NEW STRUCTURES
The trend of the 20th century towards the constant opening-up of
national economies will continue at an increasing rate for the next few
decades. This will cause the wide-scale redistribution of manufacturing
forces and their re-structuring on a branch level. The dynamics of national
and world economic growth will be determined more and more by international
exchange...
T
here is not doubt that the globalisation of the world economy is
accelerating. According to the predictions of the World Trade Organisation
the volume of goods traded in 1995 will increase by 8%. In 1994 this figure
was 9.4%. The fact that during the past ten years, world trade has grown
faster than the annual global domestic product (see table 8) shows that the
integration and opening-up of national borders continues to be a dominant
process.
Table 8
% annual growth
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
World Trade
8,0
2,5
4,1
5,3
7,9
6,5
4,5
3,5
4,0
3,5
9,5
World GDP
6,0
2,4
2,8
2,9
4,9
3,4
0,5
-2
-0,5
0,2
2,4
Source: World Trade Organisation.
How can this phenomenon be explained? Why for the greater part of the
20th century has world trade been greater than manufacturing? My brief
response to these two questions is as follows: the constant growth of world
exchange has been caused not only by the growth of manufacturing but also by
the cultural and political opening-up of countries, the laws of human
progress and technological development. The vast majority of the governments
in the countries of the world realise that the effectiveness of their
efforts and the wealth of their citizens depends on export and their
successful involvement in the international distribution of labour. It has
become beneficial not only to exchange newly manufactured products but also
those products created in the recent past as well as knowledge, services and
personnel.
Of particular significance is the difference between the growth of
trade and the growth in World Gross Product over the past six years
(1990--1995) or since the collapse of the Berlin Wall. There has been a rise
in the levels of export from the most developed nations to Eastern Europe
and Russia and a continuous increase in the exchange of trade with China. In
1984 alone the progressive Asian economies, including China but with the
exception of Japan, achieved a 20% increase in their services trade. There
is a simultaneous related increase in Eastern Asia and Central and Eastern
Europe. There is no doubt that we are witnessing a new rise in world trade
and a reduction in the significance of national borders. If we exclude
Africa and the Near East, there is evidence almost everywhere of a growth in
world trade and the resulting economic revival.
The growth of export is a feature of future change in the structure of
product manufacture. The most dynamic group of new products in recent years
has been telecommunications and office equipment. I believe that
telecommunications will continue to increase their share of world trade and
will be the most dynamic and profitable export area. This will result in
increased communications between people and the intermixing of cultures and
manufacture in the world. Telecommunications are a symbol of the Fourth
Civilisation and the main technological channel for its development.
Clearly telecommunications will continue to contribute to the
re-structuring of social life and the stimulation of growth, the opening-up
of the world and the linkage of millions and billions of people. The main
integrational effect will be the linking of the new communications
technologies to televisions and computer technology. The American media
group "Time Warner" has already developed and begun to market the first
digital interactive television network in the world. Their "Full Service
Network" permits its subscribers to carry out banking operations from home,
to receive information about products, services and events, to buy and to
order and to see new films etc.. Consumers' choice is guaranteed. However,
at the same time, this allows the television companies to guarantee their
monopoly of the market. Whatever happens in the future, there is little
doubt that telecommunications will continue to expand their share of world
trade and be a key factor in economic development and structural and social
changes. Together with world finance which has developed as a result of
improved world communications, telecommunications will continue to be the
most attractive area of the world economy. The Internet has allowed tens of
millions of people over the entire world have become part of a single
network of communications and access to information. Computer networks will
lead to revolutionary changes in finances, trade and manufacturing.
Despite certain serious predictions concerning a fall in profits from
manufacture and sale of aeroplanes[56], I believe that all modern
forms of transport will continue to grow dynamically. People of different
races, ethnic groups and cultures are coming closer to one another, running
to embrace each other. They are beginning to realise how useful it is to
travel together and to meet and use the experience of others.
The conclusion which seems to suggest itself is that the branches of
the Fourth Civilisation (telecommunications, finances, services, computers,
information technology, transport, services etc..) have made life more
integrated and are a product of the new inter-dependency which is required
by humanity. The process will not stop here. On the basis of these key
branches of the New Civilisation, still more, newer, branches will be
formed. Television and telephones will spur the creation of new audio-visual
telephones. Paging systems and mobile telephones will become cheaper and
will allow parents to have more control over their children and to gain
information from their teachers. Doctors and policemen will be called to
where they are needed. This will change politics and management. It will
ease and change ways of voting. There is already software available for
conducting trade over the computer with full legal support.
In ancient times peoples were separated from one another by years of
travel. In the Middle Ages the distance shortened to months. In modern times
distances can be covered in days. In the New Civilisation the whole of
humanity is connected within hours, minutes and seconds. I recently had to
fly from Sofia to Honolulu by Lufthansa and United Airlines. I covered the
distance in 15--16 hours. Twenty time zones to the other side of the globe
in 16 hours! I am convinced that in the Fourth Civilisation people will be
able to circumnavigate the world in less time. Despite the opinions of
certain sceptics I am sure that transport will continue to improve and
develop with leaps and bounds. This applies to car manufacturing, aeroplane
construction, shipbuilding and certain other completely new forms of
transport. This will also provide new prospects for world economic growth.
New technologies will continue to stimulate this growth and the dynamic
processes will never stop despite the critics who believe that the computer
and audio-visual market are already satiated. The limits of high technology
growth and integrational products have not yet been reached.
It is not certain whether this growth will dominate the world economy
as a whole. It is most likely that the next 10--20 years will be years of
technological progress but also slow reconstruction. The lack of
manageability and even elementary order within the world economy means that
it is not clear which of the two will gain the upper hand.
Above all this requires the replacement of old industrial production
with new technology, a process which has been in progress for the past 15
years. This process, however, should not be perceived as the elementary
replacement of the "factory chimney with the computer", as some philosophers
believe. The old industrial sectors (metallurgy, chemicals, machine tool
engineering, energy production, transport) will be partially reconstructed,
partially relocated to the lesser developed countries for the sake of
cheaper labour and the lack of environmental pressure groups and opposition.
One only has to look to see what is happening with the automobile industry,
machine tool production, electronics and the electronics industry and
chemical production. Everything now involves new high technology and
computers. In modern automobile construction as much money is now spent on
new electronics as on improvements to engine design. The new generation of
aeroplanes, "Boeing" and "Airbus" are practically operated from the ground
taking off and landing using electronic equipment, while the pilots fulfil
mainly regulatory functions. The chemical industry is re-orienting itself to
new, environmentally clean technology and hitherto unknown products. The
construction industry is investing more and more in new highly resistant
materials. Just as in the 19th and 20th century the industrial revolution
lead to revolutions in agriculture without replacing it, the new technology
of the New Civilisation will revolutionise industrial technology and will
change their essence but will not destroy it. Development does not allow for
absolute rejection. Revolution itself always means the addition of the new
to the old and its transformation. It has been interpreted in other ways in
history, but that was just destruction.
The second very important area in the restructuring of the world
economy, in my opinion, is the huge process of the geographical
re-distribution of world production. Today, the citizens, trade unions and
politicians in Bavaria and California are concerned about the re-location of
manufacturing facilities to the countries of South East Asia and Latin
America. Millions of people are suffering as a result of the reduction in
military production, as is the case in California. This fact cannot be
ignored, but this is only the beginning. The modern geographical
distribution of world production was formed at a time of colonial power and
consolidated during the bi-polar world. Given the new world conditions of
the Fourth Civilisation, things will have to change out of all recognition.
As paradoxical as it may sound even the direction of investments will have
to change. Amongst the favourites are the countries of South East Asia. The
export of manufacturing potential from North America and Europe will expand.
This will consist mainly of those products which can be easily adapted to
the new technologies and the constant increase in the cost of labour in the
industrialised countries. Finally, the advent of the New Civilisation will
be accompanied by the closure of a number of manufacturing processes. This
process will be more intense than at any other time during the whole of the
20th century.
Whether we live in New York, Tokyo, Belgrade or Dakkar we are living in
a state of transition between two civilisations. This is a technological
transition, a transition in the nature of economic development. New
manufacturing sectors and products will come to the fore. The distinct
division between intellectual and physical labour and the manufacturing and
non-manufacturing sector will disappear. This is indisputable and supported
not only by P.Drucker but also by the chairman of the majority in the US
Congress N.Greenwich.
The state of change is indeed similar to that which existed at the end
of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th. Let us hope that the
consequences for the people of the world will not be as dramatic as they
were then. During the processes of industrialisation millions of people were
thrown out onto the streets or transformed into factory slaves. The
developed societies were divided into classes causing huge social unrest.
Today the experience of the past and the bitter lessons of the 20th century
provide us with the hope that the great changes in technological and
economic growth will not inevitably lead to chaos and social strife.
3. WHO WILL DOMINATE THE WORLD ECONOMY
Recently, everyone has been trying to convince us that the three
economic centres -- the USA, Japan and Europe dominate the world and that
the technological and financial power of Japan will replace the economic
power of the East. I do not believe in these prospects...
D
uring the Third Civilisation the power of countries was determined by
their military and political power. This was based on economic strength but
was not always the most decisive element in the consolidation of power of
one country over another. The Ottoman Empire was not more advanced
materially when between the 13--16th centuries it conquered one third of
Europe as far north as Vienna. France under Napoleon the 1st was no stronger
economically than the rest of the countries in Europe but managed to conquer
with better military organisation and leadership.
The Fourth Civilisation precludes the military resolution of conflicts.
The achievement of nuclear parity and the nature of nuclear weapons makes it
absurd to wage nuclear war. This is also true conventional conflicts as
well. Let us take the example of the war in Bosnia. There have been over
200,000 deaths (perhaps many more), the complete destruction of industry and
infrastructure, valleys of blood and violence. The war ended with the
signing of the peace accord in Dayton, USA which brought the sides back to
their starting points. The reason for such absurdities is the potential
possibility of the mutual neutralisation of the nuclear powers and their
influence on the smaller warring countries.
I begin this chapter in this way since in the 1960's and 1970's when
nuclear parity was achieved a "new concept" of world economic domination was
born. There are still people in a number of countries who believe that the
USA or Japan can play the role of a world economic super power. In the 20th
century many countries have aspired to such a role but all of them lost in
the long run. I believe that today on the basis of the laws of human
development the imposition of economic domination by one country or a group
of countries over the rest can only be a temporary state. In the context of
globalisation the economic levels of the countries of the world have begun
to level out. This process can only be stopped by political coercion or the
isolation of countries from each other. In the civilisations which have
existed up until now, nations began their development in different climatic
conditions and with different resources. In the 19th and 20th centuries
these same nations began to realise how wide was the gap had grown between
them.
During the last 50 years a series of processes began to take place
within the heart of the bi-polar model which proved that economic domination
from an historical point of view is purely illusory. Let us take as an
example the most powerful institutions of the world economy, the
trans-national corporations. Immediately after the Second World War the
American corporations were the undisputed dominating forces of the world
economy and only a group of British companies managed to upset their
hegemony. In 1962 of the 500 largest companies in the world, 300 (with a
total product of 365 billion dollars) were in the USA and 200 (with a total
product of 174 billion USD) in other countries. Today this picture has
changed beyond recognition. In 1992, of the 50 largest industrial companies
in the world, only 14 were in the USA, 13 in Japan, 2 in the U.K., 7 in
Germany, 3 in Italy, 5 in France, 2 in South Korea etc.. This trend will
continue. We can expect a serious increase in trans-national companies from
Germany, Russia, South Korea, Brazil and also a number of smaller countries.
The process of levelling will take place slowly. This is the inevitable
result of the opening and expansion of the world market. In contrast to 40
or 50 years ago, today investments, manufacturing processes and goods are
being exported everywhere it is economically viable to do so. At the
beginning of the new technological revolution in the 1970's and 1980's
investments were directed at the most developed nations which had educated
and well-trained personnel. I believe that since the 1990's a significant
part of the world investments will be redirected mainly to some of the new
"dragons" of South East Asia, Australia, China, Latin America and, given
greater political stability, Eastern Europe.
Similar changes are taking place in the commodity and stock markets.
Only a few years ago the stock exchanges in New York and London were
dominant. Today the Tokyo stock exchange has changed all that and is now
quite convincingly the leading stock market in the world. There has been a
gradual, almost invisible process whereby the new financial markets have
developed. This will lead to the re-distribution of the economic power and
new hitherto unseen trends.
Until the end of the 1980's and in particular during the period of the
Cold War, the major criterion for political and economic power was still
closely associated with the military and armaments industry. If the positive
trends of world development continue economic power will depend more on
technology, information and resources and will guarantee the future of
promising industrial sectors. This will lead to the re-determination of the
power and wealth of the countries and nations of the world and their place
in the global division of labour. The new technologies will not permit
monopolisation. They will guarantee advantages for the countries which
possess them only until they are mastered by other countries. High
technology in the modern world is being spread via the trans-national
corporations and the activities of governments.
Japan, despite its world domination in the development and production
of new technology is also a major exporter of high-tech products and
know-how. In South East Asia and Latin America there are number of
production facilities with the most modern telecommunications technology.
Competition between the trans-national corporations is the main reason for
this. I believe that this is in principle impossible for technology and
information to be monopolised in the aims of the domination of certain
countries over others especially in the context of the modern scientific and
technological revolution. The New Civilisation will still maintain the trend
of the free movement of technology and information.
The direct result of this is the formation over the past 30--40 years
of a new global distribution of manufacturing and technological priorities.
Each of the developed countries to a certain extent have found their market
niches and has established itself in world export. For example at the
beginning of the 1970's the USA exported 77.5% of world aeroplane
production; 44.1% of organic chemicals; 55.9% of office equipment; 35.2% of
computer technology; 39.3% of industrial refrigeration; 35.8% of grain and
37.1% of steel export etc.. In 1985 Germany accounted for 23.2% of world
automobile export; 19.8% of plastics; 51.5% of rotary printing presses;
32.4% of synthetic organic dies; 34.1% of packaging equipment; 30.4% of
textile and leather processing machinery. In the same years, 1985, Japan
possessed 30.8% of world automobile export; 37.5% of lorries and trucks;
80.7% of televisions and tape recorders; 82% of motorcycles; 62.2% of
cameras and video-cameras; 55.7% of microphones and amplifiers; 37.9% of
peripheral electronic equipment and 31.7% of tankers etc.. It is interesting
that during the same period a number of smaller countries achieved
significant levels of long-term exports. For example Sweden accounted for
41.7% of the world export of paper and boxes; 17.2% of centrifuges; 15.5% of
sulphate cellulose. The Swiss accounted for 45.1% of textile looms; 34% of
wrist watches; 25.3% of synthetic dies and 20.6% of
herbicides.[57]
Another criterion is the state of the available natural resources in a
given country and whether they can exert influence on the power and strength
of countries and their role in the world economy. The freer the exchange of
goods, services and labour the more open countries become to each other. In
this case the power of countries will be determined by their total national
wealth based not only the existing manufacturing facilities but also on the
available natural resources. On the basis of this logic, in September 1995
the World Bank published an analysis of the ecologically sustainable
development and the natural resources of the countries of the world.
Accordance to their classification of the available national wealth per head
of population (table 9) Australia came out in first place followed by
Canada, Luxembourg, Switzerland and Japan.
The USA was quite far down the list in 12th place and Germany in 15th.
Other countries with enormous reserves of natural resources such as Russia,
Brazil, Argentina and others are outside the classification due to their low
levels of existing production facilities and human resources. The
methodology of the World Bank is flawless: resources are of benefit when
there is an adequate material base and human resources. On the other hand,
those countries who do not have such resources will have to pay for them and
to compensate for the inequity with more labour and technology.
Table 9
Classification of the 15 leading countries on the basis of national
wealth
per head of population.
State
Wealth per head of population
Sources of national wealth %
population
capital assets
natural resources
Australia
Canada
Luxemburg
Switzerland
Japan
Sweden
Iceland
Qatar
UAE
Denmark
Norway
USA
France
Kuwait
Germany
835
704
658
647
565
496
486
473
471
463
424
421
413
405
399
21
22
83
78
81
56
23
51
65
76
48
59
77
62
79
7
9
12
19
18
16
16
11
14
17
22
16
17
9
17
71
69
4
3
2
29
61
39
21
7
30
25
7
29
4
Source: World Bank, 1985
These figures show the constant increase in the number of countries
with an established position in the global division of labour. There are at
least 30 countries with a high level of economic potential and another 60 or
70 with the potential to join them in the next 30 or 40 years. Most
significantly, in the current situation no one country can impose a monopoly
on another. The USA, Europe and Japan are inter-dependent on each other.
Their mutual dependence is unilateral and is not only between the three
established economic centres. As a result of structural reforms in the world
economy, there is a whole group of countries aspiring to reach the levels of
the top three and as a result of narrow specialisation and resources they
will soon catch up with them.
Is it then true that economic power will move from the USA and Europe
to Japan? A number of academics seem to believe this. I believe that this is
possible but that it will be a short-term and limited trend. The reason is
that the global market is now strongly influenced by significant market
forces which are capable of balancing out the economic levels of the
country. Only with strong protectionism or as a result of political
cataclysm will one country or another be able to reach a situation of
monopoly or privilege. During the entire period of the 20th century only as
a result of political and military conflicts has one or a group of nations
been able to establish such a position of privilege which has transformed it
into a political force.
This time is over. No-one any longer recognises the legality of
protectionism or uses political arguments in the resolution of ordinary
economic issues. The choice is great and the competition offers better
alternatives. Manufacturers and merchants in the whole world are forcing
their governments to remove prohibitions and limitations. There is a number
of cases where the opposite is true, for example the European agricultural
policies and the limitations on import into Japan. However, no-one can be
convinced of the strategic benefit of such policies. The Fourth Civilisation
offers simultaneously the gradual approximation of economic levels and the
creation of similar, equitable conditions for economic activity and the
mutual conditionality of these two processes. The 20th century opened the
way for this process which is irreversible whatever difficulties the
transition might bring.
Despite the influence of Japanese commercial, manufacturing and
investment expansion and despite the fact that in the 1970's and 1980's
Japan was the most dynamic economic force in the world, I believe it will
not be remain single most powerful leader of the world economy. The economic
dynamics of South Eastern Asia will continue but this will give rise to a
reverse wave of investments to other regions and countries. It is true that
in the last 15 years the USA has lost a part of its share of the world
market and Japan has increased its market share by 15%. The American share
of the heavy machinery market has fallen from 25% to 5% in 30 years while
Japan has increased its share from 0% to 22%[58]. However, even
this cannot convince me that this process will continue to develop
unilaterally and that the Japanese economy will dominate while the American
economy will flounder as this was once predicted by the former director of
the European Bank, Jacques Atalie.
I am writing these lines early in the morning in perhaps one of the
least American and the most Japanese of the United States of the America. I
can see through my window the waking lights of the beautiful capital city
and perhaps one of the most beautiful places in the world. My first
impression is that the atmosphere is mainly Asian and in particular
Japanese. Only the liberal spirit of the USA could allow for the mass
concentration of Japanese, Chinese, Korean and Vietnamese influences in a
single, albeit island, state. It is here that I can understand the arguments
in favour of another type of thinking, that the majority of the older Asian
immigrants as well as the new arrivals consider themselves to be Americans
or at least citizens of the world and that Honolulu has become a bridge
between the USA and Japan and that it is such bridges which create a
balanced market.
Japan and the smaller Asian "dragons" cannot become the masters of the
world. However, they have indisputably destroyed the economic, technological
and financial monopoly of the Atlantic countries of the USA and Europe. They
have created conditions for a completely new distribution of world
manufacturing production and hitherto unknown geo-economic structures. In
the 19th century Britain and France and eventually Germany dominated the
world. During the first half of the 20th century the USA and the USSR caught
up and eventually became the world leaders in a bi-polar world. Between 1960
and 1990 Japan indisputably became a member of the family of the world
economic leaders and this list will continue to grow. There are at least
another 5 or 6 countries in the next 20--30 years which will win significant
economic positions and will find their niches in the world market, balanced
between the old leaders. At the end of the 20th century and clearly at the
beginning of the 21st century the stimulus will continue to come from Asia
-- not only from Japan but also from China where the growth rate at the
beginning of the 1980's deserves admiration, from Australia whose resources
and its "bridge" policies between the USA, Asia and Oceania have given it
tremendous advantages and from Indonesia and the Philippines which are also
making strong progress.
There are good grounds to expect that at the beginning of the 21st
century the more powerful Latin American economies will also begin to move
ahead beginning no doubt with Brazil. If they achieve political stability
and a balanced process of denationalisation then a number of Eastern
European economies will also begin to make progress. Russia with its
colossal, untapped resources will also begin to play a serious role.
I am leading to a statement of my opinion that further economic growth
will of necessity require the removal of economic monopolism. Despite the
ambitions of dictators, selfish politicians and militant ideologues the
globalisation of the world has not lead to the economic domination of one or
two countries or individual governments. At the end of the 20th century
there is also another clear growing trend which will be predominant in the
New Civilisation. I could call this "economic polycentrism" or in other
words, the trend towards the re-distribution of economic power and strength
between a larger number of countries with the gradual involvement of new
ones. It should not be considered that such a trend towards economic
polycentrism will summon in a "glorious future". There is not a single
country (or group of countries) which can independently control global
finance, natural resources or the markets. There is no one country which is
in a condition to force the others to follow it. Directly after the fall of
the Berlin Wall the theory of the "responsibility of the single super power"
become popular. Some people in the USA between 1991--1994 developed this
idea, combined it with the American dream and tried to establish a complete
doctrine on this basis. Fortunately, the majority of American politicians
and the majority of American intellectual elite have realised that this
concept is unreal and have rejected it. During my many meeting with American
politicians and diplomats in the State Department of the USA between
1995--1996 I became growingly aware of the rejection of this idea but also
of the impossibility of this task from the point of view of finances and
resources. The experience of the USSR and the USA during the last 50 years
has shown categorically that to take on the role of a world super power to
defened the sovereignty of the remaining states means to take on an
unsupportable financial burden. The collapse of the USSR and the growing gap
between the USA and Japan are to a large extent due to the burden of
military expenditure.
Polycentrism is at the root of world economic development and at the
root of democracy. It is a counter-trend to the experiences of imperialism
which has dominated world politics for the last 150 years.
4. IS THERE A NEED FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC REGULATION?
If the global economic world is becoming more polycentric is there not
a danger of permanent chaos? Is global economic regulation a way to avoid
it...?
T
he new civilisation which humanity is entering is the antipathy to
imperialism. Instead of the super powers and the great powers of the Third
Civilisation the main trends of the Fourth Civilisation are polycentrism and
the possibility for an increased number of countries and people to
participate fully in the international division of labour. The mutual
dependency of the countries and state leaders make this process sustainable.
To this we should add one more element which was discussed in chapters five
and six, the transfer of a significant portion of the economic power of the
nation state to corporations, companies and individuals or, in other words,
organisations and the civil society. The combination of these two processes
has lead to great changes in global economic structures but has also posed a
number of new questions of principle about world development in general.
During the past four or five hundred years everything seemed to be clear:
all dependended on the state and their monarchs or leaders, later
governments and parliaments. Today things have altered significantly. The
multi-national corporations control the major processes of the global world
and more and more people including political leaders realise that this is
the case. The lack of correspondence between globalisation and the
nationally organised activities of governments could lead the world into
serious new crises as was discussed in chapter three.
If politicians are aware that they are losing their grip over power and
realise that they cannot guarantee their election promises to their
electors, what should they do? The most logical solution would be for the
large international companies to assume national responsibility for all
their activities and to be put under some sort of legal control. This should
also extend to the investments of large sums of money abroad. Such
experiments have been made and will continue to be made. The results are
usually disastrous since they lead to the "closure" of the national economy
depriving it of any possibility to rationalise its manufacturing industry.
If any particular government or parliament imposes limitations upon
companies which are acting within their jurisdiction, then they will simply
leave the country and will find other more accommodating partners and
patrons. Experiments to impose limits on the movement of capital or to
impose direct influence on the management of corporations in modern
conditions is doomed to failure. Such methods are within the arsenal of the
outgoing civilisation.
So there remains another possibility, the creation of an adequate
system of global economic regulation. The aim of this new system is to form
common economic conditions and regulations for the activities of all
economic subjects operating within the global market. I am convinced that
sooner or later such a system of global regulation will become a reality.
History cannot be halted. It is not possible to turn back the trans-national
corporations upon which so much of modern progress relies, nor is it
possible to delay the progress of globalisation which is stimulated by them.
Progress means the establishment of a new world economic order based on
the common global rules of the game. Years perhaps even decades will pass
before such an order is established but even today the need for it is
evident. This is the only guarantee against the threat of a return to
imperialism, the widening of the gap between the poor and the wealthy
nations. One must be aware of two possible misconceptions, firstly, that
there is a need for the creation of a united world government and secondly,
that the role could be fulfilled by the United Nations. Undoubtedly, the
generations which will live through the second half of the 21st century or
later will find some solution to the matter of a world government. Today,
however, this is still a Utopia and not only because it will be derided by
the vast majority of politicians but because nation states have not
exhausted their functions. For this and many other reasons the UN cannot
take on the responsibility of global governmental functions.
Globalisation which is being propelled by the multi-national
corporations and new technology presupposes the gradual development, above
all, of a new world economic order. The quicker this takes place, the sooner
humanity will enter a new, more mature stage of its development.
When after the Second World War the Brenton Woods system was
established, governments bore the complete responsibility for the management
and movement of monetary flow. The medium and long term transfers of capital
were managed by national governments and the international finance and
currency organisations. In these conditions fixed exchange rates played an
important role as a stabilising factor and the International Monetary Fund
complemented the role of the central banks as a reserve fund. This system
functioned for three decades.
The main reason for the end of the Brenton Woods system was that as a
result of the turbulent development of world trade, the majority of
international liquid funds overflowed beyond the limits of the nation
states. This mass of funds increased by such a huge amount that the volume
of international currency speculation began to overtake the volume of trade
in goods. In such a situation the world stock exchanges became a
significantly more influential factor than fixed exchange rates. With the
transition to floating exchange rates the world entered an intermediate
state. The abilities of the national governments to "manage" their economies
independently became significantly hampered. This was a state of "paradise"
for the trans-national corporations and world financial players. The world
has lived with this system now for more than twenty years. I can now
categorically say that this system based on floating exchange rates,
enormous levels of currency speculation and the uncontrollable growth in
government borrowing can last no longer. We are sitting on top of a powder
keg as a result of the huge mass of money which is outside the control of
financial institutions. This system has created privileges for corporations
which possess large amounts of free money and those who exploit the
instability of the system to multiply their billions.
As an antidote to the present international practice of "liberalism" I
propose the logic of balanced development. This requires the creation of a
set of common rules for the movement of monetary flow, compulsory reserves
in the case of investments, stronger controls of "off-shore" zones and the
environmental responsibilities of investors etc.. Such measures will lead to
a reduction in interest rates which in turn will be of benefit to the weaker
nations and will lead to a re-direction of investments into the real sector
of the world economy. I do not know whether there will be enough willingness
or readiness on the part of governments and central banks of the largest
countries to carry out a common global macro-economic policy on the basis of
general agreements and long-term accords. The problems could be resolved by
the financial and governmental leaders of 7--10 countries and given the
current state of the world, the rest would follow.
The other possible solution would be to create a real World Bank which
would guarantee universal conditions for the exchange of currency and a
single global macro-economic policy. Such an idea, if it was supported by a
number of financial experts would have a revolutionary, radical character
and might be able to put a stop to instability. I am not convinced, however,
that at this stage the national governments and the central banks would
agree to such a step, although I, personally, am strongly in favour. The
majority of world financial strategists still hope that the Federal Reserve
System of the USA[59] and the central banks of Germany, Japan and
a number of other countries will be in a position to control the world
currency markets. During the past twenty years this has, more or less, been
the case. When the world financial markets begin to "hit below the belt" the
central banks of the major countries coordinate their activities to
intervene.
There is sufficient evidence to show that this practice is ineffective.
One only has to look back to the collapse of the US dollar against the yen
in 1995. This was a clear enough sign that the restoration of balance is
becoming more and more difficult and the powers of the central banks more
and more inadequate. This process is inseparable from the universal logic of
the collapse of the institutions of the Third Civilisation. First of all,
liberal international economic relations in the last couple of decades have
caused the increase in the strength of the "free" players on the world
financial markets and made their structures infinitely more complicated.
Secondly, the polycentralism of the world economy has brought many more
national currencies into the "turnover" of the world stock exchanges.
Despite the interest of many countries the dollar will no longer be able to
play the role of an international currency.
Consequently, there is little likelihood that the current system will
survive. It will be necessary to begin negotiations on the creation of a new
system of global economic regulation or to develop an entirely new World
Bank with similar regulatory functions. I believe that there will be more
and more support for the issuing of a currency which will be subject to
multi-lateral control and which could be based on the special issuing rights
of the International Monetary Fund or other forms of securities which could
be issued by a new World Bank.
The system of global economic regulation is an inevitable new feature
of the Fourth Civilisation. We shall gradually have to become used to the
idea of accepting universal standards of economic and human activities and
the formation of international courts which will resolve any conflicts which
may arise. These will be above all a series of environmental standards about
which the people of the world are particulary sensitive at the moment.
However, at the same time there will have to be new standards for the
payment of labour, social security and arbitration etc.. It is a shameful
fact that many of the trans-national corporations have moved their
production facilities to less developed nations to avoid pressure in other
countries. Recently a large number of workers in Ecuador appealed to an
American court to request compensation for being poisoned by pesticides
while working for an American company. It is not clear whether the American
court will be able to pass judgement on matters pertaining to foreigners
outside their jurisdiction. However, it is clear that the absence of
acceptable international standards and an adequate international court
system is a precondition for inequality amongst nations. What it cannot do
in the USA, an American registered company may do in Ecuador. There are
innumerable examples of such practice in our modern world of inequality.
One of the main aims of the system of global economic regulation will
be the increase of global savings with a view to the increase in the level
of investments on a world scale. The needs for investments in Asia, Eastern
Europe and Latin America are constantly on the increase. As a result of the
opening-up of the world and after the fall of the Berlin Wall the need for
investments will continue to rise until the end of the 20th century and the
beginning of the 21st. If the levels of savings reduce as they did in the
1980's, this will create extremely serious problems and will hold back world
development.
In general terms the system of global economic regulation is the
mechanism which will limit and will, eventually, put a stop to the processes
of the chaotic development of the world economy. This would provide a
stimulus to the development of many countries creating the opportunity for
the gradual balancing of the economic levels of the countries of the world
assisting in the formation of universal world criteria for economic growth.
Sooner or later this system will become reality. The problem is for people
to become aware of its necessity sooner rather than later.
5. VIVAT EUROPA AND THE DEATH OF THE INTROVERTS
One of the possible scenarios for the future is the division of the
world into regional blocs. Is there a risk that the integration of Europe
and the aspirations of the Europeans to create a common home will lead to
the new division of the world or will globalisation turn the regionally
integrated blocs into marginal powers...?
T
he establishment of the global institutions of the Fourth Civilisation
will take place from the bottom up through a gradual process of the transfer
of the rights of the national governments, legislative and judicial
institutions to international organisations. The best example in the history
of humanity is the unification of Europe: from customs unions, the free
movement of people, capital and knowledge, the creation of a European
parliament, government and court to the decisions to create a common
European monetary union (EMU) and the single currency (EURO). Over a period
of 30 years the builders of the European Union have not only established the
Common Market on the basis of tremendous dedication and created the
foundations for universal citizenship but also created a common feeling of
belonging for all the citizens of the member countries. In answer to the
opinion poll carried out by the "Eurobarometer" in July 1994 "Are you
frightened of or do you believe in the European Market?", 53% believed
strongly or relatively strongly, 35% were afraid or relatively afraid and
12% had no opinion. I mention these statistics here because I want to prove
the most unbelievable fact that only fifty years after the most destructive
war in Europe, former enemies have realised that the borders between them
are of little significance and that the road to progress is not through war
and disputes but via a single market.
There is no need to dwell on the details of European integration. There
are literally hundreds of books written on the subject which say practically
all there is to say. For the needs of my study, the European experience of
integration has a different meaning. If the advocates of integration in
Europe succeed (and they almost have) this will have an exceedingly positive
effect on global processes. The European Union has proved in practice that
the processes of integration are stronger than national prejudices. It is no
accident that the European continent which during the 20th century has
suffered more than any other region of the world has managed to overcome its
divisions and the selfishness of its national interests. Europe has learnt
from its suffering and torment. More than 60 million Europeans died in world
and civil wars in the 20th century alone.
The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the unification of the two halves
of the divided Europe was of particular significance for the pan-European
processes. It posed the question of whether the model of European
integration can be applied in other parts of the world. Would this example
be followed in North and Latin America or Asia? Are the European Union,
NAFTA and the far-Eastern processes of integration comparable? Would the
regional processes of integration push globalisation to one side?
One of the possible scenarios for the future is the division of the
world into regional trade blocs. The European market and currency union, the
North American Free Trade Agreement (a new version based on the old 1960
agreement), The Caribbean Common Market and a new far-Eastern zone for free
trade are trading blocs which could become a basis for conflict. There are a
number of writers, L.Thorou, for example who believe that the 21st century
will be a time of regional trade blocs and their selfish domination of the
world.
There are a number of political concepts based on this. The USA will
distance itself from Europe. Europe will strengthen its borders with the
East to isolate Russia. Military security will coincide with the borders of
the integrated regions etc.. Such ideas are logical only if the intellectual
horizons of the advocates are no further than the ends of their noses.
Regional isolation within the limits of whatever integrated bloc is an
extremely dangerous prospect. It will lead to a chain reaction within the
whole world and the creation of similarly isolated regions within American
and Asia. While there is little likelihood of this taking place within the
new Asian dragons, or the newly confident Latin American economies or
Australia, this prospect does not look too improbable for Europe. The
European syndrome of "protecting one's achievements" and "strengthening of
one's borders" in order not "to let chaos take over" is still alive and in
real danger of being provoked.
Of all the autonomous economic regions in the world at the moment
Europe is one of the most closed. Its internal exchange of trade is
extremely high it providing between 60 and 80% of the imports into the
larger countries of the Union. While as the European economy is strongly
dependent on Asian markets, its investments in Asia have reduced in
comparison to American levels. Europe cannot profit from this "integrational
introversion". It profits from its own integration but is losing as a result
of its introversion and from the lack of sufficient aggression in relation
to other markets. This is further stimulated by the fact that the share of
national ownership in Europe is significantly higher than in other parts of
the world.
At the end of 1995 there was a meeting in Spain of the leading European
industrialists. I was able to talk to one of the major European
industrialists after the conference, the president of the Swiss company ABB,
David de Puri. The European industrialists understand the simple truth that
"openness is at the root of success". They are in favour of the "more rapid
integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe into the common
European market" and also that it is up to the "Europeans to re-discover the
open world economy". I quote the opinion of David de Puri not only out of
respect for his undisputed talent as a global leader but also because of the
significance of his views in general. Each regional integration, including
European integration will be successful if it takes into account the laws of
globalisation and if it finds its place within the open global world. There
is no doubt that if the European Union becomes transformed into a more or
less closed community, if it becomes a closed bureaucratic multi-national
state, this will reduce its prospects. As a Bulgarian politician I am firmly
in favour of the acceptance of Bulgaria as a member of the European Union
and I believe Bulgaria to be part of the European cultural tradition.
However, I am not blind. Europe is the richest part of the world, with the
vast majority of historical and cultural archaeological sites and monuments.
However, it is only one part of the world. In the same way as I cannot
accept the term Americanisation, Westernisation or Japanisation, I cannot
accept the term Europeanisation. I would like to be able to shout out, "Long
Live Europe", "The end of European isolation", "The end of European
introversion" -- "Yes, to the open world!"
This brings me to my main conclusion. The regionalisation of the world
is possible and a probably inevitable stage in world integration, of the
transfer of the authority of the nation states to the supra-national
economic and political institutions. Regional integration is typical of the
transition between the Third and the Fourth Civilisation. It was typical of
almost the whole of the 20th century during which alliances between states
began to take on more long term features. After the Second World War they
took on an economic character. On the eve the new century, however, the
regional processes of integration will become more and more subordinate to
global processes. The globalisation of financial, raw material and
information markets will not permit anyone, including the champions of
integration from Europe to close themselves up from everyone else. This will
just be ineffective and of no benefit to anyone.
The Fourth Civilisation will accept the regionally integrated
formations as a intermediate stage in the framework of the polycentric
organisation of the world economic order. For a certain period of time they
will make up for the absence of global economic regulations without being
able to replace it completely. Thus, step by step, stage by stage the
structures and the institutions of the new human civilisation will be
formed.
6. THE BALANCING OF ECONOMIC LEVELS
The balancing of economic levels of countries is also as important as
their opening-up to the world. Each of these processes is impossible without
the other.
G
lobalisation and regionalisation, economic polycentralism and the
openness of countries, trans-national corporations and global economic
regulation, the new global communications and the reduction of the role of
the nation states, the deregulation and socialisation of ownership -- these
features best describe the economic essence of the Fourth Civilisation. This
could also be called global reconstruction or a new economic order or a
number of other titles. Countries are opening up to each other but this
inevitably requires the balancing of economic levels of development. Each of
these categories is impossible without the other at least at the end of the
twentieth century.
Today there are 1 billion rich people in the world, 2 billion people
with medium income and 3 billion poor people. It may be madness to speak of
the balancing of economic levels in such conditions. However, if there is to
be a new economic order based on the criteria of the New Civilisation this
is not impossible. To ignore the problems of poverty and the widening gap
between the poor and the rich countries is not only amoral but ineffective.
If the world continues to be divided into rich metropolises and a poor
periphery this will lead to further isolation. Sooner or later this will
give rise to further serious conflicts and new utopias and a new return to
totalitarian doctrines. Rich countries will not benefit from this.
Rich people do not like to live next door to poor families since they
feel that this will affect them. In the same way in the global village the
rich countries will be faced with more and more problems from the poorer
countries. Earlier in the book I wrote about the problems of realisation of
poverty by the poor and their possible reactions. Now I am writing about the
slow but inevitable process of realisation of poverty on the part of the
rich.
The balancing out of economic levels of countries and nations will be a
slow and drawn-out process. It is a general consequence, a common result of
all the structural and institutional changes which will accompany the advent
of the Fourth Civilisation. The huge level of imbalanced development between
the countries and nations is caused by the disintegrational processes of
isolated development of nations during the past three civilisations.
Different tribes and later national communities developed in the context of
completely new climatic conditions, resources and socio-political context.
It is entirely logical that certain nations should develop further than
others. First of all the Shumerians and the Egyptians, then the Greeks and
the Romans followed by the Chinese and the Indians. By the 15th century
there was already a clear trend towards European domination over the other
countries of the world. It is only now at the end of the 20th century that
this domination could be said to be coming to an end.
What are the differences in the development of the individual countries
of the world now in the 20th century? If we take as our basis the GDP per
head of population we can divide the countries of the world into three
groups, the rich with a GDP per head of population of more then 10,000 USD,
the medium-rich with a GDP of 2-10,000 and the poor with a GDP of less than
2000 USD.
Table 10
Gross Domestic Product per head of population (US
Dollars)[60].
Wealthy countries
Medium wealthy
Poor countries
Switzerland
Luxemburg
Japan
Bermuda
Sweden
Finland
Norway
Denmatk
USA
Iceland
Canada
Germany
France
Austria
UAE
Belgium
Italy
Holland
U.K.
Australia
Brunei
Qatar
Hong Kong
Singapore
Spain
New Zealand
Israel
Bahamas
Ireland
33,515
30,950
26,919
26,600
25,487
24,396
24,151
23,676
22,560
22,362
21,254
21,248
20,603
20,379
20,131
19,295
18,576
18,565
16,748
16,595
16,554
15,484
13,192
12,869
12,461
12,136
12,092
11,708
10,789
Cyprus
Taiwan
Kuwait
Dutch Antibbes
Saudi Arabia
Malta
Bahrain
Barbados
Greece
South Korea
Puerto Rico
Lybia
Portugal
Macao
Estonia
Gabon
Trinidad
Surinam
Latvia
Russia
Belorus
Fm. Yugoslavia
Brasil
Mexico
Uruguay
Argentina
Czech Republic
Lithuania
Hungary
Cuba
Venezuela
Botswana
Malaysia
South Africa
Kazakhstan
Mauritius
Ukraine
Iran
Moldova
Chile
8,641
8,546
8,520
7,300
7,300
7,217
7,075
6,581
6,498
6,356
6,338
5,842
5,626
5,417
3,829
3,777
3,620
3,585
3,418
3,220
3,111
2,956
2,921
2,874
2,860
2,794
2,714
2,711
2,690
2,620
2,614
2,585
2,503
2,474
2,467
2,429
2,336
2,205
2,176
2,163
Ruanda
Vietnam
Malawi
Laos
Burundi
Bangladesh
Madagascar
Zaire
Chad
Cambogja
Afganistan
Nepal
Buthan
Uganda
Ethiopia
Somalia
Tanzania
Mozambique
Sierra Leone
261
227
227
226
216
216
213
213
211
208
199
195
178
177
164
116
100
86
72
All the countries of the first group are inseparably linked to the
world economy. They have open economies and a relatively stable position
within the international distribution of labour. One part of the second
group has the potential of catching up with the first if they are permitted
to participate in the integrational processes and are provided with
sufficient investments. Greece, Portugal, Mexico, China, South Korea,
Hungary and the Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia,
Brazil, Venezuela, Thailand, Malaysia, The Republic of South Africa and even
Kazakhstan have sufficient potential to make serious advances. Table 10
shows a third group of countries whose position is practically hopeless and
whose manufacturing structures are hundreds of years behind that of the most
developed countries.
Of course, the GDP criterion is not exhaustive. It only shows the
actual productivity of the world population. Many countries in the second
group will face problems due to the high costs of servicing their foreign
debts, especially when compared with GNP. Table 11 shows this ratio for 40
countries whose manufacturing industry is not in a position to pay the
rapidly accumulating foreign debts. 15 of them are medium-developed
countries including Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Malta, South Korea and
others. Of course, the foreign debt problem will hamper attempts to reach
the necessary level of economic development.
The paradox of the transition to the Fourth Civilisation is that one
group of countries is already within its embraces, another is standing at
the threshold while a third group is still living within the conditions of
the pre-industrial era. The majority of the population of Tanzania, Kenya,
Mozambique, Nigeria and other countries still live in huts. Large numbers of
children in Somalia, Ethiopia, Ruanda and Congo are dying of starvation.
Given such a situation, are we right to pose the question of the balancing
of economic development? I believe that we are right and that this is the
only way for the New Civilisation to establish itself.
Table 11
Foreign Debt as a percentage of Gross National Product[61]
Syria
Bolivia
Uganda
Oman
Costa Rica
Bangladesh
Pakistan
Bulgaria
Tanzania
Cyprus
Mozambique
Ghana
El Salvador
Kenya
South Korea
Papua New Guineau
Tunisia
Poland
Lebanon
Malta
728,4
426,0
283,4
262,6
250,8
225,3
222,6
221,7
214,7
181,7
167,5
155,9
148,3
142,4
130,2
129,9
118,1
114,5
113,8
109,8
Mauritius
Hungary
Ethiopia
Zaire
Barbados
Zimbabwe
Panama
Sri Lanka
Dominican Rep.
Togo
Gabon
Benine
Jordan
Egypt
Nepal
Nigeria
Uruguay
Laos
Cameroon
Lesotho
109,2
108,8
104,9
95,4
94,8
89,6
88,1
88,1
85,3
85,0
84,6
82,3
81,0
80,0
79,0
77,0
73,6
72,9
72,6
71,5
If the existing world structures and the liberal structures of the
world economy are preserved, the gap between the most develop and the least
developed countries will continue to increase. Only in the last 30 years
this gap measured on the basis GDP per head of population has doubled. If
these policies continue in the future there will be no significant change.
It is true that the economic development of China and the smaller Asian
"dragons" and the expected revival in the economies of Latin America to a
certain extent will fill this vacuum. However, this is not the case for many
countries in Africa or for another fifty or so poorly developed states where
there is little hope .
The pure market approach will not guarantee balanced development for
another reason. 8-10 of the first group of the most developed countries will
for some time to come continue to "rule the world" and to aspire to the role
of an independent economic regulator. I am not saying that the global market
will not impose limits on this trend but the intense competition for
investments in the developed countries will give the poorer countries a
chance and will force investors to take risks. However, this will not be
sufficient. I believe that the decisive factor will the combination of
market trends with global regulation which will stimulate a significant
increase in investments from the wealthier to the poorer nations. Of course,
each of them will have to take additional responsibility for the
establishment of stability, order and the fight against corruption and
crime. For the moment things have been left to the interest of the
multinational groups. With certain notable exceptions this has not
stimulated the improvements to infrastructure in the poorly-developed
countries which they need for further economic development.
The problem of world poverty and in a broader context -- the balancing
out of economic levels will be resolved at a global level. This will be
accomplished by the United Nations, the IMF or the World Bank but above all,
by changes in the world economic order and the creation of institutions of
global economic regulation. Certain statesmen, including the late President
of France, Francois Mitterand, believed in the need for a comprehensive
agreement between the North and the South, between the rich and the poor
states. This was a good if not realistic idea. I believe that it would be
much more effective to develop specific economic programmes for individual
countries aimed at the stimulation and guaranteeing of private investments
via specialised funds and the integration of the poor states in the world
economy. Only about 2% of the global military budget would be sufficient to
carry out such programmes, or about 10-12 billion US dollars. This would
give a powerful impetus to the process of resolving the problems of hunger
and illness, the reduction in the birth rate and the creation of more
sustainable forms of income for specific populations.
The balanced development of the world requires a change in direction
from charity and hand-outs to policies aimed at changing the economic
infrastructure of the least developed nations in the world. It is true that
this will not at all be easy and that the reduction of military budgets does
not mean the sudden release of huge funds for investments. In many cases
these funds will "sink" out of sight as a result of corruption, the lack of
organisation and the desperation of the hungry. However, these are
inevitable difficulties which should not stop the process.
If humanity and especially the wealthiest nations do not take serious
steps to change the trends in the development of the poorest nations, this
will lead to the appearance of new utopias, open the way to religious
fanaticism and confrontation and incite new local, regional and even world
wars. If humanity finds the strength within itself to begin the processes of
resolving this matter this will lead to a change in the face of the earth.
New opportunities will be opened up not only to the people of the poor
countries but to all. What seems impossible and too expensive as an approach
to the struggle against poverty in actual fact will save money in the long
run because future generations will not have to pay the bill. Such are the
laws of the mutually dependent global world.
Chapter Nine
THE CULTURE OF THE FOURTH CIVILISATION
1. THE BEATLES, MICHAEL JACKSON AND
THE BULGARIAN CAVAL
Some of the strongest driving forces of the Fourth Civilisation are the
new global communications. They permit not only the simultaneous
distribution of information products all over the world but also promote
cultural images and standards, universal models and styles. With every
passing day the world is being taken over by a new universal culture.
W
hen I heard the Beatles for the first time in 1966 I was 12 years old.
This was in Sofia at a time when television, radio and the newspapers
divided the world into the "good" (socialism) and the "bad" (capitalism) in
the most terrible and primitive manner. The Beatles came into our small,
closed country via the radio. I remember that first of all, one or two of my
classmates and then almost everyone began to swap information about them --
who they were, where they came from and we began to learn off by heart the
titles and the melodies of their songs. The popularity of the Beatles began
to worry some of those responsible for education in Bulgaria I remember one
day our teacher saying to us, "Even if we like their music, the way in which
they dress and their behaviour is unacceptable".
This fact alone demonstrates that the Beatles were much more than just
music and that they were much more than just another pop-group. From their
appearance in Liverpool and their first concerts in Scotland in 1963,
Germany and Britain the Beatles transformed their music into a world
cultural and social phenomenon. The entire youth of the 1960's and 1970's
took John Lennon, Paul Macartney, George Harrison and Ringo Star to their
hearts.
In 1964 and 1956 the Beatles conquered Europe, North American,
Australia and New Zealand. In 1966, much to surprise of the sceptics, they
took Japan and the Philippines by storm. Their concerts in Tokyo and at the
national stadium in Manilla were no less successful than their concerts in
Europe and America. The sensation was undisputed. It was a new global
phenomenon for which there were no borders or, perhaps, which destroyed the
existing cultural barriers and prejudices. Beatles' records went all around
the world and their songs were sung in Africa, Asia and in Latin America.
The Beatles were a phenomenon of special cultural value. For the first
time a pop-group had achieved such universal global fame. This is, however,
not to underestimate other such famous performers such as Elvis Presley or
Edith Piaf or Caruso. Although each of them was a part of the cultural
treasury of the 20th century, the Beatles phenomenon was an expression of
and the beginning of something entirely new.
The undoubted reason for their success was the talent of the musicians
from Liverpool. However, if they had been born 30 years earlier with even
greater talent they would have not achieved such colossal success. The
Beatles appeared at the moment when the electronic media had just begun a
global revolution. This was not only a matter of electric guitars but the
new means of information transfer and the speed and methods of disseminating
new cultural images. The Beatles were the first swallows of the new era and
heralds of our current civilisation. The process of the globalisation of
world culture began with the Beatles. New musical styles began to appear
within a given country, in a particular town or bar but as a result of the
electronic media they became international and lose their local and national
significance.
The language of music is a language equally understandable in all the
corners of the world. It was logical to expect music to be the main and most
natural channel for the dissemination of universal cultural symbols and
images and that music would be the starting point for the process of
globalisation of culture.
Moreover, together with the dissemination of cultural images created
within one individual state the 1960's were also a time of the intensive
intermixing of cultural styles and the search for points of intersection
between formerly autonomous national and cultural traditions. The Beatles
looked to the cultures of India and Japan for some of their motifs. In the
1970's many African and Latin American musicians gained significant
popularity.
Generally speaking, in culture as in economics there were two types of
phenomena which could no longer be defined as purely national either in
terms of their significance nor in terms of their specific legacy of
cultural traditions. Some symbols appeared in a local context and then
gained global recognition. Other appeared as a result of cultural
intermixing and the creation of cultural models and styles which organically
combined or synthesised individual national cultures.
What national and cultural style is expressed today by the music of
Michael Jackson? The Anglo-Saxon cultural tradition? Hardly. The culture of
black America? Yes, to a certain extent. As he grew more independent and
more creative, his music became more primal separated from local concepts
and traditional criteria of beauty and aesthetics. Michael Jackson's style
and his songs have been influenced by a number of cultures. However, his
primal attraction and personal musical energy are products of a time which
does not recognise national borders and which forms global cultural and
aesthetic standards of beauty and values.
In previous centuries cultural influences were imposed mainly by
coercion and they tended to effect only individual parts of the world. Today
modern global communications and the global media do not only disseminate
the best manifestations of global culture but also require the creative
artists to observe the new cultural criteria and requirements of the new
world art. Anyone who wishes to achieve world fame must be allowed access to
the hearts and souls of people in the different parts of the world. The
Beatles and Michael Jackson, Madonna and Queen as well as many other
musicians have created works of music and artistic influences which owe
their success to a hitherto unknown musical style and to the unique
combination of dynamism and expressivity which knows no national boundaries.
There have been similar phenomena in the other art forms. Television
and video, and advertising have begun to penetrate the whole of world
culture. First of all they penetrate a local culture and then in conjunction
with other less culturally specific products form a part of global culture.
I recently listened to an interview given by the world famous designer
Lacroix in which he was describing his attempts to combine influences from
different cultures, "Intermixing -- this is the essence of things". This is
the essence of the new and it is a logical consequence of the opening-up of
the world and the influence of global communications. The intermixing of
cultural traditions is an expression of the same synthesis which is now
apparent in global economics.
It was his death from AIDS which elevated Freddy Mercury to a status
perhaps greater than he was in life. However, Queen's music was not purely
English or European but a more universal music of the future world as an
integrated community. Who does the music of Jean Michel Jarre belong to? It
has nothing in common with the powerful tradition of the chanson. The music
of Jean Michel Jarre is a product of the electronic society not only in
terms of technology but in terms of its historical significance and the
beginning of the new age. The main result of this process is the formation
of a universal spiritual and cultural content of the world. This is above
all manifested in the appearance of a growing number of cultural products
which have no national borders and limits. Music was the first of these but
now similar processes are taking place in the cinema, fashion and art
resulting in the appearance of millions of new bonds between the people of
the whole world.
I live in a country with rich and ancient cultural traditions. I am
saddened by the destruction of traditional culture which has been taking
place since 1992. However, I am encouraged by certain new and important
phenomena -- the combination of the global culture with national traditions
on the one hand and the adaptation of national traditions to global trends.
Few people would recognise the Bulgarian folk instrument, the Caval. There
are similar looking wind instruments in other countries of the world, but
the Bulgarian Caval in terms of its construction and sound is unique.
Theodosi Spasov has used it to win many significant international awards and
has conquered the hearts of many people. His performances have little in
common with the traditions of the Bulgarian Caval. His improvisations are
filled with the spirit of the new and his compositions are a symbol of
modern musical philosophy. For this reason he is understandable anywhere.
There is no chronological distinction between his art and that of the
greatest modern composers.
This is only one example. Many others could be drawn from the various
areas of art. Most significantly even the smallest of world cultures can
produce global culture. All they need to do is to find the link between
their own identity and the universal global cultural processes. Between
1984--1995 the famous Bulgarian folk-singer Stefka Subotinova recorded a
number of Bulgarian folk songs with a modern arrangement which achieved
enormous popularity. Other famous Bulgarian pop singers such as Lili Ivanova
and Georgi Hristov also combine Bulgarian and global cultural elements.
There are similar processes at work all over the world.
The most important conclusion which I draw here is that after the
1960's together with the appearance and the spread of new global
communications and the media there also began a new process of the
globalisation of world culture or in other words, the creation of a culture
with a supra-national character. This culture created global criteria and
values, overcame national, cultural and religious prejudices and is
undoubtedly an element of the coming Fourth Civilisation which the 21st
century will bring us. This culture is creating the future. It is a bridge
to it and a bridge to the unification of new generations from all over the
world.
This new culture became possible as a result of the mass influence and
cultural mixing born by the world media. Satellite television made possible
the removal of borders without tanks and violence without the dissemination
of militant ideology and doctrines. The world is united with new
communication networks -- a process which will clearly continue with growing
intensity into the coming century. This is the greatest guarantee for the
continued globalisation of world culture. A shining example of this is the
creation of television networks which cover the entire globe. It can be
easily predicted that such global television networks will continue to
penetrate all the corners of the earth. Part of them will carry information,
some of them will broadcast art, while other will show sports. However, they
will all be the most powerful integrational factor in the world.
While the collapse of the Eastern European totalitarian systems was a
political revolution, the first part of the collapse of the Third
Civilisation, the new communications will be the material manifestation of
the new age. Microchips, computers and satellite televisions spell death for
bureaucracy, partocracy and the restrictions of human rights. The Beatles,
Freddy Mercury, Jean Michel Jarre and Theodosi Spasov are all directly
linked. They are but different manifestations of one and the same global
phenomenon, the globalisation of art and new cultural dimensions which will
combine the strongest national traditions with a new, hitherto unknown
global culture which will belong to no one single nation.
Will national traditions and cultures disappear? Will cultural
differences not become a reason for the new division of the world? Is not
global culture a covert form of media dictatorship? These questions will be
answered later.
2. THE TRAVELLING PEOPLES
Until only fifty years the majority of people travelled only to the
neighbouring town or village and foreign travel was a privilege of only a
select few. Each subsequent generation bears within itself the spirit of the
global world. Today millions and billions of people travel around the world.
Travel has become a bridge over which the peoples of the world can get to
know one another and exchange their cultures.
T
he globalisation of world culture has lead to a particular form of
cosmopolitanism which has flourished as a result of new technologies and
communication. Cosmopolitanism, however, is not characteristic of all
countries and peoples nor is there any direct link between cosmopolitanism
and the level of technological and economic progress which a given country
has achieved. Switzerland is one of the most advanced countries in the
world. However, they are more conservative than cosmopolitan. They
acknowledge and service the cosmopolitanism of others without accepting it
for themselves. Everything depends from an historical point of view on the
development of a given nation, its openness to the world and at the same
time its ability to preserve its integrity. Many peoples exiled from their
native lands over the centuries have dissolved into foreign ethnic groups or
have been simple either enslaved or annihilated. Therefore the decisive
factors are not only national openness and mobility but also loyalty to one
roots.
Those nations in history which were the first to master new forms of
communication were able to spread their culture to other states. I like to
refer to these nations as the "travelling nations". In this process they
achieved significant historical advantages and became leaders in the
processes of integration. The modern world is now dependent on those
"travelling nations". Joel Kotkin calls them the "global tribes". For Kotkin
these global tribes combine a strong feeling of loyalty to their family
roots, observe the principles of national fidelity and despite being spread
all over the world identify with one specific geographical area. According
to my analyses these global nations are not only a continuation of an
historical tradition but are, above all, a powerful integrating element of
the modern world. In the same way that the ancient Greeks spread their
culture to Scythia and Rome, today the global nations are amongst the most
effective bridges for the dissemination of capital, technology and culture.
Each of these peoples left their native land and later established positions
of strength in dozens of other countries and created an invisible network of
families, relatives or national ties or channels for the dissemination of
economic and cultural values. A typical feature of these "travelling
nations" is their facility to become naturalised successfully in different
countries amongst varying ethnic groups at the same time preserving their
national roots and traditions. There are several reasons for this: the
absence of a homeland state; colonisation of cultivable lands; migration as
a result of wars and natural catastrophes; political, ideological and
religious conflicts. These are the most common reasons which instill the
spirit of the pioneer and traveller.
The Jewish people are a typical example of this. The modern world
economy and world corporations were founded by Jews. Expelled as a result of
persecution and the lack of their own homeland, as early as the 18th century
the Jewish people began their own processes of economic integration. At the
time when everything functioned within narrow national borders, the Jews
exploited the differences between national manufacturing conditions and
today it is no accident that their representatives are amongst the richest
people in the world. The religious prohibition against Christians lending
money with interest allowed them to master the secrets of banking. The lack
of their own state institutions and land made them into the best traders in
the world. Perhaps their greatest strength was the close network of
connections and their efforts to preserve the traditions of the old Jewish
families.
Today the Jews, the oldest travellers, are not alone. One might go so
far as to say that their trans-national monopoly has been taken from them.
There is another group of peoples who are keenly following the achievements
of world communications and are gradually catching up with, and in certain
cases overtaking, the achievements of the Jews. The British, the Armenians,
the Chinese, the Indians and more recently the Americans and Japanese are
gradually becoming global nations or in other words, people who are links in
a complex chain spanning the world with millions and millions of other
links.
Many of these global peoples have specialised themselves in significant
parts of world manufacturing and trade. For example the Jews from generation
to generation have expanded their influence in the entertainment industry,
the world of finance and the diamond trade. The Japanese are the world
leaders in precise engineering, in the production of high powered computers
and computer technology. The Indians are amongst the world leaders in
software, the British in banking and communications, the Americans in
telecommunications, aerospace engineering and the Chinese in textile
manufacture etc..
Perhaps, the most important factor is while preserving their relative
specialisation and making their own contributions to the global cultural
treasury, these travelling nations have helped greatly in the removal of
borders between the nations of the world. Thanks to them the world today is
closely integrated and the intermixing of their cultures has reached
tremendous levels. The global world would be impossible without these
"travelling peoples".
The preservation of national cultural traditions and tolerance to other
cultures has allowed them to become some of the leading architects of the
new world. At the opposite extreme those who are isolated and intolerant to
other cultures have no chance. They will either remain at the tail-end of
world progress or they will incite conflicts which will have serious
consequences for themselves. The totalitarian regimes were typical examples
of this. Totalitarianism can flourish only in isolation. The Russians,
Czechs, Bulgarians and Poles were isolated from progress and the new
technological revolution which embraced the world in the 1960's. Today they
are having to redouble their efforts to make up for lost time.
On the other hand, there is the example of the eternal Jews. They have
occupied key positions in the economic, cultural and political life of
France, Russia, the United States and the Republic of South Africa. Members
of the same families can be found in London, Paris, New York, Capetown and
even Hong Kong. It is these families and clans which have been the major
channels for the explosion in world trade over the past 30--40 years.
Another similar example is that of the Indians who apart from operating
within their own country exert strong influences in London, Los Angeles,
Chicago or Lagos. If you visit Nairobi the capital of Kenya, you will be
amazed to see how many Indians there are in the financial and commercial
sectors. As a result of their powerful navy and great colonial empire in the
19th century, the British have very strong global positions. The influence
of the British financial networks is particulary strong in Sidney,
Singapore, Toronto or San Francisco.
The majority of the travelling nations became established in the 19th
century and the first half of the 20th. They opened the way for the
globalisation of the world. They not only gave birth to this process they
were also its children. Today the "old travellers" are accompanied by new
"travelling nations" who are more dynamic and will perhaps make up for what
they missed out on.
One of the newest travelling nations are the Japanese. They have the
biggest banks in the world, the most progressive world technologies and
their own "settlements" within all the world economic and cultural centres.
I would say that from the 1960's onwards the Japanese have spread all over
the world. Some people consider that this is a planned invasion with a view
to conquering new economic influence and living space. Others say the
opposite, that the Japanese economy is like a balloon which if it is to
avoid bursting needs first to be deflated.
I do not believe that from an historical point of view any one given
nation can dominate the rest and by the same token I do not believe that
international Japanese invasion has reached its apogee. The Chinese and the
Indians will have a hard job to try and take their place. At least until the
beginning of the next century the Japanese global diaspora will continue to
exert a strong influence on the formation and development of the whole
world. The strong Japanese influence on the American economy, their
penetration into European economic structures and their strong overtures to
Latin America and some African countries demonstrate that the Japanese will
continue to be one of the leading travelling nations. Only one example is
sufficient. Each year the Japanese economy invests huge amounts of free
capital into real estate in the USA and Europe. According to some analysts
almost 40% of the property in the centre of Los Angeles in Japanese. The
same can be said of the huge skyscrapers in New York. There are thousands of
Japanese enterprises in the USA some of which occupy leading positions in
technology. One of the most prestigious world resorts, the Hawaiian islands
are owned to a large extent by the Japanese. If you walk along the coastal
boulevard at Waikiki beach you are more likely to hear Japanese than any
other language and you will see that the majority of the marvellous hotels
by the beach are Japanese. What the Japanese were unable to achieve with
their attacks and their bombs against Pearl Harbour they have achieved by
hard work, money and consistency. Today only a few kilometres from the place
where in December 1941 Japanese bombers inflicted their most serious blow
against the American Pacific Fleet there is a chain of luxury Japanese
hotels.
The Japanese have two amazing features. They have a tremendous ability
to adapt and to achieve progress quietly and consistently. Take a look at
the streets of any of the world's large cultural, financial or tourist
centre. Practically everywhere you will see Japanese tourists taking
photographs, taking notes and they are always in little groups. They are
soaking everything up. They will later analyze the information they have
taken away with them and then they will come back, this time with
investments and specific ideas for entering the market, quietly, slowly and
unnoticed.
The other new global travellers who can be seen everywhere are the
Chinese. According to some statistics, the Chinese who live outside the
border of China control the larger part of the hard currency reserves of the
world. There are "Chinatowns" in Los Angeles and San Francisco, Toronto and
New York. They are becoming more and more influential and add their own
colour and new cultural phenomena to the countries in which they live. There
is a growing Chinese influence in Japan and Australia. Clearly the reform
government of China is trying to emulate the experience of Japan to create
conditions for new world domination on the basis of traditional Chinese
domination. If the current rate of Chinese economic growth persists to the
end of the century and the hard currency reserves of the Chinese living
outside China continue to increase then within 10--15 years they will become
the most dynamic "travelling nation" in the global world. With new
simplified procedures, an ethnic economy, strong national links, extreme
hard work and consistency -- these are the characteristics which guarantee
great chances of success for the Chinese. The Indians and the South Koreans
whose economic elite are becoming more and more self-confident will also
direct their attention to a similar global approach. It can be expected that
the Asian economies will not only experience an ardent renaissance but that
their development will have a colossal global effect. The example of South
Korea and a number of smaller Asian states is indicative that it is not
necessarily only the larger peoples which become "travellers" and take on a
global significance. Perhaps their example will be infectious.
The collapse of the bi-polar model and the destruction of the Berlin
Wall gave the Eastern Europeans a chance to discover the advantages of the
open world. Very soon after 1990--1991 the Slavs and in particular the
Russians began to re-settle all over the world. Although it is too early to
make any sort of conclusion, the Russians seem to be turning into one of the
new "travelling nations". The large export of capital (according to the
Russian official figures -- over 40 billion dollars between 1991--1994) and
the creation of a Russian suburb in New York, the purchase of real estate in
London, Paris and Madrid, these are all features of the new, long-term
Russian presence in the global world.
When I speak of the "travelling nations" I am not emphasising the
leaders of this group. I mean the general trend towards the re-settlement of
people, people travelling for the purposes of business or leisure. People
are no longer restricted to their own states as they once were. They do not
only travel to neighbouring countries. Younger generations are losing their
feelings of loyalty to the country in which they were born and are more
capable of living anywhere where there is a chance of good work and decent
living conditions. For the past 20 years the number of people travelling by
air has constantly been on the increase. The forecasts for the year 2010 are
particularly significant.
Table 12
The number of people travelling on international airlines
(millions)
Year
Passengers
1986
318
2000
485
2005
624
2010
789
Source: The World in 1995. L.,1995.
As can be seen from table 12, for the next 15 years the number of those
travelling on international airlines will double. If we also add the number
of people travelling by other means of transport we will see that more than
one third of the world's population travels to different parts of the world.
Most of the travellers are from the industrialised countries and there is a
logical trend arising, the greater the material progress of a given nation
the more they are inclined to travel.
The "travelling nations" are uniting the world in an inimitable manner.
Their families and ethnic and cultural connections, their national
affiliations unite countries and continents, frequently in spite of official
government policies. They are the bearers of globalisation and it is no
accident that they produce the vast majority of the representatives of
global culture.
Only those nations which can adapt to the conditions of new world
communications will be able to survive and to dominate the world
intellectually and economically. The Jews, the British, the Americans, the
Japanese and Chinese are the leading nations in the processes of
globalisation. They are immediately followed by the Indians and Armenians
who in their own way and in different scales have attempted to establish
their own networks. The Armenians are fewer in number but very closely knit
while the Indians are motivated by their desire to catch up with the rest of
the world. It should, however, be noted that very soon the benefits which
can be gained by "travelling" will be discovered by others. There is a great
likelihood that the Russians, Brazilians, Mexicans, Nigerians and South
Koreans will follow in the footsteps of the other "travelling nations".
Some people say that the time of ethnic groups has arrived, I
personally believe that now is the turn of the "travellers".
3. MAN WITHOUT ETHNIC ORIGIN OR THE REBELLION OF ETHNICITY
No-one can say how many people of mixed blood live on the earth. No-one
can say how many mixed marriages there are, but one fact is certain -- that
they are on the increase. There are hundreds of millions of people who by
blood or by spirit do not belong to one nation or group of people. They are
simply citizens of the world or a part of the New Civilisation.
T
he demographic statistics of the UN show that about one third of the
modern world population is of mixed ethnic origin. This may include the
majority of the population of multinational countries, the children of mixed
international marriages and so on. I am convinced that all the figures which
have been collated in relation to this question are relative simply because
of the different types of methodology used and the lack of precise
statistics. There is one significant element: the more globalised the world
becomes the more people will become the bearers of multicultural traditions.
This is another demographic aspect of globalisation and global culture.
While the "travelling nations" stimulate the processes of opening-up, the
children of international marriages are the truest expression of the new
civilisation. It is not important where a person is born and what passport
he possesses. Even if a person is defined as an American, although he is of
Italian-Irish or Russian descent or even if he is Tatar-Ukrainian, this is
not the most important. What is most important is that there is an
increasing number of people in the world who on the basis of their
behaviour, their lifestyle and their value systems demonstrate the
characteristics of the multicultural society and the intermixing of
different traditions and customs.
There is a growing number of people all over the world who are becoming
aware of their global belonging and regard their specific citizenship as a
relative and distant concept. The daily life of these people bears little
resemblance to that of their mothers and their fathers. They may have come
from India, Egypt, Zimbabwe or Thailand but they dress like Europeans, live
in apartments with simple modern furniture and eat international cuisine.
Their ethnic origins might be expressed only through certain national
dishes, items used to furnish their homes or the celebration of certain
national feast days.
With the intermixing of trade and communications and national cultures,
man himself is changing. Little by little day by day he is becoming a
citizen of the world. Born of a European mother and a Latin American father
he might wake up in an apartment in New York, watch the world news on the
BBC and go to work in a Japanese company. He might lunch in a Chinese
restaurant and then go to Russia on business. This Mr.X might have a house
which is furnished with items "made in the world", he might have a Polish
wife and his children might be learning Italian. There are innumerable
examples of this. They are the signs of an emerging, unclassified phenomenon
-- the appearance of a universal human culture and common global awareness.
The main centres of this intermixing used to be in university cities,
tourist areas or companies with employees from many countries of the world.
Today these processes of drastic change are taking place all over the world.
There are certain exceptions, where the women of a certain country are not
allowed to marry foreigners or to have children by them. The Palestinians,
for example, do this for reasons of national survival. When the Jordanians
require the children of mixed marriages to take Jordanian citizenship this
is mainly for religious reasons.
The ethnic and the cultural intermixing of the world is a slow and
evolutionary process. It can be seen in cultural adaptation, the use of one
and the same language and the intermixing of lifestyles and cuisine etc..
Let us take for example language learning. As can be seen from table 13, at
the moment there are 12 major languages in the world. In total there are
between 4000 and 10,000 spoken languages and between 20--50,000 dialects.
There is an undisputed trend towards the gradual disappearance of a large
number of dialects and languages. The process of cultural intermixing also
is taking place in languages. On the one hand this is a sign of the trend
towards the use of a single or small number of languages as a global
lingua-franca. To a great extent this is the role of English. On the other
hand there are a large group of local languages which thanks to the
electronic media will survive and will play a significant role in the
survival of the culture of certain nations. At the moment more than 1
billion people in the world use English as an international language. This
is due to the fact that the English speaking group is the second largest
group of people in the world (table 13) as well as the fact that it has been
the English-speaking countries which have provided the main stimuli for
progress and that the world media broadcast in English. English is
undoubtedly the major language in North America, one of the major languages
in Europe and is used widely in Japan, India and Latin America as an
international language.
Globalisation will require sooner or later one of the world languages
to become a global language. It is very likely that this English will fulfil
this role. This is because the most active processes of globalisation during
the last 50 years have come about as a result of the domination of the USA
in the world economy. It is possible, however, that in the processes of
economic polycentralisation English will lose part of its domination to
French or German or one of the eastern languages such as Chinese or
Japanese.
Whatever the outcome I believe that the future of culture and language
lies in a combination of global language and culture, national cultures and
languages and the unsustainable cultures and languages of the smaller
nations. There are notably over 2 billion people in the world, mainly in the
poorer countries who do not speak any of the 12 major languages of the
world.
Table 13
The major languages of the world.
Chinese More than 1 billion China, Taiwan, Singapore
English 300-400 million people United Kingdom, USA, Canada, Ireland,
India, Nigeria, Australis, South Africa
(official language of 87 nations and
territories)
Hindi 250-300 million North Africa, Trinidad, South Africa,
Mauritius
Arabic 165 million North Africa, Near East
Russian 250-300 million Republics of the Former Soviet Union
Malay 180 million Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei
Bengali 150 million Bangladesh, India
Spanish 180-520 million Official language of 20 nations and
territories in Europe and America
French 100-150 million Official language in 37 countries and
territories in Europe, Africa, America
and Oceania
Japanese 125 million Japan, minorities in USA and Brasil
German 150 million Germany, Switzerland, Luxemburg,
Lichtenstein, Austria and Belgium
Urdu 50-90 million Pakistan.
Source: the Universal Almanac 1996 ed. J.Wright, Kansas City, 1995.
It is still unclear which of them will preserve their languages and
which of them will fall under the influence of the stronger cultures.
Neither one extreme, the disappearance of ethnicities within a global
culture, nor the other, their isolation and conservation is capable of
answering the needs of humanity. It has already been mentioned that the
explosion of ethnic groups is more or less an attempt at self-defence and a
consequence of aggression against smaller cultures and nations. If
migration, mixed marriages and the world media stimulate the intermixing of
culture, then education and concern for the smaller cultures is a compulsory
precondition for the preservation of local traditions and universal harmony.
The Fourth Civilisation will be an era of global cultural phenomena but also
the preservation of all the smaller cultures which express the diversity of
the human species. This process cannot be stopped and there is little doubt
that there will be an increase in the number of people who will lose their
"pure" ethnicity but this will not lead inevitably to the destruction of
national traditions and features. There have been periods throughout the
history of humanity when the mixing of blood for many nations was considered
shameful. Many nations aspired to preserve the purity of their roots and
people through the purity of their blood. The formation of nations and
nation states coincided logically with this process.
The New Civilisation places the emphasis on the moral aspect of the
common human spirit, the search for the common elements between autonomous
cultures and peoples. Only in this way can the new dimensions of technical
and spiritual progress be combined with tolerance, mutual influence and
unification of difference cultures. The other alternative is isolationism
and conflicts between civilisations and religions. Whether the 21st century
will be a century of wars between cultures and civilisations as S.Huntington
seems to believe or a century which places the priority on the universal and
humanitarian elements of development -- this is a question of choice between
the past and the future.
4. GLOBAL AWARENESS
The 19th and the 20th centuries were a time of mass ideology. Global
awareness rejects the closed ideologies of confrontation. It is a reflection
of the common elements which unite the inhabitants of the earth but also of
the differences between us and our neighbours. Global awareness is the main
driving force of the Fourth Civilisation. It is the sense of the
compatibility and legitimisation of these differences.
H
umanity is constantly adapting itself to the common spiritual values of
integration. The integration of manufacturing and communications has lead to
a growing awareness of the common problems of people and the ways in which
they can be resolved.
Religions are a typical expression of this unified awareness. Sometimes
they are imposed through methods of conviction more frequently by violence
and coercion. Religious conflicts over the past 2 millennia have been
struggles between spiritual values and the different systems and structures
of human awareness. Homo Sapiens in his evolution from the apes inherited
and developed this common awareness. Over the centuries group ideologies
became more and more massive. General or mass awareness is reflected in the
common features and standards of life, in common gods and religions and in
common spiritual values.
The industrial age from the end of the 18th century saw a new period of
structuring of mass values. The unifying nature of existing dogmatic
religions was gradually replaced by unifying ideologies. Liberalism,
Marxism, Leninism, nationalism, fascism and Maoism are just some examples.
Certain ideologies reject religious awareness, others try to adapt it to
their value systems. Until the 19th century violence was the basic, albeit
limited, means for the solution of all conflicts between peoples, cultures
and ideologies. Mass ideologies gave rise to mass violence. The most radical
religious ideologies of the 20th century were undoubtedly communism and
fascism. Although they were essential different and had different economic
bases they both used violence as a key political method. Zbignew Brzezinski
was correct when he referred to such ideologies as "coercive utopias". Such
ideological religions allow for only one truth and exalt one system as the
true system. They share the same eternal ideas and the same laws of human
society. This is not only an expression of the primitivism of Utopia or
subjective illusions imposed through coercion but a definite stage in the
development of humanity. Ideological religions are an expression of the mass
awareness which is caused by violent and radical integration, by the
coercive persecution of the rural population and their transformation into
industrial workers, the exploitation of hired labour, the violent
colonisation of hundreds of nations and billions of people. Mass ideologies
are the result of violence but also carry its seeds.
How otherwise is to explain that communism, the greatest utopia of the
20th century was accepted by practically half of humanity? Or that the
Germans, Italians, Spanish and Japanese believed in fascism? Ideological
religions appeared on the historical scene as a result of the great
cataclysms of the 19th and 20th centuries but above all as a result of the
internationalisation of manufacturing forces and spiritual life. This
internationalisation of manufacturing gave birth to the illusion that the
world might be ordered on the lines of a ready-made political model on the
basis of dogma imposed by a group of people. Utopias become transformed into
mass credo only when the social conflicts and chaos have caused huge
destruction. Historically, mass poverty and mass violence have always caused
mass reactions which has prepared the ground for the appearance of coercive
utopias.
Ideological religions create different types of culture. In their
extreme forms these ideologies have given rise to the cult of personality
and the exaltation of leaders. Just as the ancient peoples prayed to Amon
Ra, Zeuss or Tangra in the 20th century they prayed to Hitler, Stalin, Mao
and Pol Pot. Of course, the cult of personality is not the only type of mass
utopia. The ideological religions also created the cult of the system
itself, the notion of the future, power and its structures. All this was the
imposition of freedom of thought. In certain countries and certain peoples
this type of mass awareness lead to accompanying forms of daily life, dress
and behaviour humiliating man in favour to ideology.
One of the most important consequences of the collapse of the Eastern
European totalitarian regimes was the destruction of the totalitarian type
of mass awareness. The collapse of the Berlin wall not only destroyed the
communist utopia but also created the opportunities for the entire
historical removal of ideological religions. Hitler, Stalin and Mao had
aspirations of disseminating their utopian notions over the entire world.
Fortunately this did not happen. The destruction of ideological religions
did not mean the ideological and spiritual division of the world not the
final removal of the danger of new coercive utopias. The removal of the iron
curtain does still not mean the final end to global inequality, economic
violence or the impossibility of the appearance of new ideological
religions. IN order to put a stop to such a danger many things will have to
change in this world.
Global awareness is radically different from the ideological religions
and the culture of the coercive utopia. It is developing as a result of the
new communications and the natural technological progress of humanity. It is
not a consequence of violence and coercion but of the modern technological
and cultural revolution. Its origin has to be looked for in the intermixing
of values and the criteria for the most advanced cultures of the world and
in their constant enrichment. The intermixing of different cultural values
leads to the formation of common thought processes with common foundations
which have began to develop rapidly since the falling of the iron curtain.
Global awareness is the common understanding of people for the common
problems of the world which cannot be resolved by one or a single group of
countries or by one or a group of peoples. This is the realisation of the
interdependence of the world and that the tragedy of one individual people
might lead to a tragedy for all. Global awareness is also a change in the
hierarchy of human values and in the extent to which common human conflicts
come to the fore. The enormous problems of pollution, the appearance of
holes in the ozone layer, global warming, the destruction of the rain
forests, AIDS, cancer and other mass illnesses of the 20th century, the
dangers posed by nuclear energy and numerous other problems are occupying
the thoughts of people around the world more and more and motivating their
actions.
Global awareness is reflected in the growing realisation of a larger
part of humanity that only human rights, individual freedom, freedom of
speech and the press and the gradual improvement in labour and living
conditions around the world can guarantee the preservation of the human
species. The most important thing is that in this way, gradually but
undeviatingly the common criteria for good and evil, justice and injustice,
progress and stagnation are being formed. This is the basic meaning of the
new theoretical and ideological synthesis which has been mentioned in an
earlier chapter.
Global awareness is developing on the basis of the cultural images and
standards of world significance and which do not belong to any one national
cultural school. Education and science, information and the media, trade and
finances, sport and tourism, food and daily life are a part of this growing
awareness. Today over 90% of the adult population of the world receive
information from more and more accessible and homogenous sources of culture.
The universal heroes, the universal film stars, the universal sports idols
are all symbols of one and the same phenomenon. Claudia Schiffer, Naomi
Cambell and Cindy Crawford are the greatest models at the end of the 20th
century because they are a reflection of the diversity of the ideal of
beauty and universal aesthetic standards. The travelling peoples have taken
their cuisine all over the world to Latin America, the USA, Russia and
Africa. Pele was the world football idol and the death of the racing driver
Aerton Senna was mourned all over the world. The reason is because we are
becoming citizens of one global village about which each subsequent
generation will know more than we do.
Today, global awareness is still just a trend but a trend which is
developing in the space of hours and minutes. The world corporations, the
global culture, mixed marriages, the "travelling peoples", universal
communications and values and common experiences are all an undisputed fact.
However, the trend towards the formation of a universal global awareness is
still at its very beginning. It has to cope with national and local
prejudices, ethnic enmity as well as social and economic inequality. This
trend towards the formation of the global awareness of humanity cannot be
stopped. It will take a long time and will most probably reach its peak in
the next century.
5. MULTICULTURE AND GLOBAL CULTURE
Multiculture or the combination of global, mixed and local cultures is
the main feature of the Fourth Civilisation.
T
he modern era was a time of cultural coercion. The violation,
plundering and export of huge amounts of works of art to Europe and America
was a symbol of colonialism. Fascism and Communism with their ideologies of
unification destroyed many cultural traditions and opened the way to the
violent imposition of monolithic cultural products. Imperialism in all its
manifestations bore within itself the idea of unification and multiculture
or, in other words, the domination of one culture and the transformation of
others into museum exhibits. One only has to compare the ancient cultures of
Benin and Nigeria and their artifacts exhibited in the British museum or the
culture of Bukhara and Samarkand preserved in the vaults of the Hermitage in
St.Petersburg with what has remained in the local museums.
The 20th century was a century of colonialism and imperialism, a
century of the greatest progress of humanity. It was at the same time a
century of the greatest destruction and oppression. One can but hope that
the New Civilisation will resolve the problems of cultural aggression.
However, this will be conditional upon the removal of media imperialism as a
threat to cultural imperialism. Only the future will tell whether the trends
of imperialism and cultural monopolism associated with the outgoing
civilisation or the global trends of the Fourth Civilisation will prevail. I
personally believe that historical progress and the global changes in the
world are taking us towards something different from cultural imperialism
and the dominance of one culture over others. There is, however, absolutely
no guarantee that we will turn the clock back.
If the trend towards imperialism persists and is not modernised, if the
media and cultural unification of the world takes place as a result of the
cultural domination of a number of countries via the trans-national
corporations then the forecasts of Samuel Huntington may very well come
true. The 21st century will be a century of conflicts between cultures and
civilisations and the slow and turbulent development of economic
polycentrism and associated cultural structures.
The cultural equivalent of economic polycentrism is multiculture.
Multiculture is the combination of many different cultures and their
intermixing and also the preservation and the development of international
and supra-national relations. The preservation of the cultures of small and
large nations will be preserved with the relevant legislation and economic
conditions. Multiculture means the rejection of media and cultural
imperialism. Together with economic and political polycentrism this is the
next most important feature of the Fourth Civilisation. Integration causes
either oppression or intermixing which is at the foundation of multiculture.
It is this intermixing stimulated by economic growth will be the main
cultural feature of the 21st century.
The most obvious manifestation of this process is in the area of
showbusiness, art and music, dance and the fine arts. The resolution of
religious conflicts, however, will be more difficult. The formation of a
global culture and the localisation of cultural ethnic communities will have
determinate roles in both economic and political processes. Globalisation
and autonomisation are already leading to the huge re-structuring of
cultural communities. Everything I have mentioned in this chapter: the
intermixing of cultures and global culture, the intermixing of ethnic groups
and the "travelling peoples", the formation of global awareness are features
of this process.
There are, of course, no absolute or automatic processes. I am speaking
only of a determining trend for the future. There will be processes and
events which will lead us forward but there will also be retrograde
influences. There will be a struggle for the establishment of new relations
between civilisations and the temporary victories of the protectors of the
past. The greatest task faced by the modern world is the removal of cultural
imperialism, the intermixing of religions and cultures with mutual
tolerance. The international media have great responsibility to avoid
becoming the advocates of new forms of oppression. However, they could also
become the proponents of a new spirit of multiculture. In practice this
means the protection and support of small and large cultures, a respect for
the daily life and traditions of smaller nations, the implementation of
policies of mutual adaptation of different cultures and, importantly, the
rejection of totalitarian cultural forms.
The last of these steps is of particular importance. As can be seen in
table 14, there are in the world today five basic religions. Each of these
religions and the cultures which are associated have their own geographical
and historical roots and form part of the world's cultural and ideological
treasury. However, at the same time each of these religions has its sects
and branches which would like to transform their religion into one of world
dominance and demonstrate intolerance and irreconcilability to
non-believers. This is as true for Christians as it is of the Muslims. The
gentle nature and lack of aggression inherent in Orthodox Christianity,
perhaps, make it the only exception. After the collapse of the two-bloc
system of the world the ideological vacuums were filled by religions and a
semi-overt struggle for domination began. A number of evangelical Christian
sects decided that the time was ripe for them to impose their own belief on
the world with little concern for the fact that they were depriving many
people of their individual freedom and turing them into obedient
instruments.
Table 14
Region
Christianity %
Islam %
Hinduizum %
Buddhism %
Judaism %
Africa
East Asia
South Azia [62]
Europe
Latin America
North America
Oceania
Fm. USSR[63]
236300
22300
125900
420300
392200
227200
21500
102200
15,3
1,4
8,1
27,2
25,3
14,7
1,4
6,6
215800
22300
534900
9200
600
2600
100
31500
26,4
2,7
65,5
1,1
0,1
0,3
*
3,9
130
*
644000
600
600
700
300
*
0,2
*
99,5
0,1
0,1
0,1
*
*
*
143400
150900
200
500
200
*
400
*
48,5
51,0
0,1
0,2
0,1
*
0,1
300
*
3900
1500
1000
7900
100
3100
1,7
*
21,9
8,4
5,6
44,4
0,6
17,4
Total
1548500
100
817000
100
647500
100
295600
100
71800
100
*100000, 0,1% Source: The World Christian Encyclopedia, 1985.
Islamic fundamentalism has also displayed public intolerance to
non-believers and the representatives of other countries. The murders in
Egypt and the execution of foreign hostages in Algeria and international
Islamic terrorism are examples of intolerance towards the traditions of
others. It is extremely important that such features of modern religions be
overcome. This will not be resolved by force but with the efforts of the
world community and states and their politicians and government to achieve
reconciliation. If modern Islam turns towards modernism combining its
profound cultural heritage with the achievements of the modern world it will
become part of the New tolerant Civilisation. The other alterative is
isolationism and the division of global cultures and traditions. During the
middle ages in Asia Minor and other places in the world Islam was the
embodiment of progress and was a source of innovation and new philosophical
and cultural trends, in the modern world it could assume a similar role.
The opening-up of cultures and religions to each other is a slow and
clearly painful process. It requires people to live democratically and in
mutual tolerance particularly of those nations which live in the border
areas between two geographically and religiously different zones. One
shining example is that of the Israelis and the Palestinians who since the
historical events of 1993 have been attempting to find a new
non-confrontational model for the resolution of their conflict. The
Bulgarians, Greeks and the Turks also have a vital role to play living as
they do on two sides of the divide between Christianity and Islam. There is
much dependent on the way in which these countries will resolve the problems
of their ethnic minorities and international relations. Cultures and
religions have to be sensitive to other cultures and religions. This does
not only mean avoiding conflict but actively assisting and complementing
each other. Only in this way will the principle of multiculture be able to
throw off the burden of the outgoing world of imperialism.
Perhaps, the ideal model of multiculture and tolerance for others can
be seen on the Hawaiian islands. Japanese and Polynesians, Americans and
Koreans, Buddhists and evangelists live in harmony and peace on such a small
piece of land. After so many centuries of inter-cultural conflicts the
nations which make up the multicultural communities of the USA have achieved
an impressive state of tolerance and unity.
I am convinced that the idea of global multiculture is not at odds with
the universal processes of globalisation. Clearly the structures of world
culture and the structure of the New Civilisation and will contain the
following mutually influential components:
-- the emerging global culture is being developed and disseminated via
the world media and is becoming distinct from the culture of the large
nations which have done much to create it;
-- the culture of the large nations which together with the
establishment of the principles of political polycentrism and multiculture
will gradually lose their ability to influence and erase the culture of
smaller nations;
-- the culture of the smaller independent nations which require more
specific forms of protection and whose preservation and development is one
of the most important issues in the modern world;
-- intermixed or border cultures as a product of the mutual influence
of individual nations.
There is little doubt that during the 19th century and for the entire
period of the 20th, there was a great deal of inequity between cultures and
religions. This was a result of colonial oppression, of two world and
hundreds of local conflicts and the violent attempts to impose cultural
domination. After the collapse of the two world systems humanity has every
opportunity to stop this trend and open up the way for multiculture as the
direct alternative to cultural imperialism. A balancing element to this is
the undoubted development of global cultural values which will take their
inspiration from the larger countries and nations who control the world
communications. The responsibility of the owners of global communications
and the governments of the countries in which they function will be to
ensure the development of the smaller countries and their integration into
global culture exchange.
There is no doubt that sooner or later this process will require strict
forms of global regulation, less passive and powerless than perhaps that of
UNESCO but, nevertheless, similar in terms of its profound and multi-lateral
experience. Many small nations and languages have already disappeared and
this process will, no doubt, continue for a number of years to come.
Countries living in isolation can not but be affected by this process.
Cultural autonomy is closely associated with weak economies. Weak economies
permit a low level of economic integration and lead to conflicts rather than
cooperation between ethnic groups and culture. This is an almost universal
truth and can be seen in Iran and Iraq, Israel and Turkey, India, the
Balkans and the Caususus.
The opposite example of cultural intermixing and emergent multiculture
can be seen in those regions of the world where people have realised the
senselessness of cultural assimilation and the value of peaceful cultural
co-existence. The USA, Australia, Europe, Cuba, Brazil and a number of other
countries in the world are fine examples of the intermixing and cooperation
of different races and cultures.
Chapter Ten
THE NEW POLITICAL ORDER
1. THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPERPOWERS
The Fourth Civilisation will change the global political order. This is
a logical consequence of the end of the cold war the appearance of new world
economic powers and the globalisation of finances and the stock markets.
T
he political history of humanity has developed through a number of
large cycles. The First Civilisation was a time of great empires. Later,
over a period of about 10 centuries, from the 4th to the 13th century, the
world was witness to the collapse of empire and the formation of small
unstable states and the large scale migration of tribes and entire nations.
The Third Civilisation saw the development of nation states and new imperial
aspirations which reached their height with the creation and the struggle
between the two world systems. The New Civilisation will to a certain extent
once more return us to the features of the Second Civilisation but to a
qualitatively new cultural and economic level of development as well
migration of large groups of people the collapse of great blocs and empires,
the redrawing of national borders. Is this part of a logical cycle or is it
merely a temporary political cataclysm?
I believe that the cycle of predominant political concentration has
already come to an end and we are entering a new cycle of the domination of
global culture and the parallel development of local features. This, of
course, does not mean that globalisation will come to a halt but that the
parallel processes of globalisation and localisation will exert a strong
influence on current state and political formations. The 19th century left
us a legacy of the concept of the Great Powers. The 20th century brought in
the concept of the two superpowers: the USA and the USSR.
With the collapse of the USSR the world found itself faced with two
possible alternatives: either to develop monocentrically with the domination
of the single remaining superpower, the USA, or to search for a new
geo-political form. A number of researchers, politicians and journalists
seemed to be in favour of the idea of the exclusive role of the USA as the
superpower to lead the world into the 21st century. Indeed, during the first
years after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union this seemed
possible. Without its basic enemy, the USA was transformed into the most
powerful economic and political force in the world. After 1989--1990 the USA
seemed to be the only power capable of resolving a number of world conflicts
and stabilising the world order. The war in the Persian Gulf in 1991, the
intervention in Somalia, the positive role of the USA in the peace process
in Bosnia in 1995 and the resolution of the problem of Palestinian autonomy
served to strengthen this conviction.
The USA are still the strongest nation state in the world but,
nevertheless, I believe that the time of the superpowers has passed. The
Fourth Civilisation will finally reject them and even now, during the
transition between eras, there are already noticeable trends and processes
which support this.
The gradual twilight of the superpowers is for a number of reasons a
general process. It is consequence of the trend towards global balance and
the expected balancing of the global market. It is also due to a number of
reasons associated with the cyclic development of geopolitical structures. I
mentioned earlier that the economic development of the world has become
polycentric. Japan, South Korea, more recently China and a number of other
Asian economic powers have achieved significant economic strength. European
integration has undoubtedly raised the importance of the European Economic
Community in the world division of labour. The Latin American markets have
become more attractive for investments. The globalisation of the economy has
allowed for many more countries to accumulate economic strength and
self-confidence. During the cold war and up to 1989 the appearance of new
powerful and independent economic centres was of secondary importance.
Military power and nuclear weapons were an undisputed factor in the
determination of political power. This trend persisted for the entire period
of the 20th century. In the 1960's and the 1970's there was a growing
conviction that there would in fact be no victor after a nuclear conflict.
Indeed, after the collapse of the Berlin wall there are still people who
continue to wag their sabres and claim that they can achieve their aims
through armed conflict. Nevertheless, things do seem to have changed. The
emergence of new technology and new economic opportunities have come to the
fore.
This has reduced, at least for the time being, the role of Russia in
world politics leaving it to ponder the questions of its domestic political
and economic restructuring. For the same reasons, the USA now finds itself
in a completely new situation.
The vacuum which was formed after the collapse of COMECON and the
Warsaw Pact (1990--1991) has begun to be filled not only by the USA but
Germany, France, Japan and the European community as a whole. Although this
process is rather veiled and timid it will continue in the future. Germany
demonstrated its new-found self-confidence with its independent position on
Bosnia. The nuclear tests carried out by France in the Pacific in 1995 were
more significant from a political point of view than scientific. Similar
ideas can be read into the applications by Japan and Germany to join the
Security Council.
The other issue which has always seemed to dog the USA and which will
undermine its potential as the only superpower in the world is the issue of
economic expenditure. Since the Second World War the USA has run up a huge
armaments bill which has lead to a colossal increase in its foreign debt.
Today the world's financial systems is under an enormous strain because of
the constant increase in American borrowings, especially in the 1980's
(table 15). In the 1970's and 1980's, however, this seemed not to be such a
serious matter. The USA at the time was the leading figure in the Brenton
Woods system and the dollar was the only reserve currency in the world and
the US was able with some ease to compensate for the debts it had
accumulated. In the 1980's the USA was paying 250--300 billion dollars in
interest alone on its foreign debt. The majority of global economists
believe that if this trend persists for much longer the American economy
will begin to slide and the dollar will lose its position to the yen and the
German mark.
Table 15
Federal debt of the USA
Year
1900
1920
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
1992
1994
Billion Dollars
Per head of population (USD)
Interest paid on debt (bill)
% of federal income
1,2
16,6
-
-
21,2
228
-
-
256,1
1688
5,7
13,4
284,1
1572
9,2
10,0
370,1
1814
19,3
9,9
907,7
3985
74,9
12,7
3233
13000
264,8
21,1
4064
846
292,3
21,1
4692
026
296,3
80,3
Source: Bureau of Public Debt, US Dept of Treasury.
There is little doubt that the USA and Russia will progressively have
to reduce their military expenses which are the main causes for budget
deficits and huge debt. IN 1994 the USA spent 280.6 billion dollars on
defence which more than all the other countries of the world put together
with the exception of Russia. US military expenditure was 9 times greater
than that of Germany (35 billion dollars); 9 times that of France (34
billion); 7 times that of the UK (41 billion); 50 times that of Japan (5.9
billion dollars); 100 times that of China (2.7 billion)[64]. I
have never seen accurate or proven figures for Russia but I believe that up
to 1990 they were similar to the US. There is no economy in the world which
can compensate for such expenditure and bear the burden of competition in
the global market. For this reason the role of the USA and Russia as the two
superpowers has begun to subside. Superpower tension might reappear in the
world only if the two-bloc system is revived. There is, however, little
likelihood of this since global financial markets are so interlinked and
interdependent and for all the other reasons associated with the emergent
New Civilisation.
This leads on to the other question of where the new centre of economic
and political power will develop and who will take on the roles and
responsibilities of the USA and Russia. Russia clearly needs time to
reorganise its economy and bring it in line with the needs of the market.
However, even if this were to take place within the shortest possible period
of time -- 10--15 years, it would not be able to assume the role of a
superpower, nor would it want to. On the other hand Jacques Atalie and other
writers have forecast that "economic power is moving away from America
towards Europe and the Pacific".[65] I believe that it would more
accurate to make another conclusion. It is true that during the Third
Civilisation the Euroatlantic powers made great progress in their domination
of the world at the beginning of the processes of globalisation. It is also
true that after the 1960's the Asian economic powers began gradually to free
themselves from the protectionism of the USA and Europe and they will play a
very active global role in the coming 21st century.
This fact, however, is insufficient to support the claim that "economic
power is moving away from America towards Europe and the Pacific". It is
more likely that there will be a period of levelling and mutual balance
between the Japanese, American and European economies. This is possibly the
most effective solution. Of course, this is also associated with the
reduction in the responsibilities and burdens of the USA and the involvement
of other countries such as Japan. The superpowers will disappear but it will
not necessarily follow that the USA will preserve their role as one of the
world's main political and economic centres. The world can no longer benefit
from American domination or its downfall. In the same way the world could
have done without the political and military conflicts within the former
USSR.
2. FROM IMPERIALISM TO POLYCENTRISM
"The old geopolitical order has left the stage and a new world order
has been born".
Jacques Atalie
T
he central issue is what will replace the two-bloc world order based on
the dominance of the superpowers. Other similar periods of transition in
history have lead to geopolitical chaos, conflicts, wars and huge loss of
human life. The first years after the overthrow of the totalitarian regime
in Eastern Europe seemed to bear out this sad truth. Today the dangers have
not yet passed and seem to confound those who are optimistic of a new world
order.
There is no single or single group of powers capable of establishing
this order. It will have to be created through a amalgamation of local and
regional resolutions and the renunciation of ideas associated with the
domination of one country or nation. This is the main feature of the New
Civilisation. During the entire period of the outgoing civilisation monarchs
were engaged in struggles for power, conquering and losing territory and
making plans on how to expand their dominions. In the 19th and 20th
centuries the idea of world domination arose and the revival of the huge
empires of Caesar of Fredrich Barbarossa. The greatest empires of the Third
Civilisation were the two political and military blocs which dominated the
world for 50 years.
I believe that the era of imperialism will be replaced by a new world
order based on the principle of polycentrism, the alternative to imperialism
and monocentrism. This principle is a rejection of the monopolism and
imperial aspirations of any single nation or ideology. Polycentrism is that
level of international relations which is the most concomitant for the
opening up of the world and its globalisation.
Polycentrism will not appear overnight. However, I am more than
convinced that it is inevitable and part of the logic of historical
development. The alternative is new confrontation, new violence with the
accompanying threats of thermo-nuclear conflict. There are two basic
conditions without which polycentrism and the natural competition between
nations and countries cannot develop:
Firstly, the inevitable, albeit gradual, disappearance of the super
power phenomenon.
Secondly, the evolutionary nature of the development of polycentrism as
a system of international relations. The natural replacement of the bi-polar
model with polycentric structures will pass through a number of phases, each
of which will take differing lengths of time.
We are already experiencing the first of these phases. The world is
undergoing transition from the bi-polar model of confrontation to a
multi-polar world. It is quite realistic to assume that in the next ten or
so years we will pass into a transitory phase of a tri-polar world. This
tri-polar world began to emerge based on the existing framework of the
bi-polar world as early as the 1970's and 1980's. This model is based on the
USA and a number of states which gravitate around it, Europe and the Far
East lead by Japan. These three economically integrated poles have been
developing gradually over the past 25--30 years. They are economically very
compact and consist mainly of the economic interdependence of the individual
countries. At the same time these three economic centres are strongly
dependent on and open to each other creating one of the greatest
opportunities for the peaceful development of the world. The tri-polar world
is the closest alternative to the bi-polar world but is not an easy way out
of the current crisis. The tri-polar model is to a large extent conditional
on the development of common global trends.
At the very beginning of the 21st century both Russia and China will
aspire to become involved in the three large centres of economic power. All
the most sensible politicians in the world believe that without Russia and
China the world cannot develop successfully. This has been a clear feature
of US policy during the Clinton administration. During the next 20--25 years
we shall no doubt witness the development of a five-six-polar world in which
the three main centres will be joined by a number of other new ones. China's
rapid economic development and Russia's enormous resources of raw materials
and its strategical capability will exert significant influence on this
process. The triangular community of the USA, EC and Japan has quite quickly
replaced the bi-polar model the development of a multi-polar model will take
at least 15--20 years. Russia will need time to stabilise its economy and
China will need to consolidate its reform process and balance out its levels
of development.
There is, however, a question of principle here. Will this not take us
back to the beginning of the modern age, to a situation where five or six
great powers dominated the world creating a series of conflicts which may
develop into regional or even world wars? May this not also lead to the
grouping of these powers into two or three political and military groups and
a repeat of the Third Civilisation? It is here that the difference between
the outgoing civilisation and the new era lies. The new powers will not
arise only on one continent, Europe or America. They will develop in all the
continents and within the framework of a single global economy.
I, therefore, believe that the second phase, the transition to a new
world order will be characterised by the gradual transition from five or six
centres to a multi-polar or polycentric world structure. Even at the
beginning of the transition period countries like Brazil, India, Australia,
South Africa and others will increase their geo-political roles. They will
be balanced between the other "great powers" and with their geographical
position and size and increased economic potential they will gradually begin
to assume greater geo-political significance. When speaking of the
polycentric structure of the world, I am not concerned only with the
political aspect but also with the economic and cultural sides of the issue.
At the same time global integration will take place simultaneously in all
countries but will lead to the creation of a number of regional formations.
I also believe that we can expect that the poles of the new world
structure will be defined via the development of a number of economically
integrated blocs which of necessity will be open to one another and will
autonomous units within an expanding integral entity. L.Thorou forecast that
the 21st century would be a century of "quasi-commercial blocs applying
managed trade". This is true to a certain extent but only in the initial
stages since I believe that with the emergence of polycentrism the
autonomous economic regions and commercial blocs will gradually become very
interwoven and to lose their primary borders.
The principle of polycentrism is at the heart of the new world order.
However, these are not the same world centres which existed in the 13th and
the 19th centuries and whose monarchs and presidents went to war every
10--15 years to re-distribute their dominions. They will not be the same
centres which colonised the entire world and imposed their will on other
nations. Polycentrism is the principle of balance between the world's
powers, the umbrella under which new centres will develop and a bridge
leading to a more complete integration of the world. The essence of the
Fourth Civilisation is in the gradual formation of this new world order.
3. THE FATE OF THE NATION STATE
Do not be in a hurry to destroy the nation state. It will not die
suddenly of cardiac arrest but will gradually fade away...
T
he functions and the borders of the nation state depend directly on the
economic maturity of societies. Historically the nation state is a
transitory category. It appeared when nations were being created and the
economic conditions of life were imposing certain certain types of
government and regulation. There were different versions of statism and
state government during the First Civilisation and the Second Civilisation,
more commonly know as the Middle Ages. Nation states, however, are a typical
feature of the Third Civilisation.
The reduction in their role and changes in their functions is a result
of the same phenomena which created them. The globalisation of modern
economies and culture, the media invasions, transnational corporations and
everything else which has been mentioned in other parts of the book are
leading to changes in the borders and the essence of the concept of nation
state as well as in the structure of government and economies. For a number
of decades the inhabitants of the most developed nations have become
growingly aware that the governments for which they may have voted are not
the only centres of power and that the promises of politicians seem to have
little in common with realities and that the implementation of policies
depends on other factors and phenomena.
P.Drucker frequently speaks of a new pluralism. In this he is
absolutely correct. Pluralism does not mean competition between parties and
their leaders. It is a very diverse pluralism of economic, government,
cultural and lobby groups. What is even more significant is that this new
pluralism is becoming more and more international. Corporations and
political parties, foundations and association, information groups and
trans-national media have transformed pluralism in to an universal concept
and the nation state into an annoying but not insurmountable barrier.
It is quite evident that as society develops governmental restrictions
decline along with the significance of national boundaries. For this reason
open societies are a symbol not only of democracy but progress in general. I
believe in the truth of this argument but it is not so simple. Openness
which is inevitable and necessary means nothing in isolation from the
economic processes. Many underdeveloped, ex-colonial countries are both
absolutely open and absolutely poor. Progressive and stable openness comes
about as a result of economic and political progress, the attainment of a
certain level of economic balance. This is not a political whim but a result
from the accumulation and maturity of a given society.
We should not, therefore, be in a hurry to depose the role of the
nation states. They will not disappear overnight but will fade slowly in the
process of the development of relative economic balance. During the Third
Civilisation state power was absolute. During the Third Civilisation state
power was absolute. Ludwig 14th, Napoleon, Hitler, Mussolini, Lenin and
Stalin were themselves incorporations of the state. Today, however, this is
impossible. Dictators such as Idi Amin Dada in Uganda, Boccassa 1st in the
Central African Republic or Pol Pot in Cambodia have been condemned to
historical oblivion and hatred. However, many other democratically elected
government have felt obliged to "protect" the national output and to isolate
themselves with restrictive import duties and other protectionist barriers.
Those who feel threatened and isolated as a result of their backwardness
rather than integrated have to pay a high cost in terms of armies and
weapons.
Therefore in the under developed countries the nation state will
preserve its traditional functions for a relatively longer period of time.
This will be both natural and progressive if the relevant governments make
efforts to open and adapt their economies to the global market. Adversely,
their countries will continue to vegetate within the conditions of the Third
Civilisation and will begin to lag behind in universal world development.
This issue has another side to its. The movements towards world
openness and integration is a resource of progress. No government will
succeed in the modern world to integrate its people into processes of world
progress if it does not affiliate itself with the World Trade Organisation
and the international financial markets. The decline of the role of the
nation state is a universal process which is taking place more rapidly in
the developed countries and more slowly in those who are still aspiring to
become affiliated with them and slowest of all in those countries who feel
themselves obliged to defend their frail national identity. Nevertheless, no
one country will be able to ignore the common processes of the globalisation
of the world, markets, manufacturing and the media.
What then will become of the nation state and its power?
I believe that the main trends in world development will be as follows:
the role of the nation states will decline in significance whereas the
functions of the local institutions of authority and supra-national and
global coordinators will increase. This is taking place at the moment in
Europe and all other states whose governments are conceding more and more
power to the trans-national corporations, the world media networks or other
autonomous and influential non-governmental organisations. Louis d'Or 14th
in an expression of the absolute nature of power once said, "L'Etat -- c'est
moi". From the second half of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th
century governments began grudgingly to concede part of their economic power
to the owners of large private enterprises. Now as a result of the
globalisation the national governments have no choice other than to give up
many of their prerogatives. This is a natural process which follows the
logic of world development. Many people find it difficult to understand and
regard national honour and pride as a priority and any suggestion to the
contrary provokes nationalistic reaction. There have always been such
governments and there, no doubt, will be for many decades to come. However,
such policies which seem to forget the need for global and humane
responsibility will lead nations into the back roads of development. Sooner
rather than later nations will realise that they have been deceived and will
seek recompense for the politicians who brought them to that state.
The borders of states in the transition to the Fourth Civilisation will
continue to narrow as a result of major technological and social changes. If
you remember the message of A.Toffler in chapter four of this book, he
predicted that the new technologies would transfer power both downwards to
the local institutions of authority and upwards to the global regulators and
the transnational corporations. On one hand many economic and social
functions will become much more effective if they are transferred from
governments to civil societies and are controlled by legislation. This is
the case with the planning and coordination of a series of macro and
micro-economic processes. This is also the case with social welfare and in
particular pension funds, health case and academic and scientific research.
ON the other hand national governments are not in a position to regulate
independently the global environment, world financial markets, the global
redistribution of resources, goods and services, information flow and the
media etc.. The more people, goods and services cross over national borders
the less significance these borders will have. This will in turn lead to
changes in the prerogatives of nation states.
At the end of the 20th century the state is too small an institution to
resolve global problems and too large to resolve its own local issues. This
is also a result of the new technology, the restructuring of manufacturing
and the market.
A typical example of such a bi-lateral change is offered by the member
countries of the European Union. According to some researchers since 1957
about half of the authority of the nation state has been transferred either
to local authority or to the European Commission in Brussels. This is
perhaps an isolated example of a regional alliance. However, the same
process seems to be taking place in the USA where the American political
system has been stretched vertically upwards by the transnational
corporations and financial markets and downwards by the individual states
and the non-governmental and private organisations. Bill Clinton would
hardly have the authority to implement such a wide ranging programme of
reform as the "New Deal" of President Roosevelt in the 1930's. Even in the
case of the states such as the USA national governments do not have the same
authority that they had 40 or 50 years ago. They have also taken upon
themselves a range of global responsibilities with which to compensate for
the decline authority and the transfer of the real power to the
trans-national corporations. The specific global role of the USA at the
beginning of the 1990's will soon have to be shared with others. It is not
fair on the American people to carry the huge burden of military
expenditure, the peace-keeping operations of the UN and so on. It will not
be long before they will also involve Russia, Japan and Europe (France and
Germany). IN this way the gradual decline in the significance of the nation
state is as true for the USA as it is for everywhere else.
A distinguishing feature of the modern nation state is its integration
and strong links with the civil society. A number of writers such as P.
Drucker and J. Lukac have written that the sovereign state will become just
one of a number of centres for identification and integration rather than
the only one and will coexist and compete with the trans-regional,
supra-national and local, even tribal structures. When this rule of logical
development is applied universally then nations attain a higher level of
enrichment. Switzerland, for example, leads all statistical classifications
on the basis of GDP per head of population and this is not only due to the
success of the Swiss banks. This is rather a result of the co-existence of
the trans-national corporations and the banks, strong local authorities and
the state (government and parliament) which fulfils the role of a bridge
between the two sectors. The lack of bureaucracy, the active role of the
local population in global business and the decision making processes is a
particulary strong feature of the Swiss political system.
The modern state will have less and less international authority.
Globalisation opens borders and the world market "erodes" sovereignty. By
transferring their authority to the new global leaders and to local leaders
the national governments will have less and less capabilities. This,
however, raises the issue of the preservation of the identity of nations and
states in the face of the emergent global culture and global awareness. It
is the "travelling peoples" which will succeed with their sustainable and
strong cultural links which not only produce avant garde technology but use
it to effect. It is not states and weapons but technological power plus
knowledge which will play a decisive role in this question.
4. AFTER THE CRISIS OF POLITICAL IDENTITY
The modern-day left is like the right undressed and the modern-day
right is like a well dressed left.
(political jokes from the end of the 20th century)
A
lthough I frequently speak of the Fourth Civilisation, the new
ideological and theoretical synthesis and balanced development I realize how
difficult it is for these new concepts to be accepted by the modern world.
This is particularly true for the smaller (albeit proud) countries such as
Bulgaria. In face of the new global changes and challenges there is no
difference between the small and the large countries. We are all part of the
same game. Some are quicker while some are slower but we are all undergoing
the same profound changes. In Eastern Europe three years were sufficient to
understand the crisis of universal political identity which the West has
long been aware of.
For more than 100 years the political left in the world has been
associated with the new role of the working class, social guarantees,
nationalisation of the basic means of production and the expropriation from
the expropriators etc.. The right has always been linked with the defence of
large and medium scale private capital, traditions and security, no state
intervention in business and non-involvement in social matters. However, in
the modern world at the end of the 20th century, with the exception of a few
fringe parties and movements, there is no country or political party in the
world which resembles these traditional concepts of the left and right.
Together with the collapse of the Third Civilisation we are also
experiencing a crisis of political identity. This is a consequence of the
new ideological and theoretical synthesis, the changes in ownership and the
social and class structure as well as the end of the traditional state
mechanisms. The object of the differences between the left and the right is
disappearing. The entire world is undergoing a process of ownership
socialisation and states are being integrated into civil societies in which
neither the old left nor the old right can preserve their traditional
status.
During the present time of chaos and the growing mistrust towards the
traditional leaders, of left-wing promises made by right-wing politicians
and the concern of the business sector for social issues we should expect
too much. The political inertia is very strong and only a minority would
take the electoral risk of trying to overthrow the traditional symbols. What
we are witness to at the moment is the adaptation of the old phraseology to
new world realities. Whether they want it or not the left and the right wing
parties in the world are intuitively moving towards a state of "balanced
development" and will fight for domination of its ideological territory. The
"left" no longer reject the concept of private capital and do not demand
nationalisation. The "right" are no longer ashamed to speak of social
programmes and the needs of the poor. The borders between the traditional
electorates are fading as a result of a process of irreversible changes in
the social and class structure of society.
As a consequence many new parties have appeared which give voice to
localised interests within a given country or region. The "success" of Ross
Perot at the presidential elections in 1992 and national independence
parties in Canada or Catalonia and Northern Italy are features of the same
phenomenon: the change in the foundations and structures and economic and
social interests is leading to changes in political doctrines and political
parties. The traditional parties which succeed in making the transition and
re-orientate themselves rapidly within the complex situation of the modern
world will survive and their traditional names will be no more than a mere
decoration. Those who delay will fade away and gradually open the way to the
new political formations.
The end of the crisis of modern political identity will come quite
quickly. Many of the parties of the Socialist and Liberal Internationals or
Christian Democratic parties are making timid steps towards changes in their
programmes. Some of them are rejecting their traditional programmes outright
with the justification of the need for a new pragmatism. The former
communist parties of Eastern Europe changed their names to "socialist" or
"social-democratic". Some of them have become so closely associated with
large-scale capital that they already resemble the bourgeois parties of end
of the 19th century.
Together with the changes in ownership and the social and class
structure, as well as the new borders of the nation state and the transition
to global polycentrism, the changes in modern political parties and
doctrines is another important feature of the changes in world civilisation.
The rapprochement between party programmes and views which is taking place
at the moment is a consequence of the new ideological synthesis. It will not
be long before political pluralism will take its stand on the new problems
of the Fourth Civilisation and the transition to it.
There are two further processes linked with the problem of political
identity which I would like to mention. The first of these is linked with
the obvious need for regional and trans-national political formations such
as the Party of European Socialists, for example. The second is the need for
new types of voting systems and the development of direct democracy. My
friend the American political scientist Theodore Becker refers to this as
"teledemocracy". The world telecommunication systems such as the Internet
provide wonderful opportunities for the direct involvement of millions and
billions of people in the decision-taking processes. Today, there are very
few politicians who are aware of this, a few others are sceptical and
concerned about preserving their own power and forces of manipulation.
For me there is little doubt that the Fourth Civilisation will lead to
enormous changes in political life and its structures, types of government,
electoral mechanisms and decision taking. These are not utopias, nor are
they long-term forecasts. These are simply the results of something which is
appearing before out very eyes.
5. THE GLOBAL COORDINATORS
The Fourth Civilisation will be at one and the same time an open,
polycentric and integrated world. This will require a more effective system
of global coordination.
W
hen analysing the system of the Fourth Civilisation, I naturally came
upon the problem of global coordination. This once again brought to my mind
the unsystematic but indicative thoughts of Lenin on the "single factory for
all workers and peasants", Stalin's idea of the "world wide victory of
communism", Hitler's thoughts on the "World Reich" and Fukoyama's writings
on the "End of History" etc.. A great number of researchers from the World
Federation for Future Studies have also written on the need for a world
government.
There is clearly some logic to this argument. Globalisation will
require much more than ever before increased global control. As the
processes develop and political polycentrism increases there will be a
growing need for world coordination. Nevertheless, I do not believe that it
will be possible in the near future to establish such a global government.
This is an element of the distant future to which neither I nor my
generation belong. Of course, the Fourth Civilisation will cover the entire
period of the 21st century and no doubt future generations of our
grandchildren and great-grand children will have to face the issue.
Today the world is faced with hundreds of global problems which lead to
collapse of the bi-polar world structures. There are a number of world
organisations involved in these problems such as the UN, the World Trade
Organisation and the IMF based on the need for compromises between nation
states and their products. Since compromise between nation states is at the
basis of the development of the world organisations their capabilities to
act in the real conditions of the modern world are seriously restricted. If
we want the world organisations to succeed, they will have to receive wide
empowerment and responsibilities for the global problems which are outside
the domain of nation states. This is the only way in which a united world of
small and large states and cultures will be able to face up to the
challenges of supra-national environmental interests. It is, of course,
absurd to speak of a world government, but it is clear that there is an
obvious need for a coordinating body which from the very outset will be able
to resolve military and ecological crises, regulate the conditions for world
finance and the fight against international crime etc..
It is, therefore, evident that the modern world needs a revision of the
Constitution of the United Nations and the expansion of the powers of the
Security Council as well as the establishment of new institutions. Many of
these have already been proposed by a number of leading world politicians
and intellectuals. These include the Council for Ecological Security of the
United Nations. A reflection of the new directions in thought are the new
structures within the United Nations and its specialised organisations
including UNESCO, INIDO, FAO and others.
This process of expansion has to be carried out very carefully with the
gradual empowerment of specialised national organisations with the rights
and responsibilities currently born by nation states. I expect that the main
priority will be global economic control and the resolution of global
environmental and social issues. The restructuring of the UN, the creation
of an effective World Bank, the increase in the prerogatives of the World
Trade Organisation and the empowerment of all these organisations to deal
with the real problems of the world is the path to balanced development.
This path will be difficult, slow and gradual but there is no other way. The
alternative is for the new communications, computers and automated factories
to dig a deeper gorge between the poor and the rich rather than a source for
democracy and freedom.
At the same time the large nations have to double and treble their
efforts to create a new climate in the world and another type of global
intercourse. This may lead to the institutionalisation of the meetings of
the G-7 and its expansion to include Russia and China and perhaps a few
other nations. It may be a good idea to hold regular meetings of the heads
of state of the whole world. There are a number of possibilities. The most
important thing is for us to realise that the new age which we are entering
requires new type of thinking and a new understanding of our own
responsibilities.
THE NATIONS WHICH WILL SUCCEED, THE NATIONS OF THE FOURTH CIVILISATION
(instead of a conclusion)
T
his book is an expression of my inner spiritual world and my thoughts
over a number of years on the present state and the potential future of our
confused world. I have been profoundly influenced by the major political
changes which have taken place since the collapse of the Eastern European
political systems and their economic structures. I am acutely aware that the
"Fourth Civilisation" will provoke a number of different reactions. During
such a watershed period in our history unanimity is dangerous and
unnecessary. Indeed, the book which I have written contains a number of
generalisations on the character of global change at the border between two
millennia, the periodisation of history and the crisis of the entire modern
civilisation. The logic of my research has lead me to a number of
conclusions on the new geo-political nature of the world and the necessity
of global economic and political regulation.
The "Fourth Civilisation" is not based on abstract proposals or
invented eloquent phrases. All my conclusions are based on experience and
suffering, on years of research and reading as well as specific practical,
academic experiments and political experience. The "Fourth Civilisation" is
not a forecast, nor futuristic literature but an evaluation of the facts as
they are. It is an attempt to overcome the academic dogma of the 19th
century which have existed for over 150 years. I am interested in the clash
of ideas and I realise that many of my conclusions merit further analysis,
something which I intend to do in the future. I can now see with delight
many new areas for creative work.
The "Fourth Civilisation" is not intended to reveal all the details of
the issues which it raises but to unify them within one general concept and
to reveal the universal character of the global change which the modern
world in experiencing. The common crisis of the bi-polar world and the
collapse of the Eastern European regimes, the modern conditions of
geo-political chaos in which we are living, the major re-structuring of the
world economy, culture and politics shows that the new realities with which
we are faced have a complex and accumulative effect. Whether we want to or
not, they will lead us to new solutions. My book is concerned with these
solutions and the new methodological approach to the evaluation of world
processes. It is also concerned with the changes in ownership, political and
economic structures and the way in which they are finding more and more
common global ground. I realise that these conclusions may be quite
controversial but I deeply believe in them as indicative proof. Everything
which proves that the old civilisation is fading and that we are entering
into a new Fourth Civilisation is based on the trends and processes to which
we are already witnesses.
I have to confess that everything which I have touched upon in this
book is a starting point for further work based on the country in which I
was born and bred. Bulgaria is now undergoing a difficult and complex crisis
caused by the transition from a totalitarian to a market and pluralist
economy. I have spoken little about Bulgaria in the "Fourth Civilisation"
but in actual fact all my conclusions concern its fate. I believe that I
have been right to keep my conclusions about Bulgaria to a separate book.
This has allowed my to concentrate on the features of global change and to
concentrate on the specific features of Bulgaria at a later stage. For this
reason there is a direct and unifying link between the "Fourth Civilisation"
and my book about Bulgaria which is soon to be published. I hope that they
will both be of interest to all my friends with whom for over ten years now
we have been discussing the fate of the changes and all my colleagues all
over the world with whom I have argued about the future of our world and all
those people with whom I have shared the good and the bad in the political
life of Bulgaria over the past seven years.
Whatever the fate of this book, on completing it I want to thank all
those without whom it would not have been possible. I owe so much to my
mother and my father who bore me and brought me up, my family who have
suffered the deprivations of my almost permanent preoccupation with work, my
teachers from whom I learnt so much, and my colleagues and my friends who
helped me with the book. Nothing in this life can be achieved without love
and I thank all those who believed in me since it was their faith, hoe and
love which inspired so much of my conclusions.
During the entire period of writing and preparing the "Fourth
Civilisation" I asked myself the question, "Which nations will succeed and
will not be lost to the chaos of the global world?". During the great
migrations of the Second Civilisation many nations and ethnic groups lost
their potential and remained on the periphery of the nation states which
were to emerge later. Some of them have disappeared. I hope fervently that
the Bulgarian spirit is not lost and that it does not become dissolved in
the waves of migration of people, information and goods which is on the
horizon. I shall work and I shall struggle for this not to the detriment of
any other nation. I shall work to consolidate the culture and the economy of
Bulgaria in the context of dignified competition.
The nations which will succeed do not live only in the great countries.
These will be the nations which will accept the laws of the new age and will
become the people of the Fourth Civilisation. These nations will not be
divided on the lines of capitalist or socialist, workers or bourgeois,
imperialist or colonial. These peoples will not allow their civic freedoms
to be usurped nor will they recognise cultural or political isolationism and
closed economies. The nations of the Fourth Civilisation will be united with
millions and billions of visible and invisible threads. They will produce
the new values which belong to the whole of humanity.
The road is long and there will be many storms along the way. The New
Civilisation does not require social engineering it requires merely the
pursuance of the logic of progress which our fathers and the outgoing 20th
century have bequeathed to us. It is a difficult but glorious legacy, a
legacy which will require us to be true to our time and those who will come
after us.
Sofia 1996.
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8 P.Kennedy. The Rise and the Fall of the Great Powers (see table)
9 Although between Hobson, Hilferding and Lenin there are certain
differences about the historical fate of imperialism, their works relating
to its origin and features are worth of academic recognition. [see.
J.Hobson, Imperialism, L.1902, R.Hilferding, Financial Capital, L.1910.
V.Lenin, Imperialism as the supreme state of capitalism, Essay No.5, Volume
27]
10 P.Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers [see table]
11 P.Kennedy. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Table 28, p.299.
N. Y. 1887.
* Under 50 000. Source: Political Economy, Moscow, 1975. P. 150.
12 Bzezinski. The Great Failure, Sofia 1991, pages 21-54
13 The concept of the evolutionary rebirth of monopolistic capitalism,
of a society of trusts and cartels within a single world "super trust" or in
other words a united world society governed from a single centre (a single
super trust). The author of this concept was K.Kautski, 1915
14 According to the Brent Wood (USA) agreement in 1944 a system of
international financial organisations was established resulting in the
American dollar becoming the leading currency in international finances. In
the 1980's this "system" was profoundly changed
15 See V.I. Lenin, collected works, vol.27, page 408
16 See also Z. Brzezinsky. The Great Collapse. S., 1981 (Statistics).
17 In the summer of 1986, the Bulgarian leader, T.Zhivkov published
what for the time was a courageous reformist article entitled the "July
Conception". It received much criticism from Mikhail Gorbachev and his
entourage since it raised questions about the leading role of the communist
party. Of course the Bulgarian leaders bowed under the pressure of
"comradely advice".
18 See Z. Brzezinsky. The Great Collapse. Appendiy.
19 Hundreds of books have been written on the subject of the
development of the Stalinist regime. Some of them give a particulary vivid
description of the essence of this process - e.g. D.Volkogonov - Stalin.
Triumph and Tragedy - 4 volumes. Moscow 1991.
20 Ludwig Von Mizes. Socialism. M., 1994. Introduction.
21 This can be seen in all of the speeches made by Mikhail Gorbachev.
For Example M.S. Gorbachev. On the process of implementing the decisions of
the XXVII congress of the CPSU and tasks connected with the advancement of
Perestroika. Moscow 1988.
22 There is no doubt the Gorbachev was frequently advised to use the
army to restore "law and order" and the status quo. Ifhe had given in to
such advice this would not only have returned the reform process to its
initial starting point but would also have caused conflicts involving the
spilling of blood.
23 At this time G. Yanaev was Vice President of the USSR. V. Pavlov was
Prime Minister and V. Kruchkov -- Head of the KGB.
24 According to a number of writers, including the last advisor the
Soviet president - Andrei Grachov, the decisive factors for the resignation
of Mikhail Gorbachev were the opinion of the Minister of Defence,
B.Shaposhnikov and his support for Boris Yeltsin. In a conversation I had in
December 1995 A.Grachov once more re-iterated his astonishment at this fact
and described it as the key factor in the collapse of the USSR.
25 The Madrid summit meeting of the member states of the EU spoke
eloquently of this. Even if the deadline for the introduction of the common
currency is postponed there is apparently no doubt of its eventual
implementation.
26 The statistics in this paragraph are taken from the Economist -
World in figures L., 1994
27 K. Marx. Das Kapital. V.1. C., 1984. P.484.
28 This was the dominant thesis of the leaders of on the leading
parties in Bulgaria -- the union of democratic forces between 1990--1993.
29 J. Grey. Liberalism. Sofia. 1991. P. 92.
30 V. Lenin. Complete Works. V. 29. P. 121.
31 These three conclusions were developed for the first time in my
books "Socialisation and democratic centralism" (1987) and "Socialism and
Self Management" (1989)".
32 A.Toffler. Forecasts and pre-conditions, Sofia, 1991, page 64
33 A.Toffler - Ibid
34 See Fortune, 1995, April, August
35 The Best Companies To Work For In America. N.Y. 1993. P. 285.
36 Samuel Huntington. The Clash of Civilisations? Democratic review
ed.2-3, 1995, page 167
37 Foreign Affairs, vol.72, No.4, page 16
38 A. Toffler. "The Shock of the Future". S., 1991.
39 See Creating A New History For Future Generations. Ed. By T. Him and
J. Dator. Kyoto. 1994.
40 J. K. Galbraith. The Anatomy of Power. S., 1993, p. 54.
41 A. Toffler. Forecasts and Preconditions.
42 Employee Ownership. National Center for Employee ownership, 1985, p.
53.
43 Calculated on the basis of "Germany's top 500", Frankfurt/Main 1995.
44 A. Toffler. Forecasts and Preconditions.
45 P.Drucker. Post-capitalist society. Harper, 1994, p.96
46 J.Stalin. Economic problems of the development of socialism in the
USSR (in his book, J.V.Stalin on the Socialist Economy). Sofia 1955. 47.
P.Drucker. Post Capitalist Society. N.Y.,1994
47 P. Drucker. Post Capitalist Society. N. Y., 1994.
48 See. H.Genov. The Path of the Dragon. Sofia, 1992.
49 L.R.Braun. K.Braun and S.Pastel. I. The Condition of the Planet (A
Picture of a Stable Society). S.1990.II. Thinking about Future Generations.
Tokyo.1994
50 R.Allen. Mathematical economics. (Russian translation) Moscow. 1963.
51 Leon Walras. Elements of Pure Economics. L.1954.
52 What I am referring to here is Marx's claim that during the
historical processes "the civil society will come again to engulf the
state". This conclusion which he came to during the period of the Paris
Commune (France 1871) was entirely ignored by the majority of his followers
and especially the founder of "real socialism".
53 Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU with
responsibility for ideology during the term of Gorbachev.
54 St. Gill and D. Law. The Global political economy, p. 151.
55 UNCTAD World Investment Report. 1993.
56 The world in 1996. L., 1995, p. 113.
57 Based on statistics by M.Porter. The Competitive Advantage. N.Y.,
1990
58 Jacques Atalie. The Millenium. Sofia. P. 52.
59 The Federal Reserve system fulfils the role of the central bank in
the USA. It is currently under the directorship of A.Greenspan.
60 Based on "The Economist" World in Figures, L.1994.
61 Based on the "The Economist","World in Figures" L.1994.
62 Inc. Middle East.
63 Republics of the Former Soviet Union.
64 The military balance 1994--5. UK;Brassey.
65 Jacques Atalie. The Millenium. S., 1992, page 15.
??
THE FOURTH CIVILISATION
ALEXANDER TOMOV
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